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Abstract 
Despite the long-standing tradition in the mainstream media, policy and academic scholarship 
on China's role in investing and providing development finance to Africa, the majority of 
narratives assume China dominates the decision-making processes around the engagement. 
Drawing on qualitative case study rooted in an extensive field based research, I challenge 
such assertions with contextual reference to Ethiopia-China engagement in wind energy 
infrastructure financing and development. Situated in the authoritarian developmental state 
praxis and African agency analytical framework, I first examine the drivers and motivations 
that contributed to both Ethiopian and Chinese actors to finance and develop the Adama wind 
farms. Second, I explore engagement modalities and negotiation processes between 
Ethiopian and Chinese stakeholders along the wind farms projects’ lifecycles. Third and finally, 
I examine the engagement outcomes and local development impacts of the wind farms.  
The study found that, firstly, there were a plethora of drivers and motivations for both Ethiopian 
government and Chinese state and semi-state actors to finance and develop the wind farms. 
The choice by the Ethiopian government to seek financing from China and consequently 
award the contracts to Chinese enterprises to develop the two wind farms was driven by a 
bricolage of economic and political factors. Second, Ethiopia’s domestic socio-economic and 
political makeup conditioned the Chinese interactions with the Ethiopians to ensure that the 
Ethiopian government retained control, influence and direction of the engagement from 
brokering to commissioning of the wind farms. That said, in some cases, the Chinese were 
allowed to shape the processes where the Ethiopian government had limited control and local 
capacity. Third and finally, local outcomes and development impacts of the two wind farms 
are complex and are intertwined across multiple actors. On one hand, the wind farms are new 
frontiers for enabling environment-friendly electricity generation to sustainably power industrial 
growth and ensure modern energy access for all, and on the other hand, are seen as symbols 
of dispossession and disruption of communities’ livelihood capabilities. Such complexity 
underscores the contested and disruptive nature of development. Importantly, the 
engagement outcomes and local development impacts of the Adama wind farms were 
dependent on Ethiopia’s regulatory and governance structure, and to a lesser extent the 
conditioning effects of Chinese transnational capital features. This thesis’ findings, therefore, 
help to develop a new reading and better understanding on politics of development in Ethiopia 
and the role of African agency in shaping engagement outcomes with external actors.    
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
  
1.0 Introduction  
On the 1st of June 2017, I woke up early on a chilly Monday morning, packed my rucksack, 
and together with my driver and research assistant, we left for Adama town. Driving 
southwards from Goro toward the Addis-Adama Expressway, I couldn’t help but notice the 
hive of construction activity along the way - it seemed like a giant construction site. My local 
driver and research assistant were eager to explain: “this is our government effort, they want 
to fight poverty, they are building condominium houses and industrial parks so that people can 
get houses, then get jobs and get a good life”. The optimism is understandable, but as we 
edged toward the Addis-Adama Expressway, the six lanes on both sides running for almost 
85 kilometres, the Chinese presence is obvious. The expressway funded and built by the 
Chinese in collaboration with the government of Ethiopia heralds a new era in Ethiopia - one 
in which China seem indispensable.  
After 60 minutes, we approached Adama, the windy town located right at the throat of the 
great east Africa rift valley. Adama is of economic value to the country because it is the 
processing hub of goods traded via Djibouti. It is also of political significance to the Oromia 
regional state having been the capital before relocation to Addis Ababa. Around 10 kilometres 
from the Adama tollgate, I noticed in the distance, large, dazzling and spinning three-bladed 
wind turbines. Later, on visiting the villages near these turbines, I met a local priest. Legend 
has it that “these wind turbines were long foretold that they were going to be built” remarked 
the elderly priest from Bubisa Kusaye, one of the Kebeles where the wind farms are located. 
He went on to say: 
“Long time ago, my ancestors and forefathers who lived on top of that mountain, once 
said to me in the future white birds will fly over this land. They will make this place 
beautiful, and they will be like angels flying over the land” (Interview 20171101140944 
translated from Afaan Oromo to English).      
Electricity infrastructure is critical for socio-economic structural transformation, but, according 
to the World Bank (2018) more than 70% of Ethiopia’s 102 million people have no access to 
electricity. In addition to contributing to economic growth by powering industries and reducing 
poverty, access to electricity enriches “the lives of the beneficiaries” of electricity services 
(Bacon & Kojima, 2016, p. 4). To address the electricity access challenge, in 2009, Ethiopia 
Electric Power Corporation (EEPCo) – subsequently split into the Ethiopia Electric Power 
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(EEP) and Ethiopia Electric Utility (EEU)1 - awarded HydroChina Corporation2 and China Geo-
Engineering Corporation Overseas Construction Group (CGCOC) an engineering 
procurement and construction (EPC3) contract plus financing in which the Chinese Export and 
Import Bank (C-EXIM) provided 85% of the finance with the remainder being covered by the 
Ethiopian government. The contract was initially for Adama 1 wind farm. In 2012, EEPCo 
awarded another contract to the same Chinese contractor on a similar contractual scheme as 
Adama 1, to construct a bigger wind farm in the same location but on a different site. 
Construction of Adama 1 began in 2011 and was completed in 2012 adding 51 megawatts 
(MW) to the national grid. Construction of Adama 2 began in 2013 and was completed in 2015 
adding 153 MW to the national grid. In 2015, Adama 2 met more than 20% of Addis Ababa’s 
total demand (PowerChina, 2016a). The two wind farms were described by both the Ethiopian 
and Chinese stakeholders as the truest reflection of friendship between the two countries—
and at the 2015 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Johannesburg, were 
used as examples of Africa-China cooperation in clean energy development (PowerChina, 
2016a). For HydroChina, CGCOC and the Chinese government, the wind farms are their most 
successful overseas projects and specifically Adama 2 is the largest international EPC wind 
power project for Chinese corporations (PowerChina, 2016a). They are the first projects of 
their kind in Africa and use a combination of Ethiopian regulatory guidelines and Chinese 
standards and technology.  
While the two projects are the first Chinese wind energy projects in Africa, they are embedded 
in bifurcated narratives which argue that China, on the one hand, is a good stakeholder, 
positively shaping Africa’s development trajectories through infrastructure, skills and 
technology transfer necessary for Africa’s economic and structural transformation (see 
Brautigam & Tang, 2013; Brautigam, Xiaoyang, Xia, & Harvard, 2018; Davies, 2007; Dollar, 
2016; Mohan, Lampert, Tan-Mullins, & Chang, 2014; Zheng, 2014). On the other hand, some 
critics argue that China is part and parcel of the global configurations of capitalism and, as 
such, its engagement4 with Africa is ‘bad’ as it extends neo-colonial5 tendencies  to the 
detriment of Africa’s underdevelopment (see Bond & Garcia, 2015; Economy & Monaghan, 
2006; Grammaticas, 2012; Michel, 2009; Patey, 2018). While there is an element of truth in 
these dichotomous views, Africa is reduced to being ‘acted upon’ and ‘impacted on’ by the 
                                                          
1EEPCo was split in 2013 to EEP and EEU. EEP is responsible for generation, transmission and system operation, and EEU 
specialises on electricity distribution and sales.  
2From onwards referred to as HydroChina.  
3 For definition and explanation, see chapter 6 
4 Defined as any form of political, economic, social or cultural interaction between Africans and Chinese state, quasi-state, private, 
or individual actors—as representatives of their governments or in their personal capacities.   
5See French, Howard. 2014. Into Africa China’s Wild Rush http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/opinion/into-africa-chinas-wild-
rush.html; and Clinton warns against “new colonialism” in Africa. June 11, 2011 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-clinton-africa-
idUSTRE75A0RI20110611 
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Chinese (see Hanauer & Morris, 2014; Marfaing & Thiel, 2013; Park, Lampert, & Robertson, 
2016). Africa is presented as less assertive, lacking negotiating capacity and autonomy when 
engaging with China (see Carmody & Owusu, 2007; Crabtree, 2018; Soulé-Kohndou, 2019b).  
In this thesis I challenge these oppositional discourses by applying the analytical framework 
of African agency—aimed explicitly at ‘bringing in’ Africa in Africa-China scholarly debates. I 
define African agency6 as the ability or capacity of African formal/informal actors whether 
collectively (as states/institutions) or individually, to act consciously and sometimes 
unconsciously to achieve (un)intended objectives out of a combination of free will and choice. 
Furthermore, this choice and free will lies in deciding “between potential courses […] subject 
to the [African] actor’s conscious deliberation” (Hay, 2004, pp. 94-95 cited in Hudson & 
Leftwich, 2014, p. 73).  
Research on African agency in the context of Africa-China engagements is scanty but 
increasing (Carmody & Kragelund, 2016; Corkin, 2013; Gadzala, 2015a; Lampert & Mohan, 
2015; Mohan & Lampert, 2013; Phillips, 2018; Procopio, 2019; Soulé-Kohndou, 2016, 2019b). 
For example, some studies have attempted to re-insert (Mohan & Lampert, 2013), make space 
for (Lampert & Mohan, 2015) and uncover (Corkin, 2013) African agency in Africa-China 
engagements. Others have argued that Africans have exercised agency when interacting with 
the Chinese, but only in brokering the engagement and not changing the structural aspects of 
the relations (Carmody & Kragelund, 2016; Phillips, 2018). Although these studies recognise 
that Africans are not passive actors in their engagements with China and the architecture of 
international relations (Brown & Harman, 2013; Odoom & Andrews, 2017), they do not provide 
an adequate and disaggregated analysis of the drivers and motivations, engagement 
modalities and negotiation processes of the actors involved in these interactions. At the same 
time, far less research has been conducted which provides an analysis of how state-society 
relations influence and shape the operationalisation of African agency by African actors.  
This thesis seeks to contribute to this body of literature on Africa-China engagements by 
contextualising African agency through provision of empirically grounded observations on the 
drivers, motivations, engagement modalities, negotiation processes, outcomes and 
development implications of Ethiopian interactions with the Chinese actors in the financing 
and development of Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind energy infrastructure. Particularly, my thesis 
focuses on accounting for the Ethiopian actors’ exercise of agency when interacting with the 
Chinese in these two wind farms. I argue that, African agency should be understood as 
contextual and cannot be generalizable across space and time. African actors’ (regional 
                                                          
6 For detailed explanation and definition see chapter 2.  
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bodies, state, civil society and individuals) exercise of agency when interacting with the 
Chinese therefore is relational.  
This chapter serves to introduce the thesis and is arranged as follows. Section 1.2 and 1.3 
takes stock of literature on Africa-China studies and global wind energy sector dynamics and 
the role of China. Section 1.4 reviews literature on African agency in the context of Africa-
China relations leading to the presentation of the research questions in section 1.5. Section 
1.6 provides the contributions of the study while section 1.7 clarifies the focus of the study. 
The final section provides the structure of the thesis.    
1.1 Taking stock of Africa-China relations  
Research on Africa-China relations has mainly focused on two strands. The first explores the 
drivers and motivations of China’s engagement with Africa be it in trade, aid, investment or 
politics (see Kaplinsky & Messner, 2008, Chemingui & Bchir, 2010; Elu & Price, 2010; Wang, 
2010; Anshan, 2006; Hanauer & Morris, 2014). Most of these studies conclude that China is 
driving the engagements. Research in this strand has shown that drivers and motivations for 
increased Chinese engagement with African countries vary with the sector and country 
involved (Chen, Dollar, & Tang, 2018) and conclude that the search for markets for Chinese 
goods and services remains one of the underlying drivers of engagement in Africa (Pigato & 
Tang, 2015). For some studies (Hu, 2015; Thrall, 2015) China seeks to diplomatically and 
internationally isolate Taiwan (Lee & Sung, 2015) which it considers a runaway province 
(French, 1994) and China uses aid, trade, and investment to influence African countries not 
to have relations with Taiwan. In Africa, only Eswatini still maintains diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan as of 2019. Some studies argue that China’s emerging role in international relations 
comes with responsibilities and pressure that require international alliances (Halper, 2010) so 
that trade, aid and investment are often used as sticks and carrots for lobbying purposes. This 
could partly explain the significance of FOCAC, United Nations (UN), Group of 77 (G77)+ 
China, Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) and other platforms as channels 
of yielding international support (see Pigato & Tang, 2015; Thrall, 2015). Some studies also 
suggest that the ‘Go Out policy’ and more recently the Belt and Road Initiative (Scobell et al., 
2018) are major drivers of China-Africa engagements (Chen et al., 2018).  
However, these studies fail to account for how Africans drive the engagements, rather 
presuppose that China drives the engagement. At the same time, little or no research has 
been done to unpack the drivers and motivations of the Chinese enterprises, whether state or 
semi-state owned, in engaging with Ethiopia specifically in the context of wind energy 
infrastructure financing and development. Although Shen and Power (2017) have attempted 
to understand the push and pull factors for the Chinese state and ‘quasi’-state enterprises’ 
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engagements in South Africa’s solar and wind energy sector, the study reaffirms the Chinese 
as the drivers. This undermines the significance of the South African Renewable Energy 
Independent Power Producer Programme (REIPPP) which created pull factors for the 
Chinese. Overall, the results on the drivers and motivations for Chinese engagement with 
African countries highlight the need for further research in the context of the wind energy 
sector. Currently, it is unclear what drives the Chinese involvement in Africa’s wind energy. As 
noted, “China’s involvement in the continent’s utility-scale renewable energy sector is a 
relatively recent development and is thus an area that warrants further research” (Baker & 
Shen, 2017, p. 4). Besides, “China’s increasing engagement in the promotion of renewable 
energy projects in Africa seems to have gone almost unnoticed […]. China’s engagement with 
renewable energy technologies on the continent is scarce” (Shen & Power, 2017, p. 679). This 
thesis endeavours to fill the gaps in the literature by empirically showing how Ethiopian drivers 
and motivations contributed to Chinese involvement in the two projects.  
The second strand of literature explores the impacts of Chinese engagement with Africa. 
Some studies suggest that China negatively impacts on Africa especially within the political 
and governance aspects. For example, Mohan (2015a, p. 1) argues that the “inter-elite 
brokerage […] tends to bypass domestic channels of accountability and so undermines good 
governance”. Other studies posit that China supports rogue states such as Zimbabwe and 
Sudan (Blignaut, 2007; Naim, 2009; Yin & Vaschetto, 2011). Some view China as a neo-
colonialist in Africa because of its poor record on environment standards, and above all, 
dumping of low-value products in Africa (Edwards & Jenkins, 2013; Halper, 2010; Haugen, 
2011) which negatively impact Africa’s manufacturing capabilities. 
While China is purported to be negatively impacting on Africa’s development, some studies 
argue the opposite. For example, Davies (2007), Wu and Cheng (2010) and Yin and Vaschetto 
(2011) posit that China’s ‘miracle’ of taking more than 500 million people out of poverty serves 
as a good starting point for cooperation and experience sharing between China and Africa in 
poverty reduction. For Mohan and Power (2010, p. 462), “Chinese leaders and strategists 
believe that China's historical experience and vision of economic development resonates 
powerfully with African counterparts”. To put things into perspective, research shows that the 
Chinese have been involved in financing infrastructure projects in 53 of the 54 countries in 
Africa and between 2000 and 2017 China extended more than $143 billion in loans to the 
region (China Africa Research Initiative, 2018b). In 2018, during the FOCAC summit in Beijing, 
President Xi Jinping pledged $60 billion in commercial loans to Africa7. Because of this loan 
                                                          
7 US$15 billion (grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans), US$20 billion of credit lines, US$10 billion (special fund for 
development financing), US$5 billion special fund for financing imports from Africa. US$10 billion of investment by Chinese 
companies in Africa in the next three years.  See http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-09/03/c_137441990.htm  
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provision, China is now the largest bilateral creditor to sub-Saharan Africa and as of 2014 it 
accounted for 14 per cent of the region’s total debt stock8 (Chen & Nord, 2018). In terms of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), China’s inflows to Africa remain very low and in 2015 
accounted for just over 5 per cent of the total FDI inflows in the region. Although two-way trade 
between Africa and China remains skewed in favour of China, it reached more than $200 
billion by the end of 2014 (Ibid). As of 2017, a McKinsey report shows that more than 10,000 
Chinese owned firms are in operation in Africa of which more than 90 per cent are privately 
owned (Sun, Jayaram, & Kassiri, 2017a). The majority of these firms are in the manufacturing 
sector while state-owned enterprises tend to dominate the construction sector. These 
engagements, as a result, have led to skills development, technology accumulation, job 
creation, low-cost capital for infrastructure development and above all transfer of management 
and entrepreneurial skills necessary for Africa’s structural and economic transformation 
(Schneidman & Wiegert, 2018).  
Overall, these studies (Wu & Cheng, 2010; Yin & Vaschetto, 2011) postulate that China-Africa 
relations contribute to the generation of revenues, improve infrastructure development which 
is important for Africa’s growth and development. It is not surprising that China cancelled 168 
debts of 33 African countries in the 2009 FOCAC thereby easing African governments’ 
indebtedness (Schiere, 2010). Shinn (2007) further argues that China’s engagement with 
Africa differs significantly from traditional donors who appear to condition aid/development 
finance. Although cases differ, Shinn (2007) suggests that China provides 
loans/aid/development finance at lower interest rates and with repayment plans different from 
those of the Global North. Kaplinsky and Morris (2009, p. 561) conclude that “the costs of 
these large infrastructural projects are 20–30 per cent lower than those of northern, South 
African and Brazilian competitors”.  
These competing views on Chinese impacts in Africa highlight several gaps. First, there is a 
lack of disaggregated data on Chinese engagement with African countries. This leads to 
generalisation of findings where one ‘bad’ case is used to represent the totality of Chinese 
engagement in Africa. Second, the rise of China is seen by Western stakeholders as a 
challenge to Euro-America spheres of influence in Africa (Reuters, 2011). This creates room 
for Western journalists to demonise Chinese engagement in Africa, whereby the West is seen 
to hold higher moral and ethical standards of knowing what is best for Africa. However, little is 
known about how domestic socio-economic and political governance structures condition the 
practices of Chinese actors in their engagements with Africans, specifically in the context of 
infrastructure development (Makundi, Huyse, & Develtere, 2017). My intention is to provide a 
                                                          
8 Excluding South Africa 
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critical analysis of the Ethiopian authoritarian developmental state’s regulatory and 
governance structures in mediating the outcomes and development impacts of Chinese 
involvement in the financing and development of Adama wind farms. Such an attempt shifts 
the focus of attention from the Chinese to the host country’s political environment.   
1.2 Taking stock: China’s role in the global wind energy sector 
Wind energy generation has seen remarkable growth. Estimates from Global Wind Energy 
Council (GWEC) show that the sector will constitute “20% of global electricity by 2030 creating 
2.4 million new jobs and reducing carbon dioxide emissions by more than 3.3 billion tonnes 
per year and attract annual investment of about €200 billion” (2016a, p. 1). By the end of 2017, 
China’s cumulative installed wind energy capacity was over 188,392 MW accounting for 35% 
of the global installed capacity of 539,123 MW. In 2017 alone, China installed 19,660 MW 
which was about 37% of the 52,492 MW global installations that year (GWEC, 2018). In 2019, 
8 of the world’s top 15 wind turbine equipment manufacturers are based in China9. Mingyang 
and Goldwind are ranked number one suppliers in medium speed geared drive and direct 
drive turbine technologies respectively (GWEC, 2019). In 2014, the top 10 global 
manufacturers of wind turbines with the largest installation market share included three 
Chinese companies, namely Goldwind, United Power and Mingyang (Smead, 2014). While 
the Chinese enterprises in the wind energy sector are on the rise globally, much of their market 
installation share has been domestic. Shen and Power (2017) suggest that the Chinese 
domestic market has reached saturation point, creating fierce competition, unintentionally 
forcing companies to ‘Go Out’. According to the Chinese Renewable Energy Industrial 
Association (CREIA, 2014), Chinese enterprises exported wind turbine equipment to more 
than 27 countries between 2007 and 2013 (see table 1.1).    
Table 1. 1 Chinese global wind energy installations by 2014 
 
Source: (CREIA, 2014) 
                                                          
9 Vestas, Goldwind, Siemens Gamesa, GE Renewable, Envision, Enercon, Mingyang, Nordex Acciona, United Power, Sewind, 
Suzlon, Senvion, Windey, CSIC Haizhuang, and XEMC in their sequential order.  
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Existing literature on China’s rise and impact in the global wind energy sector can be classified 
into two strands. The first strand focuses on the domestic explanations of China’s development 
of the wind energy sector (Tan, Zhao, Polycarp, & Bai, 2013). Numerous studies have paid 
attention to the role of the Chinese central state regulatory mechanisms in creating a 
favourable environment for the growth of wind energy (Lewis, 2013; Zeng, Li, & Zhou, 2013). 
In this regard, the Chinese central government planning and policy directions which aimed at 
self-sustenance in renewable electricity generation is identified as the primary driver  of this 
growth (Li, Hubacek, & Siu, 2012; Zhang, Andrews-Speed, & Zhao, 2013). Some studies also 
suggest that foreign stakeholders, in particular Denmark and Germany, assisted China to 
develop the wind energy sector (Lema, Berger, & Schmitz, 2013; Netherlands Economic 
Network in China, 2014).  
The second category of research focuses on the impact of the Chinese role in the global wind 
energy sector. Lema, Berger and Schmitz (2013) suggest that China has developed five 
corridors of influence in the wind energy sector: ‘market’, ‘production’, ‘coordination’, 
‘financing’ and ‘innovation’. These corridors of influence have global implications in the sector. 
Research also shows that the Chinese enterprises in the United States of America (USA), 
Germany, Australia and Canada have revolutionised the generation of electricity from wind; 
manufacturing of wind energy technology; research and development; sales, marketing and 
support; electricity distribution; EPC contracting, and investment (Conrad & Meissner, 2011; 
CREIA, 2014; Lema et al., 2013; Lewis, 2013; Mathews, Tan, & O’’Faircheallaigh, 2015; 
Ydersbond & Korsnes, 2016; Zeng et al., 2013).  
China’s involvement in Africa’s wind energy sector remains low. While data is murky, it is 
generally agreed that China undertakes joint venture projects in wind energy infrastructure 
financing, EPC, and in some instances operations and maintenance services and a very 
minimal role in setting up manufacturing firms of wind energy technologies (Baker & Shen, 
2017; IEA, 2016; Power et al., 2016). Although China’s presence in Africa’s wind energy sector 
is increasing, motivations for China’s involvement remain unknown. To date, China has been 
involved in Ethiopia and recently in South Africa— 244.5 MW De Aar wind farm built by 
Longyuan Power Group Corporation. In South Africa, Shen and Power (2017) postulate that 
China’s involvement relates to the need for market entry, wherein South Africa’s domestic 
policy and economic profitability of investing in the sector were the main motivations. Likewise, 
Power et al (2016) share similar conclusions with a stronger emphasis on the Chinese ‘Going 
Abroad’ policy, and South Africa’s REIPPP as drivers of Chinese firms’ entry in South Africa’s 
market. In some studies, China’s involvement in Africa’s wind energy sector has been linked 
to the need for natural resources, where China finances wind energy infrastructure 
development and in turn, the host government repays the loan using natural resources—
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known as the ‘infrastructure for resources model’ (Corkin, 2013; IEA, 2016). However, no 
evidence exists to back this claim in the context of wind energy development in the continent. 
For Conrad, Fernandez and Houshyani (2011) China’s involvement in Africa’s renewable 
energy sector is driven by reputational and climate change motives, with Culp (2016) arguing 
that reputation is vital for China given its track record of pollution and environmental 
degradation. Clean energy investments, whether in China or Africa, contribute to reputational 
re-branding where Beijing would be seen to be an environmentally conscious and responsible 
stakeholder in the fight against climate change (Newell, Power, & Bulkeley, 2016).    
So far, however, there has been little research on the involvement and impacts of Chinese 
enterprises in Ethiopia’s wind energy sector. A recent study by Chen (2016) comparatively 
assessed the sustainable development impacts of the Chinese constructed Adama and 
French constructed Ashegoda wind farms. Her research concluded that there is no huge 
difference in the sustainability impacts of Chinese and French constructed wind farms. Her 
major findings were on skills and technology transfer and employment creation. A second 
study has also comparatively assessed the technology transfer between Adama and 
Ashegoda wind farms framed with the North-South and South-South skills and technology 
transfer framework (Chen, 2018). These two studies provide a foundation for my research but 
neither scratched below the surface to unearth the drivers and motivations, engagement 
modalities and negotiation processes and outcomes of Chinese investment in Ethiopia’s wind 
energy. Again, the two studies do not examine the Ethiopian actors’ agency in influencing and 
conditioning the engagement patterns and dynamics. Development of wind energy in Ethiopia 
should be researched from an Ethiopian perspective where the government is targeting cuts 
in carbon dioxide emissions by 64% by 2030 and to install more than 5000 MW from wind by 
2020 (Interview 20170609111018). This indicates a need for research to unearth the 
interaction dynamics between Ethiopian and Chinese stakeholders.   
1.3 Towards inclusivity? Inserting the African agency in Africa-China engagements 
Apart from the two strands of literature discussed in section 1.2 a new body of literature is 
attempting to shift the focus from China to looking at their relations from an African 
perspective. This literature suggests that the impact of China’s engagement with Africa is 
directly attributed to African countries’ domestic legal frameworks and institutional capacities 
which negatively or positively shape relations with China (Gadzala, 2015a). Rather than 
extending the blame to China, the literature calls for the insertion of African agency in 
discourses around China-Africa relations (Corkin, 2013; Lampert & Mohan, 2015; Phillips, 
2018; Procopio, 2019; Soulé-Kohndou, 2019a), which is an area where this study seeks to 
contribute. Firstly, any application of African agency in its engagement with China helps one 
to go “beyond the tired tropes of an Africa that is victimised, chaotic, violent and poor” (Brown 
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& Harman, 2013, p. 2). These ‘tired tropes’ have by and large peripheralised Africa in which 
China is seen to be directing the pace, nature and level of engagement. Such tired tropes 
emanate in part from mainstream media, academia and think tanks that presuppose Africa as 
a “pliant third world client of either West or (now) East” (Gadzala, 2013, p. 1). Secondly, the 
changing economic and demographic variables where Africa is an actor contributing to the 
global production of knowledge and circulation of capital, allows African socio-political and 
economic actors to claim their space in global configurations of power10. This implicitly brings 
to the fore the actions, choices, manoeuvres, sacrifices, diplomacies, and strategies 
undertaken by these African actors—thereby painting possibilities of an Africa able to carve 
out its space in tight corners. Thirdly, as Brown and Harman (2013) argue, it also allows for a 
re-construction of international relations from a bottom-up approach in which the focus 
emanates from a small, probably weak country, which is nonetheless able to influence global 
politics. 
There is emerging literature on African agency in Africa-China engagements and this literature 
has conceptualised African agency from two different but interrelated perspectives: African 
non-state actors’ agency and African state actors’ agency. The first perspective underscores 
agency exercised by African non-state actors’ when engaging the Chinese directly or as 
responses to how their respective governments engage China. Few but increasing studies 
shows how African actors beyond the state influence engagement patterns with the Chinese. 
For example, Lampert and Mohan’s (2015) ethnographic research in Nigeria and Ghana is 
instructive. It shows that Nigerian and Ghanaian traders exercise agency in ways that ensure 
they retain value and control of the interactions with the Chinese across various scales and 
times. In another study on Ghana-China and Nigeria-China entrepreneurs relations, Mohan 
and Lampert (2013) shows that Nigerian and Ghanaian actors were able to exercise agency 
using their social, political and patronage networks to shape their interactions with the Chinese 
in the businesses. In these case studies, the Chinese were forced to adapt to African 
demands, showing Chinese flexibility. Carmody and Taylor (2010) terms this flexigemony. 
However, Carmody and Taylor’s (2010) take on Chinese adaptability to African contexts, 
especially in resource-rich Zambia and Sudan cases, underscores the power asymmetry 
between China and Africa where the Chinese have the power to adapt, demonstrating a 
hegemonial argument. This watered-down African innovative ways of influencing their 
interactions with the Chinese. Beyond the flexigemony perspective, Taylor’s (2015) work in 
Nigeria presents an interesting take of African agency seen through the lenses of Nigeria-
                                                          
10 Investment and market forces are increasingly moving towards Africa as the next frontier market—as seen by some Chinese 
private companies establishing factories in Ethiopia and other African countries. Also, Africa has more than 1.2 billion people who 
are young and economically active which creates large pool of labour supply at comparatively lower value than in some parts of 
the world. This is accompanied by low cost factors of production. Finally, transnational capital is interested in exploiting existing 
trade agreements between African countries and USA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) and Europe (Everything But Arms). 
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China relations. He proposes ‘counter-agency’ exercised by non-state actors such as 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) and Boko Haram, to force the 
Nigerian government to ensure that proceeds of natural resources are of benefit to ordinary 
citizens. For Taylor, militancy is a form of agency, which somehow shapes and influence how 
the Chinese engage the Nigerian government especially in the oil sector.  
The second perspective has been conceptualised based on how African state actors exercise 
agency when engaging the Chinese. A recent study by Soule-Kohndou (2019a) examines the 
bureaucratic agency and power asymmetries in Benin-China infrastructure development. Her 
study concluded that civil servants and the executive arm of the state influenced Benin-China 
engagement patterns before, during and after contract negotiations. Although this study is 
helpful as it lay the foundation for conceptualising African agency in my case studies, it focuses 
only on the negotiation aspect paying little attention on brokering, implementation and 
management of the infrastructure deals. Aimed specifically at understanding the nature and 
limits of Ghanaian state agency in its bilateral and multilateral relations since oil discovery in 
2007, Phillips’ (2018) research shows the following. Ghanaian state actors have been able to 
exercise agency on aspects of brokering relations with the Chinese, Americans and traditional 
development banks, but not on transforming the structural basis of the engagements. This 
finding is similar to Carmody and Kragelund’s (2016) work on Zambia-China and Angola-China 
engagements where Zambians exercised limited agency, and Angolans exercised constrained 
agency. Phillips (2018) and, Carmody and Kragelund’s (2016) work show the influence of 
resources (oil and copper) in African countries exercise of agency, however, the precarious 
demand-supply dynamics of resources of the global markets and pricing mechanisms makes 
African countries to exercise limited and temporal agency, albeit in tight corner.  
Another study by Procopio (2019) argues that Kenyans exercise agency when interacting with 
the Chinese in the context of health, trade and education sectors. She argues that African 
agency should be about control and ownership of the governance process of the sectors in 
which Africans interact with the Chinese. An edited volume by Gadzala (2015a) explores 
African agency of ‘strong states’ such as Ethiopia and ‘weak states’ such as Angola11 when 
they engage with Chinese. In the Angolan case study, Corkin (2013, 2015) argues that the 
Angolan state created institutional enclaves which were accountable to the political elites. For 
Power (2012, p. 998) Angola’s power is concentrated with the Futungo, a group of 
“technocrats and advisors centred on the President”. Futungo was created to specifically 
manage Chinese investment in Angola in order to maintain the Angolan ruling elite’s political 
power and legitimacy. Although Chinese investments are contributing to infrastructure 
                                                          
11 Strong states are countries with strong domestic political control and execution of power. Weak states lack legitimacy and their 
existence is threatened by domestic or external forces (Gadzala, 2015: xx-xxi).  
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development in Angola, elites benefit the most in comparison to ordinary citizens. Corkin’s 
(2015) conception of African agency in the Angolan case resonates well with Ethiopia’s 
engagement patterns with China, although Ethiopia does not have oil which acts as a lever. 
Ethiopia maintains a strong political influence in the domestic arena through the ruling Tigray 
People's Liberation Front (TPLF)-Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) Council of Ministers. This elite group is in charge of Ethiopia and controls every 
aspect whether foreign or domestic as demonstrated by Alemu and Scoones (2013) research 
on Ethiopia-China and Ethiopia-Brazil engagement in agriculture and rural development. This 
is because the Ethiopian state “takes a strategic approach […] focusing on particular sectors, 
and cultivating relationships on multiple levels, from a focus on technical exchange and 
technology transfer to administrative and reform to political relations” (Alemu & Scoones, 
2013, p. 99). Gadzala’s (2015b) research in Ethiopia-China engagement in 
telecommunications infrastructure12, agriculture and defence13 sectors, shows that TPLF-
EPRDF is using Chinese investments as mediums to maintain regime stability and political 
relevance. However, of interest, in this case, is how Ethiopia, especially under Meles Zenawi 
pushed for developmental state ideology in which “economic and developmental 
considerations are to support ideology” (Gadzala, 2015b, pp. 101–102).  
I agree with Gadzala’s (2015b) view especially given Ethiopia’s political organisation and state 
formation history, but, one should not overrule the strategic and at times pragmatic 
approaches that the Ethiopian government uses in its domestic and foreign policy 
engagements. While ideology remains central, Chinese motivations for engagement with 
African governments increasingly incline towards commercial reasons (Davies, 2015), and 
likewise, the Ethiopian elites are also shifting towards economic determinants of engagement. 
As propounded by Lim Songtian, China’s Director General of the Department of African Affairs 
of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs:   
“the engine to drive cooperation between China and Africa has been changed, the 
structure has been changed, the situation has been changed and of course the 
outcome has been changed […] This is now the cooperation driven by the market, not 
by the government, so whoever gets themselves ready, you benefit first and benefit 
more” (cited in Chikova, 2016, p. 1).   
Existing studies on African agency in Africa-China relations provide an essential departure 
point, however they do not provide an adequate and disaggregated analysis of the drivers and 
motivations, engagement modalities and negotiation processes of the actors involved in these 
                                                          
12 Expansion of Ethiopia’s telecommunication system by Zhongxing telecommunication (ZTE).  
13 Nori-La—Ethiopian and Chinese government military joint venture company.   
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interactions. At the same time, far less research has been conducted which analyse how state-
society relations influence and shape the operationalisation of agency by African actors. It is 
crucial that when examining African agency in the context of Africa-China relations, one needs 
to consider the variations and the unique design of these interactions. The variations can be 
caused by two things: (i) differences in the systems of governance in the selected case 
countries and (ii) differences in sectorial specificities (see table 1.2). Therefore, what previous 
studies established was fixed to those socio-cultural settings, arrived at by using particular 
theoretical and methodological approaches which were embedded in the transactional 
contexts where the interactions occur.  
Table 1. 2 Selected literature variations and sectorial specificities  
Author Year Country  Case study  
Procopio 2019 Kenya Education; Health and Trade  
Phillips 2018 Ghana Oil  
Soule-Kohndou 2019;2016 Benin Road; Administrative building 
Corkin 2015; 2013 Angola Oil; infrastructure  
Mohan and Lampert 2015 Angola; Nigeria; 
Ghana 
Oil; small-medium 
enterprises 
Lampert and Mohan 2013 Ghana’ Nigeria  Traders  
Gadzala 2015 Ethiopia ICT; Defence; Agriculture 
Alemu and Scoones 2013 Ethiopia Agriculture 
 
That said, specifically, in the context of Ethiopia-China relations, studies that utilise an African 
agency dimension are scarce. Yet, Ethiopia has been seen to be more active in conditioning 
its engagements with China (Brautigam, 2011). Add to this scarcity, no studies have applied 
the African agency framework to understand Ethiopia-China engagement in the financing and 
development of wind energy infrastructure. While I develop further the brokering of relations 
element presented in Philips (2018) and Carmody and Kragelund’s (2016) work, I empirically 
account for the drivers and motivations, the negotiation processes and engagement 
modalities, the outcomes and development implications of these infrastructures, which has so 
far remained under the academic radar. For example, who is involved in what, where do the 
engagement occur, what drives these engagements, what is the structure of the deals and 
how does domestic socio-economic and political conditions of African countries influence the 
engagement outcomes and development outcomes of the interactions. In particular, Gadzala 
(2015b) and Alemu and Scoones’ (2013) studies do not show the disaggregated analysis of 
the negotiation processes, modalities of engagement, actors, and bureaucracies involved—
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except for a few cases where references have been made to ‘the state’. However, what and 
who is ‘the state’ here? One possibility for this could be the secrecy around the negotiation 
process, suggestive of the black boxes14 (Zhang, Gu, & Chen, 2015).   
1.4 The research questions  
Given the missing dimension of African agency in Ethiopia-China engagement in the financing 
and development of Adama wind farms, the following research question is proposed:  
▪ How did the Ethiopian actors exercise agency when interacting with the Chinese in the 
case of Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind energy infrastructure financing and development?  
To dissect this question, three sub-questions are formulated:  
1. What were the drivers and motivations which contributed to Ethiopian and Chinese 
actors financing and developing Adama 1 and Adama 2? 
2. What were the processes and modalities of engagement and how did the Ethiopian 
government broker and negotiate with China? 
3. What are the engagement outcomes and local development implications of the two 
wind farms, and to what extent did the host country’s socio-political and economic 
variables determine these outcomes?  
1.5 Contributions of the study  
This study makes three interrelated contributions. The first contribution is the documentation 
of evidence of an evolving relationship between Africa and China in the financing and 
development of wind energy infrastructure. This study responds to calls for the availability of 
data on Chinese infrastructure financing and development terms and conditions with African 
countries. It also helps in disaggregating the actors—be it Ethiopian or Chinese, involved in 
these mega-infrastructure projects. This new data also helps one to understand what China is 
doing in the continent, beyond the normalised and exhausted tropes of China’s involvement 
in (il/legal) mining, oil and gas, land grabs, deforestation, propping-up repressive regimes and 
recently debt-trap diplomacy backlash. It further unpacks the role of Ethiopia-China 
engagement as part of South-South Cooperation (Chen, 2018) in the implementation of the 
Sustainable Development Goals—specifically Goal 7 aimed at enhancing and ensuring 
access to clean, modern, affordable and reliable energy for all (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2016).  
The second contribution is the provision of new evidence to the theme of African agency in 
Africa-China studies. Engagement patterns between Africa and China involve a two-way 
process, where in some if not all considerations, African actors are the initiators of these 
                                                          
14 Processes of interactions hidden from the public.    
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relations for various reasons. This study shows that outcomes and local development impacts 
of the two wind farms were by and large mediated by Ethiopia’s domestic state-society 
relations. As such, this study contributes to African development narratives of bringing back 
‘domestic politics’ which has been neglected upon prioritisation of ‘the market’, and yet is an 
important and influential factor in Africa’s development trajectories.  
The final contribution is a methodological and conceptual model to explore the context where 
agency is exercised by Ethiopian actors when interacting with the Chinese. This model traces 
the agential dimensions through the projects’ life cycles where the Ethiopian actors were seen 
to be proactive, reactive and precautionary. This contributes to a theoretical and empirical 
breakthrough to the study of African actors’ agency when engaging the Chinese in mega-
infrastructure development studies. It also contributes to the theoretical debate on 
agency/structure and helps re-affirm the role and influence of Africa in international relations 
and politics. In turn, this contributes to alternative international relations/development/politics 
beyond the dominant North-South interactions.  
1.6 Clarification and focus of the study 
The study applies the African agency framework to explore Ethiopia-China engagement in 
Adama wind farms. It is therefore important to clarify some aspects here. First, speaking15 
about Africa as if it is a homogenous entity may present analytical challenges. Africa is made 
of 54+ countries with more than 2000 spoken languages (Bamgbose, 2011) and over 1.2 
billion people. Bearing this in mind, existing scholarship, public discourses, images, and 
historical events continuously categorise Africa as a whole16 (Harrison, 2010).  It is justified to 
do so (i) given Africa’s almost similar and shared experiences of engagements with external 
actors (Brown & Harman, 2013). Although in the context of China, histories may be relatively 
different, there is a shared belief that the Chinese modus operandi is almost similar across 
Africa, “oil-for-infrastructure contracts, special economic zones, cultural exchanges, ‘win-win’ 
rhetoric, and claims of supposed domestic non-interference” (Gadzala, 2015c, p. xx). (ii) Africa 
is a collective international actor (Zondi, Fraser, Lee, Hoste, & Benn, 2011), with shared 
colonial history17, underdevelopment, affinities of anti-conditional development cooperation 
and at times as Harrison suggests (2010, p. 3) “through assertions of value against imperial 
derogations”.    
                                                          
15 Some have even questioned the ‘speaking for Africa’ register [(see Zegeye, A., & M. Vambe. 2006. “Knowledge Production 
and Publishing in Africa.” Development Southern Africa 23 (3): 333–349; and quoting Jacob Carruthers citing (K. Smith, 2009, p. 
281) argue that “the revival of African thought is a job for Africans only; that is only Africans can do it. If Europeans do it, it would 
only mean that they defeated us again’’ (1996, p. 9)”. I concur with Odoom & Andrews (2017, p. 44) that “arbitrary binaries should 
not constrain knowledge production” in terms of who should speak, write or produce knowledge about/for Africa.  
16 Also, existing representations of relations looks at, for example UK - Africa Trade & Investment Forum; UK-Africa Policy; U.S.A. 
- Africa Summit; Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Japan-Africa Forum etc. which bundle Africa.  
17 Some argue that since Ethiopia was not colonised (but experienced a short period of occupation from 1935 to 1939), does it 
make it un-African see Gadzala (2015c).   
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However, in order to build a strong theoretical argument on African agency in this thesis, I will 
use the adjective ‘African’ “with a full awareness of the fact that its usage constitutes a major 
generalisation” (Smith, 2009, p. 271). As such, the application of African agency framework is 
of empirical reference to Ethiopia’s engagement with the Chinese in the financing and 
development of Adama wind farms. For that matter, it applies to multiple Ethiopian actors 
across different spaces. These could be: (i) inter-state actor—African Union Commission 
(AUC); (ii) state-actor—Ethiopian actors with particular reference to (a) executive branch of 
the state—head of state (President) and government (Prime Minister); Council of Ministers, 
Ministries of Water, Irrigation and Electricity (MOWIE); Finance and Economic 
Cooperation/Development (MOFEC/D); Foreign Affairs (MFA); Environment Forest and 
Climate Change (MEFCC)18; public utilities and enterprises—EEP; EEU; Ethiopia Energy 
Authority (EEA); Ethiopian Investment Commission (EIC); Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics 
Services Enterprise (ESLSE); National Planning Commission (NPC); Federal Parliament;  
Oromia Regional State government and its sub-administrative units; State universities—Addis 
Ababa University Institute of Technology (AAUIT), Mekelle University (MU), and Adama 
Science and Technology University (ASTU); (iii) non-state actors –farmers, TPLF-EPRDF 
ruling party, interests group (Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), civil society 
organisations), workers, affected communities and general members of the public. This allows 
me to go beyond “methodological nationalism—defined as a tendency to see nation-states as 
the natural containers for social, political and economic processes in which there is 
congruence of social, political and economic borders” (Mohan et al., 2014, p. 10).  
Second, it is problematic to speak of ‘China19’ or ‘Chinese’ stakeholders as if they are a 
homogenous, structured, ordered group of actors who conform to the Chinese central 
government demands and policy direction in their engagements with African countries (Yi-
Chong, 2014). The Chinese state cannot be treated as “monolithic, or ‘China Inc.,’ in which 
everything works in harmony. Despite its executive ability, the Chinese state’s functionality is 
riddled with competing state agencies, problems of cross-department coordination, and the 
mismatch between central and local policies” (Su, 2012, p. 504). As suggested, “China is a 
collection of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities with myriad strategic ties to 
African countries” (Shen & Fan, 2014). In particular, Shen and Power’s (2017, p. 678) work 
on China’s engagements with South Africa shows the influence of Chinese non-state and 
quasi-state actors operating without a “harmonious strategy directed by a single monolithic 
state”. They further argue that these non-state and quasi-state actors often pursue “their own 
                                                          
18 Now changed to a Commission and no longer a Ministry as of April 2018 
19 The People’s Republic of China.     
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independent interests and agendas […] in ways often marked by conflict, inconsistency and 
incoherence” (Ibid, p. 678).  
As is the case with the use of ‘Africa/African’, I argue that the use of ‘China/Chinese’ emanates 
from the need to develop a representative theoretical argument. Additionally, the justification 
for using China/Chinese comes from many literary representations, public discourses and 
policy positions where China may imply the state, non-state and semi-state-based-actors. In 
order to develop a holistic empirical argument, the use and application of China/Chinese 
stakeholders/actors in chapters three, five, six, seven and eight, relates to the following actors. 
(i) Chinese state actors— head of state (President) and government (Prime Minister), State 
Council, Ministries of Finance, Foreign Affairs (including the embassy in Addis Ababa), 
Commerce (including the Economic and Commercial Counsellors’ office in Addis Ababa), 
policy bank (C-EXIM). (ii) State-owned enterprise— Sinohydro but exclusively known as 
HydroChina Corporation in the Ethiopian context, and, (iii) quasi-state and private-owned 
enterprise—Xinjiang Goldwind Science and Technology Co. Ltd—hereby referred to as 
Goldwind20;—SANY Group, and CGCOC.  
1.7 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter two contextualises and theorises African 
agency by locating it from two entry points: top-down and bottom-up approaches. A top-down 
approach is defined as the role and impact of external actors on Africa’s international relations 
and internal development, while bottom-up implies the role of African actors in shaping and 
impacting upon the practice of global politics and development trajectories. The chapter 
proceeds with a discussion of the limitation of applying the Weberian definition of the state to 
the African state—which inevitably can be convolved and conflated with the failed state 
narrative. As such, I locate the definition of the African state in the context of broader state-
society relations. The chapter also discusses the rise of emerging economies and how their 
presence revives triangulation and leverage power for African actors. I then discuss the 
conceptual and analytical considerations of African agency looking at the definitional elements 
and how power mediates such aspects. The chapter finishes off by elaborating on the aspects 
of negotiations and modalities of engagement.  
Chapter three discusses the methodological imperatives of study. First, the discussions are 
centred on the epistemological and ontological paradigms of the study. The study adopts 
critical realism and interpretivism as they help explain how I construct and view what 
                                                          
20 According to Clifford (2015). Xinjiang Goldwind: The Profits Are blowing in the Wind, Available at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mclifford/2015/08/12/xinjiang-goldwind-the-profits-are-blowin-in-the-wind/#4f05d8df2283, 
Goldwind is not a state-owned enterprise (SOE), but the company enjoys central government support as well the regional Xinjiang 
government. China Three Gorges and its subsidiary, China Three Gorges New Energy have significant shares in Goldwind. China 
Three Gorges is wholly owned by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).  
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constitutes reality or knowledge around Africa (Ethiopia)-China relations. Second, I discuss 
the methodological framework underpinning the study. This includes process tracing, 
negotiating fieldwork, data and the methods for data collection and analysis. Third, I discuss 
rigour and validity and how positionality positively or negatively affected my data collection 
and analysis. I (de)construct the ‘outsider but insider’ positionality through the process of 
reflexivity which allowed me to carefully negotiate the politics of knowledge production on 
Africa-China relations. Contextual mediation of this debate is essential so as to scrutinise and 
reveal “how Chinese knowledge of Africa and African knowledge of China is produced and 
assimilated […] [and] how this newer knowledge feeds into government policies, Western 
discourse and understanding, and attitudes and experiences on the ground” (Strauss & 
Saavedra, 2009, p. 551). Fourth, the chapter discusses the challenges encountered during 
the fieldwork and the research ethics. The last section offers a chapter summary.   
Chapter four provides the background of the study focusing on Ethiopia’s state-society 
relations after 1991 when the EPRDF under Meles Zenawi came into power. The chapter 
begins by tracing the Ethiopian social, political and economic development policy and how 
such development orientation laid the foundations for Ethiopia-China cooperation. The second 
part of the chapter discusses the factors which condition Ethiopia's agential dimensions when 
engaging with external powers. It is within these determinants that one sees Ethiopia being 
able to influence the interaction patterns and dynamics with not only China but any other 
foreign power. The third and final section of the chapter discusses Ethiopia-China relations 
post 1991.   
The fifth chapter is premised on the first sub-question, which explores why Ethiopian and 
Chinese stakeholders financed and developed Adama wind farms. It proceeds by responding 
to the drivers of both Ethiopian and Chinese actors in financing and developing the wind farms. 
In the same section, I also explore why the Ethiopian government at that time decided to build 
wind farms and not other renewable energy sources. The second part of the chapter examines 
the motivations for Ethiopian and Chinese actors in financing and developing the two wind 
farms. The third part of the chapter explores the factors which influenced the Ethiopian 
government to award the contract to the Chinese. The final section discusses the summary of 
the chapter.  
Chapter six responds to the second sub-question of the study which explores engagement 
modalities and negotiation processes between and among Ethiopian and Chinese actors in 
the financing and development of the Adama wind farms. It begins by tracing the engagement 
modalities at the negotiation tables, followed by tracing the negotiations by looking at the 
actors involved in the process. The third part of the chapter opens the black boxes through an 
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interrogation of the project pre-planning, contractual terms and conditions, implementation and 
management of the projects. The last section of the chapter discusses the empirical 
parameters of Ethiopian agency.    
The seventh chapter addresses the final sub-question of the study which seeks to understand 
the engagement outcomes and local development impacts of the two wind farms. It 
underscores how and in what ways the Ethiopian domestic regulatory and governance 
structures were responsible in mediating the engagement outcomes and development 
impacts. Chapter eight discusses the thesis’ main findings and offers key contributions, 
limitations of the study, lessons for policy and directions for future research. The appendix 
sections contain the interview questions used for the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO: CONTEXTUALISING AND THEORISING AFRICAN AGENCY 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This thesis’ approach to African agency in Africa-China engagement draws from international 
relations and social theory lenses grounded in policy debates, historical, theoretical and 
empirical literature. Existing studies on Africa’s international relations predominantly put more 
emphasis on analysing how external actors’ political, economic, social, military and 
technological power define and influence the way they interact with Africa. External powers 
are presented as dominant and being in charge of the deals with Africa. The central argument 
of this thesis is that African countries’ engagement patterns with external stakeholders, 
including China, are not entirely conditioned by existing asymmetrical power structures (de 
Bruijn, van Dijk, & Gewald, 2007). To understand this, it is necessary to empirically locate the 
areas where African countries innovatively find ways to influence their engagements with 
external actors. As such, I “treat the commitment to examining agency as an ontological 
presupposition and thus allow space to investigate empirically the different interpretations and 
choices made by African actors in any particular context” (Murray-Evans, 2015, p. 26).   
The purpose of this chapter is to contextualise and theorise African agency. The first section 
begins by discussing agency in wider empirical and theoretical literature of Africa’s external 
engagements. While this literature is “non-exhaustive and more ground needs to be covered” 
(Brown, 2012, p. 1890), it provides a foundation to frame African agency in the context of 
Africa-China engagements. The second section analytically defines the African state and 
locates it within a sociological reading of state-society relations. The third section unpacks 
African agency in the context of emerging Global South economies such as China, and how 
they reinvigorate the position of Africa in international relations. In doing so, I seek to 
understand how changes in the global configuration and distribution of power enable or 
constrain African actors to exercise agency. This presents an opportunity to move away from 
material power structure asymmetries to more narrative based, discursive and often 
ambiguous forms of agency operationalised by African agents to meaningfully, consciously 
and sometimes unconsciously exert influence. The fourth section discusses the conceptual 
and analytical considerations of agency which I will use in the later chapters to analyse the 
empirical case studies. I proceed with a discussion of resources and repertoires of power 
weaved with interests, ideas, values, preferences and ideology as important variables that 
influence how actors engage with one another. The final section of the chapter discusses the 
processes of negotiations and modalities of engagement which are empirical zones where 
engagements occur.  
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2.1 Historicising African agency in international relations 
Scholarship on Africa’s position and engagements within and beyond the continent have been 
presented and written in journalistic, comical, musical, film, poetry, theory and policy circles in 
which many “have focused on Africa and the global system, but fewer have focused on the 
African element of this relationship” (Stephen Wright, 1999, p. 1). From the late 1950s through 
to the 70s, many of these perspectives are dominated by African representation and 
association with marginalisation (Bayart, 2000; Jones, 2005), underdevelopment, dependence 
and exploitation (Amin, 1976; Rodney, 1972) a rather top-down approach in which Africa is 
considered being impacted upon by external players in its conduct of international relations. 
In this period Africa is positioned as an insignificant actor and is hemmed in  in international 
relations (Callaghy & Ravenhill, 1993).  
Bayart (1993, 2000) rejects the insignificance and idleness of African actors. He argues that 
Africans exercised agency and in certain instances colluded and collaborated with colonial 
administration. Lonsdale and Berman’s (1979, p. 505) research in colonial Kenya shows that 
the colonial state control was “mitigated by a rough compatibility between the needs of the 
settler capital and the patronage exercised by African chiefs within a peasant sector which 
was expanded to solve the colonial administration needs for peace and revenue”. Bayart 
further claims that “Africans have been active agents in the mise en dépendance of their 
societies, sometimes opposing it and at other times joining it, in such a way that it became an 
anachronism to reduce such home-grown strategies to formulas of nationalism or indeed of 
collaboration” (2000, p. 219). While Bayart’s interpretation of African agency is controversial, 
it underscores the agential dimensions of African actors whereby African chiefs found ways to 
strike a balance with the colonial administration and their subjects in ways often detrimental 
to their people’s survival. As such, African chiefs innovatively find ways of responding to 
European ‘colonial’ policy and at the same time, Europeans were also forced to act in relation 
to African chiefs demands (Gadzala, 2015c). The relationship brings to the fore how class 
influenced engagement patterns between the colonial government and the natives.  
The cold war (1945-1989) and post-cold war (1991 to present) representation of Africa’s 
international relations has likewise been portrayed in somewhat contrasting narratives with 
regards to exercising of agency by African actors. On the one hand, we see a representation 
of African liberation wars to dismantle the colonial control, and on the other hand, we see the 
struggle for survival for African states during the superpower rivalry (Clapham, 1996). It is 
significant to highlight that the liberation movements were not States themselves, but private, 
non-state-based-actors who engaged in collaboration with external actors (within and outside 
the borders) to access military aid and training. Either way, Africans’ ability to organise political 
movements in resisting and fighting for political independence demonstrated assertiveness 
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and astuteness to exercise agency (Cooper, 1994). The fact that independent African states 
decided to form a continental organisation—the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to 
facilitate and spearhead the African decolonisation project shows the collective agency of 
African actors. Also, post-colonial African states found themselves under a challenging 
moment of siding either with the communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or 
capitalist Western Europe and North America. Instead, a majority of the countries joined the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)—an organisation that pledged neutrality. The OAU and NAM 
were thus used as institutions for the deployment of collective agency.      
In the 1980s, the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)-led structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs) saw studies depicting a representation of how the international 
financial institutions and other donor agencies impacted on post-colonial African state 
governance systems (Harrison, 2004). The SAPs period saw the introduction and 
recommendation of market liberalisation and democratisation of the African state as pre-
conditions for accessing credit lines to ease the economic and political crisis Africa found itself 
in (Williams, 2007; Young, 2004). The reforms heavily impacted on African state structures 
and in some instances its ability to fully retain control. Such reforms resultantly ushered in new 
private, transnational, non-state-based actors (for example, non-governmental organisations 
and civil society organisations) which have until today partially shaped how Africa conducts its 
international relations. It is crucial nonetheless to mention that, although these aid agencies 
and international financial institutions facilitated and imposed the neoliberal reform agenda on 
post-colonial African states (Franz & Obare, 2011), some Africans exercised agency by 
carefully negotiating, contesting and even rejecting some of the proposals during and after the 
reform period (Fisher, 2013; Fraser & Whitfield, 2008).  
While several texts have attempted to unpack Africa’s international relations from a top-down 
approach some have adopted a bottom-up approach—a reverse view in which Africa is 
considered to impact on its external counterparts’ conduct of their international relations (see 
Brown & Harman, 2013; Brown, 2012; Clapham, 1996; Jones, 2005; Smith, 2009; Zondi et al., 
2011). These studies have focused on both the theoretical logic as well as the empirical 
exercise of African agency. Within the context of the theoretical debates on Africa in 
international relations, some have argued that Africa has suffered a ‘sin of omission’, or lack 
of ‘fit’ regarding what constitutes the disciplinary, theoretical basis and the ‘African realities’ 
(Harman & Brown, 2013, p. 71). For Odoom and Andrews rather than looking at the ‘lack of 
fit’ for Africa, it is the “inadequacy of the major analytical constructs provided by established 
international relations (IR) theory in capturing and explaining shifting reality in Africa” (2017, 
p. 42). As such, Africa faces “representational deficiency” (Ibid, p.43) and yet yields rich case 
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studies and experience in which Africa is far from being a peripheral actor, but a strong agent 
of knowledge production for both theoretical and empirical exercises.  
The inadequacy of existing IR theory to understand Africa’s international relations, and 
perhaps its exercise of agency hails from the disciplinary narrowness and domination of 
western-centric views (Cornelissen, Cheru, & Shaw, 2012; Smith, 2009). For others, major IR 
theories, namely Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism, rest on shallow Eurocentric 
conception of statehood, sovereignty (Clapham, 1996; Dunn & Shaw, 2001), “political 
processes, civil society, rationalities” (Harman & Brown, 2013, p. 71) and “the 
international/domestic dichotomy” (Dunn, 2001, p. 4). For some, the problem lies not in the 
entire domain but certain constructs and strands of the IR theory. For instance, Brown rejects 
some of the criticisms on all traditional IR theory arguing that the target of these criticisms is 
neo-realism. He argues that critics misunderstand anarchy and the state-centered approach 
as a unit of analysis (2006, p. 119)—what Singer (1961) termed the level of analysis problem 
in international relations. While I do not attempt to mediate this debate, my assumption is that 
existing theoretical frameworks influence the epistemological and methodological aspects of 
studying international relations. This consequently leads to the ‘absence’ and the ‘othering’ 
(Capan, 2017) of (African) countries or geographies that do not fit the Weberian21 sense of the 
State (Clapham, 1996), which if not carefully analysed, links to the failed states thesis. Do 
African states present unique characteristics that are not in some sense explainable by 
existing IR theoretical scholarship or is it simply a sin of omission, or simply “the empirical 
complexity of the [African] continent’s international relations” (Lemke, 2003, p. 85)? Below, I 
revisit the African state-society relations thesis as an effort to understand how African agents 
are socially produced, constituted and embedded within the socio-cultural and political spaces 
(whether domestic/international) they inhabit. This helps to systematise and contextualise how 
African agents and their practice of international relations have previously been studied. It also 
further provides lenses to study and understand African agency of Africa’s relations with 
emerging powers such as China.  
2.1.1 African-state-society relations and agency 
Before we delve deeper into discussing African-state-society relations and their implications 
for the exercise of African agency it is imperative to revisit the definition of the African state. 
Several definitions have been used. For some, the African state is defined by its 
characteristics22. Such characteristics relate to a state having a territory, sovereignty, 
population and institutions of rules. Some go further to add that it should also have 
                                                          
21 The customary definition of the state, as an organization that claims a monopoly within a fixed territory over the legitimate use 
of violence.   
22 See Young, C. 1988. “The African Colonial State and its Political Legacy,” (in) D. Rothchild and N. Chazan (eds). The 
Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa, Boulder: Westview Press, pp.25-66.  
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governmental apparatus and a form and sense of authority23. While these characteristics are 
important for defining and probably understanding the African state, for Doornbos (1990, p. 
180), the African state is to be understood with the following explanations:  
(i) Its post-colonial status, with all the implications this has for the evolution of ‘civil 
society’,  
(ii) its a priori problematic relationship as regards its territorial jurisdiction,  
(iii) its heavy involvement in a restricted resource base (usually primarily agricultural), 
(iv) its still relatively undifferentiated yet ethnically heterogeneous social infrastructure,  
(v) its salient processes of centralisation and consolidation of power by new ruling 
classes, and, 
(vi) Its pervasive external context and dependency. 
Doornbos (1990) further denotes that these explanations are somewhat reflections of the 
African state formation which is wrought with dynamic and non-linear processes. These 
processes include among others, the construction and deconstruction of social, political, 
economic, cultural and ideological structures. This results in the “redefinition of the position of 
various social and political formations, groups, and organisational networks within the wider 
state” (Doornbos, 1990, p. 181). These continuous changes of the structures within the wider 
context of the state consequently and dynamically define the state-society relations. State-
society relations being the state’s “linkages with constituent social units and categories, and 
the extent of autonomy it has left them” (Doornbos, 1990, p. 181).  
The second definition of the African state is based on the relationship between the state and 
society (Azarya, 1988). As Kawabata (2006, p. 1) citing Azarya (1988) claim that the (African) 
state should be seen as an “organisation within society, it is distinguished from the myriad of 
other organisations in seeking predominance over them and in aiming to institute binding rules 
regarding activities of other organisations”. Proponents of this thinking such as Migdal (2001) 
have furthered Azarya’s concept of state-society relationship, to ‘state-in-society’ in which the 
state becomes socially embedded in the society. The central argument of this thesis is that 
states are not external and immune to the social forces (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010) much as 
they are not immune to external influence.  
The state-society approach to defining the African state creates an avenue to unpack and 
understand the structures which have allowed African states to create and enable their forms 
of accountability, governance, and relationships with non-state actors. The state-society 
approach contextualises the African state formation and definition as a historical process 
                                                          
23 See Zartman, I.W. (ed). 1995. Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner 
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which is not only formal, powerful and autonomous collection of actors, rules, and norms, but 
also discursive representation. The discursive genres create representation and give meaning 
to the state which allows one to distinguish between “the power everybody has and the power 
only some people have” (Olivier de Sardan, 2006:186 cited in Hagmann & Peclard, 2010, p. 
545)—what Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (1997, p. 441) terms ‘power poles’. Hagmann 
and Peclard (2010) argue that the African state should be seen as a negotiated entity where 
various actors—both state and non-state cooperate, collaborate and at times in/formally 
compete for influence in making and unmaking the state. This leads to an open and broad 
understanding of the state where it becomes essential to “break down the undifferentiated 
concepts of the state—and also of society—to understand how different elements each pull in 
different directions, leading to unanticipated patterns of domination and transformation” 
(Migdal, 1994, p. 8).   
Informal and formal social groups/institutions play an essential role in forming and defining the 
African state (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010). The formalisation/informalisation of certain social 
groups or institutions contribute to development and redevelopment of the state’s ideological 
position, goals, ideas, values, interests and preferences. The state will always be in the 
process of constant change responding to various social groups or institutions’ demands to 
remain relevant and legitimate. These state-society interactions occur at multiple fronts, 
including among others—the state level (state-based actors’ interactions), sub-state level 
(state-actors at the lower levels), interest/pressure groups (civil society, NGOs) and also 
respond to changes in the international system. The constant interactions between these 
actors through contestation, conflict, competition, and cooperation, subsequently change the 
state’s aims, preferences, ideology, values, interests and ideas (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010). 
This also affects the structural (political, economic, social, ideology, cultural, history) base of 
the state, and bears implications on how the external actors design interaction strategies and 
rationalities with the state. I believe that it is in the interactions between the state and the social 
forces (class, politicians and ethnic groups) where interests, ideas, values, preferences and 
agendas, unquestionably emanate. The deconstruction of state-society relations is crucial and 
sheds light on the drivers and motivations of African countries to engage the Chinese.   
So how do the state-society relations affect African agency? African agents’ agency is dynamic 
in space and time and is shaped by domestic and international variables (Brown & Harman, 
2013). This suggests what Putnam coined the logic of two-level games in which “central 
decision-makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously” 
(1988, p. 460). What we can draw from this is that agents are therefore socially produced by 
the social structures that emanate from state-society relations. They then become authorised 
representatives to act on behalf of either the state (formal institutions) or non-state actors 
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(formal and informal institutions) (Williams, 2013). Borrowing from IR theory, Wendt notably 
argues that (1987, pp. 337–338) “human beings and their organisations are purposeful actors 
whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and society is made 
up of social relationships which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors”. 
For that matter, agents again become “inseparable from social structures in the sense that 
their action is possible only in virtue of those structures, and social structures cannot have 
causal significance except insofar as they are instantiated by agents. Social action, then, is 
‘co-determined’ by the properties of both agents and social structures” (Wendt, 1987, p. 365). 
Understanding these is fundamental as it sheds light on how the African state and non-state 
actors, whether formal or informal, exercise agency and the potential implications this may 
have when engaging the Chinese. The next section explores how the rise of Global South 
powers impact on African agency.  
2.1.2 African agency in the era of multilateralism with southern characteristics 
The rise of Global South countries and multilateral platforms such as India, Brazil and South 
Africa (IBSA), Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC), and BRICS has optimistically 
ushered in a new era of hope for African countries’ conduct and practice of international 
relations. These emerging powers are “acutely conscious of their own development 
challenges and, correspondingly, those facing Africa” (Alden, 2010, p. 12). Emerging powers 
is “a phrase coined to describe a new group of states which has through a combination of 
economic prowess, diplomatic acumen and military might managed to move away from 
developing country status to challenge the dominance of traditional mainly Western powers” 
(Alden, 2010, p. 12). These countries (particularly India, Brazil and China) have joined existing 
or created new and parallel platforms for developing countries not having to go through 
(Western) intermediaries (i.e. former colonial countries, international financial institutions, 
donor agencies) to access funding, negotiate deals or contribute towards international 
relations.    
While a majority of African countries celebrated the inclusion of South Africa in BRICS and 
potential elevation of the African continent on the platform of global politics (Tella, 2017), some 
critics caution the advent of new imperial powers using Southern solidarity as an anthem of 
neo-colonialism (Bond & Garcia, 2015). As such, the rise of BRICS, and China, in particular, 
is seen to represent neoliberalism with southern characteristics (Prashad, 2013) since they 
are driven by their domestic hunger for natural resources and markets (Shaw, 2015). Several 
mechanisms have been deployed to achieve their aims including the use of loans, grants, and 
resource-for-infrastructure deals (Alves, 2013; Corkin, 2015), development financing, foreign 
direct investment (although very small at the moment) and trade (Zhang & Smith, 2017). For 
Bond & Garcia (2015), the emerging powers represent an era of new exploitation making them 
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not different from the traditional powers. Making use of Chinese national oil companies 
operating in Ghana, Mohan suggests that “the Chinese firms are no different from other large 
multinationals operating in Africa” (2015b, p. 6). 
Meanwhile, the rise of the emerging powers has resulted in shifts in the conceptions of 
geopolitics where new multipolar world order is amplifying Africa’s position in international 
relations: both as a contributor to theory (knowledge producer) as well as a case study for 
empirical reference (Harman & Brown, 2013). Specifically, the rise of China, results in “a 
shifting terrain of international relations in which Africa is at the core, with the potential 
opportunity to make aggressive use […] of China to exert greater agency in the international 
system” (Harman & Brown, 2013, p. 80). So, in what ways does the rise of emerging powers 
contribute to the reinvigoration of African agency in international politics? There are three ways 
in which I believe African agency is enhanced or jeopardised. First, Africa will become a ‘site’ 
of great powers’ geopolitical and geo-economics’ contestation, cooperation, competition and 
collaboration (Gil, Manrique, 2015; Sun & Olin-Ammentrop, 2014; Thrall, 2015; Ursu & van 
den Berg, 2018). Several commentaries suggest that the rise of China in particular and its 
increased engagement with African countries is contributing to changes in the international 
lending structures (Bräutigam, 2010; Moss & Rose, 2006). These commentaries purview of 
lending denotes that the Western countries and donor agencies attach conditions on political 
indicators such as democracy, freedom, openness, transparency and human rights as lending 
yardsticks (Lombard, 2006).  
However, it will be a misconception to suggest that the Chinese do not condition their 
development finance. The Chinese attach economic conditions by prescribing the use of 
Chinese companies, procurement of Chinese technology and services as a determinant to 
have access to Chinese finances. This is conditionality, albeit different from governance-
based lending conditions of the West (Ng, 2012). As Lombard postulates “the Angolan 
government baulked at an IMF mandate for transparency in its oil revenue accounting, [and] 
the C-EXIM offered an interest-free loan … [without] … accounting required” (2006, p. 1). 
What emerges from this is that Africa becomes the “space in which these relationships are 
played out” (Harman & Brown, 2013, p. 79) and by so doing gives room for African countries 
to increase their leverage on and bargaining power when negotiating aid, development 
finance, investment or trade deals with Western countries and agencies (Ibid, p.8).  
Second, since Africa is a ‘site’ of/for contestation, competition and collaboration between great 
powers, it is equally a ground for testing (foreign) policy ideas for emerging powers before 
applying them globally (Harman & Brown, 2013). For example, China has been using Africa 
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as a testing and operationalisation ground for its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence24 
approach in which non-interference in internal affairs has been the central pillar to its foreign 
policy identity. As averred “even though the five principles were initially raised as a policy 
towards the newly independent states in Africa […] China soon realised the universal 
significance of these principles and actively expanded them […] finally making it a fundamental 
principle of China in developing its foreign relations” (Zhengqing & Xiaoqin, 2015, p. 2). Africa 
has therefore provided China with a learning platform, a ‘laboratory’ as Shinn (2016) suggests, 
for its foreign policy identity transformation. This has been the case specifically in China’s 
contradictory position in Sudan/South Sudan (Large, 2008). Likewise, Brazil has been using 
Africa as a testing ground for its More Food Program25 (in the Brazilian context) now 
transformed to More Food International (in the African context) agrarian policy position 
(Cabral, Favareto, Mukwereza, & Amanor, 2016; Scoones, Amanor, Favareto, & Qi, 2016; 
Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016). What this tells us is that “Africa is a key space in which a wide 
range of these new policy ideas are applied, replicated and developed” and therefore “invert 
the idea that the continent is the recipient rather than the generator of international policy” 
(Harman & Brown, 2013, pp. 83–84).  
Third and finally, the rise of emerging powers strengthens and solidifies the significance of 
Africa as an important ally in the multilateral institutions’ voting game of thrones. The African 
Group is one of the largest voting blocs in UN and World Trade Organisation (WTO), and for 
that, the rising powers strive to co-opt Africa into their negotiating position. Assuming Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China on the one hand, and the European Union and the USA on the 
other hand, battle out for decisions and policy direction in UN and its agencies, and the WTO, 
having Africa on your side guarantees you to victory. Africa’s significance is immense 
especially on climate change, trade, and UN reform negotiations (see Hurt, 2011; Lee, 2013; 
Zondi, 2013). It nonetheless risks becoming a ‘pawn’ between emerging powers and western 
countries contestations in multilateral platforms (Brown & Harman, 2013). For example, in the 
case of climate change negotiations, China used Africa to gain numbers for voting to block 
binding limits on greenhouse gas emissions resolution which was not favourable to the 
Chinese. Brown and Harman laments that “China’s success in getting Africa’s numbers lined 
up behind a negotiating stance, which cannot deliver the necessary changes needed to protect 
Africa from the worst effects of climate change may leave a more damaging legacy” (Brown & 
                                                          
24 As portrayed by the People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18053.shtml the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence are: (i) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty (ii) mutual non-aggression, (iii) non-
interference in each other's internal affairs, (iv) equality and mutual benefit (changed to equality and mutual benefit in the Sino-
Indian joint Statement and Sino-Burmese Joint Statement), and (v) peaceful co-existence. 
25 An agrarian policy position in which subsidised credit is offered to family farmers to support agricultural modernisation and 
enhance productivity.    
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Harman, 2013, p. 8). While I acknowledge the likelihood that China might benefit from the 
African votes and yet fail to protect Africa (from climate change induced impacts, unfair trade 
deals, lending practices), this may equally provide an opportunity for Africa to shape the 
deliberations and perhaps the voting powers in multilateral organisations (Dietz, Havnevik, 
Kaag, & Oestigaard, 2011). By so doing, this will reinvigorate African agency in international 
norm setting and policy shaping.      
Several emerging powers have contributed immensely to the reconfiguration of Africa’s 
international relations; however, China stands out, and that warrants attention. I will focus on 
understanding African agency in the context of Africa-China engagements because: (i) since 
2009, China became Africa’s largest trading partner (see Eom, Hwang, Atkins, Chen, & Zhou, 
2017); (ii) China is presently the largest builder of Africa’s infrastructure (Pairault, 2018); (iii) 
China is one of the most significant development finance providers for Africa’s infrastructure 
development projects (Brautigam & Hwang, 2016; Pairault, 2018); and, (iv) has diplomatic 
representations with almost all African countries except for Eswatini which recognises Taiwan 
(Strong, 2017). These factors allow China to command a colossal influence in African states’ 
internal as well as external relations. At the same time, due to the complexity and 
embeddedness of the engagements between Africa and China, I argue that African states and 
non-state-based-actors strongly influence how the engagements play out. However, this has 
not been acknowledged to be the case up to now, as African agents have been presented as 
less capable of exercising agency when engaging with China. This provides a gap which this 
study attempts to fill. The next section discusses the analytical and conceptual frame of 
agency.     
2.2 Agency: an analytical consideration 
In the context of Africa-China engagements, various African agents (whether state or non-
state actors) from various institutions (whether formal or informal) play essential roles in 
structuring and influencing the engagement patterns and dynamics (see appendix 2.1). From 
an IR perspective, several theoretical domains provide insights on how I can theorise African 
agency, building mainly from already existing work on agency in international relations. 
Broadly, three strands of IR theory provide the point of departure. These theories are realism, 
constructivism and institutionalism. They help to (de)construct and offer insights on the 
differentiated nature of African agents’ exercise of agency when engaging the Chinese. Given 
the ‘rainbow’ (Alden, 2013) nature of the theoretical basis of studying and analysing Africa-
China engagements, I first turn to realism—which calls for a state-centric approach to the 
study of inter-state engagements. Here the main theoretical arguments relate to the centrality 
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of the state as the principal actor in international relations. Given the anarchical26 nature of 
world politics, the theory presupposes that states engage with other states only if and when 
there are strategic national interest to be gained. The approach views states as being self-
serving interest-driven actors—a potential avenue by which we can understand why Africa has 
increased its engagement with China over the last two decades. This approach is useful 
because the state remains a crucial variable of analysis in this study—in the sense of Ethiopia 
(state) and China (state). Nonetheless, given the materiality of power assumptions of this 
approach seen through the ‘hard power’ differences between Africa and China, it reproduces 
the very same representation I am challenging in this study where China is considered a 
hegemony, trivialising Africa. Additionally, its state-centric approach though useful here 
undermines the possibilities of non-state actors’ invaluable influence in agenda shaping and 
preference setting in international engagements. Thus, it leads to an insufficiency of realism 
to adequately provide analytical lenses to understand Africa-China engagements holistically.   
Since agenda shaping, preference setting, ideas, interests and values are subjective ‘social 
constructs’, the constructivism approach is necessary to fully grasp Africa-China 
engagements. Constructivism as an IR theoretical approach focuses on the social analysis of 
world politics based on human interactions governed and shaped by ideational and not only 
material factors (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; Wendt, 1992). The social constructs result in the 
creation of shared beliefs which in turn “construct the interests and identities of purposive 
actors” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 398). This leads to the creation of state identities which 
“fundamentally shape state preferences and actions” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, p. 398). In 
the context of Africa-China engagements, quite often the rhetoric is ‘win-win situation’, 
‘solidarity’, ‘mutuality’, ‘non-interference’, ‘harmonious development’ and ‘respect for 
sovereignty’ as ideational constructs which influence and shape the value and belief systems 
patterns in Africa-China engagements. Although constructivism as an approach is essential 
and is used in this study, it is arguably too normative as it again neglects these ideational 
power inequalities. Given the diversity and plurality of ideational factors, one wonders to what 
extent, indeed, in the real-world events, this approach genuinely reflects engagement 
patterns. This again calls for the need to question further the circumstances under which the 
so-called ‘non-material’ factors emerge. These ideational factors are formulated by institutions 
(whether formal or informal) to serve specific interests. A focus on institutionalism is also 
important to understand the patterns and dynamics of Africa-China engagements.   
                                                          
26 This could potentially explain why China prioritises sovereignty and non-interference as key principles governing its conduct of 
international relations with Africa. In contrast to this, I argue that economic and other forms of cooperation have resultant 
implications in the political (sovereignty) and economic makeup of the host country, reflecting a form of ‘interference by other 
means’ (Ziso, 2018, p. 177).      
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Institutions are vital structures which determine the African agential capacity in engaging with 
external stakeholders. Institutions harbour memories, learning and bureaucratic ecosystem 
which influence African agents’ behavioural and decision-making patterns and dynamics when 
engaging China. As espoused by Scott (2001, p. 49) an institution relates to “multi-faceted, 
durable, social structures, made up of symbolic elements, social activities, and material 
resources that enable or impose limitations on the scope for the human agency by creating 
legal, moral and cultural boundaries”. Institutions, therefore, represent an arrangement of de 
facto and de jure rules and incentives that define human behaviour. This implies that agents 
are enabled or constrained by institutions, whether formal or informal which provide them with 
mechanisms, scripts, options, and alternatives regarding choice and decision making, solely 
aimed at reducing uncertainty when engaging with other actors. Although institutions define 
and confine human behaviour, Hudson & Leftwich (2014, p. 72) postulate that institutions can 
also be  “shaped, maintained or undermined by human agents”. Specifically, this allows agents 
to act and behave in confined and calculated positions in order to attain “better social 
outcomes” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 12).  
Institutional forms and procedures in any setting as averred by a sociological27 reading of the 
institutional theory suggest a culturally oriented practice which is “assimilated into 
organisations, not necessarily to enhance their formal means-ends efficiency, but as a result 
of the kind of processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices” (Hall & Taylor, 
1996, p. 14). Therefore, bureaucratic practices of the institutions in question are a mere 
extension of cultural practices, norms and forms. This approach becomes useful in the study 
as it portrays institution as “not just formal rules, procedures or norms, but the symbol systems, 
cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the ‘frames of meaning’ guiding human 
action” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 14). Although the approach is adopted in the study and 
theoretically shows how institutions have influence “over policy and political action” (Amenta 
& Ramsey, 2010, p. 17), it nevertheless assumes that human action in institutions is based on 
rationalism. This is problematic especially in the context of Africa-China engagements where 
African agents may not always engage with China entirely based on the script. There is room 
for uncertainty which suggests adoption and making of decisions based at times on 
convenience rather than rationality.   
Having discussed the three IR theoretical strands which this study draws from, concerning 
African agency in Africa-China engagements, I propose a hybrid theoretical position which 
borrows from all the three approaches discussed above. This schematic hybrid theoretical 
                                                          
27 See Meyer, J. W. & Rowan, B. 1977. “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony”. American 
Journal of Sociology 83 (1977): 340–363 
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position calls for the need to return the focus to the state28 (Taylor, 2010; Tull, 2006),  but at 
the same time break down the components which constitute it (Migdal, 2001) and factoring in 
semi-state, non-state, individuals, transnational actors, market factors (transnational and 
domestic) (Shen & Power, 2017), society, institutions (formal or informal) as important 
variables conditioning African agency in Africa-China engagements. Although I bring back the 
state, I still consider that relations between Africa and China are in the process of 
transformation and becoming more complex. New forms of political and economic 
interdependences are emerging calling for the “need to move beyond statist, elite dialogues” 
(Mohan & Lampert, 2013, p. 100). African agents, therefore, are representations of various 
institutional structures which cooperate as collective agents or individually. For these agents 
to be accepted, they should have some form of representational legitimacy from the structures 
that accords them such status.   
Is or can the state be equated to a person, an agent in international relations? This is perhaps 
one of the long-existing academic debate29 in international relations which I do not engage 
with here because of space and time. However, I selectively and carefully develop an 
analytical framework which considers the state as an agent—state agency. For Wendt (1992), 
a state is a person who has the power to act on behalf of and has the power to enable or 
constrain choice and decision making. Wendt further claims that as a person has interests, is 
goal oriented, has fears and has values, so does a state (1992, p. 397). Wight categorically 
rejects Wendt’s view and instead suggest the state is an agent only within the basis of 
“institutional structures constructed by human beings” (Wight, 1999, p. 128). He further argues 
that states can have agency, but without necessarily analogising it with a person (Wight, 2004, 
p. 273). In the context of Africa-China engagements, agents whether states, state-based-
actors, institutions, civil societies or individuals exact two exigencies: (i) capacity to 
strategically and consciously exert influence (power), and (ii) acting strategically and 
consciously on behalf of something (Buzan, 1993, p. 103). This reading is critical in this study 
and provides an ontological base to conceptualise agency. However, Wight (2004, p. 274) 
criticises Buzan arguing that the view fails to account for the “agents’ injection of meaning and 
intentionality into action”. Instead, Wight proposes a three-dimensional view of agency in 
international relations. As noted by Brown (2012, p. 1895) Wight reconsiders agency as, firstly 
embodied intentionality, accountability and personal freedom of action where agent’s social 
                                                          
28 “Putting the state in its place in this way does not exclude (and, indeed, presupposes) specifically state-engendered and state-
mediated processes; but it does require that these be considered in their broader social context and that their effects are related 
to the strategic choices and conduct of particular actors within and beyond the state” extracted from Jessop, B. 2004. ‘Multilevel 
Governance and Multilevel Metagovernance. Change in the EU as Integral Moments in the Transformation and Reorientation of 
Contemporary Statehood’, in (ed.) Bache, I & Flinders, M. Multi-level Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 49-74.   
29See Williams, D. 2013. State agency and state formation in Africa, in (ed) William, B and Harman, S. African agency in 
international politics, Routledge, Abingdon. pp129-142.  
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action is based on a self-conscious strategy to achieve intended outcomes. This dimension 
proposes an individual characterisation of agency and that behaviour and choice in decision 
making are based on a conscious strategy to achieve intended outcomes. The second 
dimension considers that choices and decisions of actors are embedded in the socio-cultural 
context they operate. As such, actors are always ‘agents of something’ in which they are 
cognizant of structural determinism but always undertake social action encumbered by social 
forces, making them naturally embedded actors. The third dimension conceptualises agency 
as a process of choice, and decision-making emanating from attributes of positioned practises 
(Wight, 1999, 2004, 2006) what Emirbayer & Mische (1998) terms routinised practises. What 
I read from Wight’s tripartite conception of agency is that it is risky to attempt to separate these 
agencies from their socio-cultural context they operate as they are co-constituted and are 
intrinsically connected to these environments.  
This suggests a “complex dialectical interplay” (de Bruijn et al., 2007, p. 10) where agents “are 
neither simply free individuals, nor script-defined role performance, but both roles and 
subjectivity shaped in extent and content by, and operating within, a specific social context” 
(Brown, 2012, p. 1895). Although Wight’s theoretical basis of agency and its presuppositions 
are important for this study, it downplays, as suggested by Mohan and Lampert, the role of 
agents who are situated and embedded in “wider capitalist relations” and the conditioning 
effect of transitional capital (2013, p. 96). For Brown (2012, p. 1897), Wight’s framework “does 
not substantively settle key analytical issues such as the relative balance between, say, 
personal attributes, domestic, political pressures and external system-level constraints”. 
Brown (2012) proposes four-dimensional parameters of agency (see appendix 2.1) on Africa’s 
practice of international relations. The first dimension is the intergovernmental agency which 
is collective and multilateral in orientation. The second dimension relates to the state agency 
and is executed by state actors. The third dimension is the agency of state-based actors who 
undertake the implementation and operationalisation of agreed declarations, memorandum of 
understandings through the invocation of the state’s regulatory and administrative systems. 
The state-based actors arguably interact with external agencies and organisations, in line with 
the state’s national interests. The final dimension is ‘non-state actors’-based agency (see 
section 2.2.2).   
The inadequacy of the IR informed conceptualisation of agency is that it fails to capture the 
behavioural and decision-making aspects of the agents who are involved in these interactions. 
To capture these, I turn to the social theory of agency. While one intuitively knows what agency 
is, it is notoriously difficult and complex to define. Following Hay (2002:94-95) cited in (Hudson 
& Leftwich, 2014, p. 73) I define agency in its broadest sense as:  
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“The ability or capacity of an actor to act consciously and, in doing so, to attempt to 
realise his or her intentions […]. In particular, it implies a sense of free will, choice or 
autonomy – that the actor could have behaved differently and that this choice between 
potential courses of action was, or at least could have been, subject to the actor’s 
conscious deliberation”.  
This definition presents agency as the possession of causal power. However, possession of 
causal power is constrained or enabled by structure. Following on Hay (2002: 94), I define 
structure as:  
“the setting in which social, political and economic events occur and acquire meaning 
[…] the ordered nature of social and political relations to the fact that political 
institutions, practices, routines and conventions appear to exhibit some sort of 
regularity over time”.  
Structure thus encompasses different forms, determinants and sources of power, whether 
formal or informal, that shape its assertion or distribution. These can be “economic structures” 
(systems of ownership, production, exchange and distribution; the sectoral composition, and 
the division of labour), “political structures” (formal and informal forms of power over decision 
making), “social structures” (class, race, gender, history, culture and religion), “ideological 
structures” (ideas, beliefs, norms and values) and “institutional structures” which shape and 
constrain the relations and activities of those who are participants in it (Hay, 2002, p.94). The 
debate about the primacy of agency or structure remains ongoing, although Giddens’ (1984) 
structuration theory has attempted to address it. Giddens argues that we cannot separate 
structure from agency as the two components are co-constituted: agents enable the creation 
of structure, at the same time structures constrain and enable agents to recreate structure.   
Since an agent cannot be separated from the social world and neither should one make a 
mistake of assuming that human action and behaviour is “patterned in particular ways” devoid 
of determinants (Wight, 2004:280), it is necessary to capture this framework sociologically. 
Emirbayer and Mische (1998) chordal triad interpretation of agency is instructive here. By 
chordal triad, the duo avers that agents have firstly, an iterational element. This means agents 
can selectively activate “past patterns of thought and action” which over time gives them 
“stability and order […] to decode, predict and decide” course of action in situations they find 
themselves (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 971). History and memory condition the action of 
the present through a constant conscious and unconscious habitual processes. Consequently, 
the iterational or repetitive dimension is, therefore “manifested in actors’ abilities to recall, to 
select, and to appropriately apply the more or less tacit and taken-for-granted schemas of 
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action that they have developed through past interactions” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 
975).   
The second dimension of agency is the projective element. Agents are futuristic in orientation 
in which social action and imagination are innovatively “reconfigured […] to actors’ hopes, 
fears and desires” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 971). This does not limit the agents to be 
projective purely based on routinised practices but also introduces possibilities of new 
inventive thoughts and action. It is therefore within this projective element that agents can set 
for themselves goals and plans. Goal and plan setting are not however voluntary nor 
instrumental (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) but socially embedded in the temporal-relational 
context—where conflict and cooperation are iteratively (re)negotiated between and among the 
social forces. Third and finally, agents have a practical-evaluative element. As proposed by 
Emirbayer and Mische (1998, p.971), agents can deliberate and make a judgement among 
possible “alternative trajectories of action in response to emerging demands, dilemmas and 
ambiguities”. This third dimension is highly contextual and is derived from specific historical 
and cultural experiences which allow agents to self-evaluate through processes of context 
identification, characterisation (description), deliberation (assessment), and action (execution 
of decision) (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, pp. 998–1000).      
Analytically framing the above discussion, this thesis underlines that agents are: (i) active 
respondents within their nested and overlapping systems, (ii) able to hold their viewpoints 
simultaneously to others, and (iii) have self-reflexive consciousness (Emirbayer & Mische, 
1998, p. 969; Jessop, 1996, p. 125). In this thesis, I therefore conceptually and analytically 
consider agents as actors who, whether in their official or non-official capacities, undertake 
social action in specific contexts aimed at maximising gains and safeguarding interests in their 
engagement with other actors. Such actions could be as a collective or as an individual. The 
process of undertaking social action is consequentially operationalised practically through 
collaboration, passivity and in some cases, resistance.    
2.2.1 State and state-based-agents   
The state as the agent emanates from ‘agents’ being “centres of power” capable of bringing 
change including to themselves (Bhaskar, 1975, p.109 cited in Wight, 1999). It is correct to 
assume that the state as the agent acts within the basis of an “institutional ensemble” (Marx, 
1966, p. 100) where the agents’ activities become states’ activities in those specific contexts. 
As such, it is through the state’s representational authority and legitimacy bestowed upon the 
state agents, that they can act on behalf of something. As recognised by Jessop (1990, p. 
367) that “it is not the state which acts, it is always specific sets of politicians and state officials 
located in specific parts of the state system”. This then builds on the argument presented 
earlier where state-society relations are critical in defining and conditioning how state agents 
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behave. If there is no representational legitimacy in the form of collective identity, collective 
action, and representational authority (Williams, 2013, pp. 136–140) which is wielded from the 
state-society relations, then the ‘state’, as well as the ‘agency’ argument, loses relevance. It 
is therefore essential to contextualise the African state as a unit of analysis which facilitates 
through institutional powers, the exercise of agency by agents (Wight, 2004, p. 279) in Africa-
China relations.  
Brown emphasises that the state as the agent is an essential unit of analysis specifically from 
an international relations perspective (2006, 2011, 2012) as it wields sovereignty (2013). It is 
always the state (for example, Ethiopia) agents (President, Minister, Diplomat, Bureaucrat) 
that undertake decisions when engaging with external actors. The state agents, be it at the 
executive or bureaucratic level (Soulé-Kohndou, 2016), influence decision making, legally and 
representationally to define “and mediate the external expression of state preferences” 
(Brown, 2012, p. 1892). It is, therefore, through the state’s creation of institutions whereby an 
individual or a collective is accorded with the responsibility to broker, coordinate and negotiate 
deals with external and internal actors. Institutions through their agents become coercive 
apparatus of the state (Williams, 2013, p. 134) to regulate and administer frameworks in line 
with and conforming to the state interests, values, beliefs and identity.    
2.2.2 Non-state-actors as agents 
Aside from the state; there are also private, individuals and transnational agents (formal or 
informal) capable of directly or indirectly influencing engagement patterns between, within and 
beyond states’ confined territorial jurisdiction (Jessop, 2010, 2013; Weiss, Seyle & Coolidge, 
2013). Actors such as celebrities, opposition politicians, civil society and community-based 
organisations, local and international enterprises, professional associations (farmers), self-
help organisations, local or international non-governmental organisations, and religious 
entities use various resources and repertoires to achieve their intended outcomes. The only 
distinction between the non-state-agents and the state agents is sovereignty which “confers 
on state agents an ability to recognise or not, give legitimacy or not, to other actors” (Brown, 
2011, p. 13). Whereas sovereignty matters for legitimacy purposes in international relations, 
non-state-agents interact with state and other non-state actors making them potentially equally 
important in defining, conditioning and even mediating patterns, processes and modalities of 
engagement between Africa and China. As such, Chinese capital in Africa enters already 
existing social life-worlds be it at the individual, community, regional or national level. As 
statehood is negotiated (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010) by various agents (formal/informal; 
collective/individuals) within the broader state-society relations (Migdal, 1994, 2001), 
transnational capital (for example Chinese development finance) likewise is not immune to 
these conditioning effects. Non-state-agents, therefore, play an important role in conditioning 
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the engagement patterns as they influence and are influenced by the state in what Bob Jessop 
terms strategic-relational approach—“a heuristic concept of strategic selectivity” (Jessop, 
2004, p. 2). The: 
“state apparatus may privilege some [non-state] actors, some identities, some 
strategies […] and some actions over others; and the ways, […] in which political actors 
(individual and/or collective) take account of this differential privileging by engaging in 
‘strategic-context’ […] when choosing a course of action” (Jessop, 2010, p. 8).  
The state agents’ strategic selectivity leads non-state agents to design and use their means 
and tactics by deploying a variety of resources and repertoires (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010) to 
ensure that they become a significant force to be reckoned with30. Importantly, it is not only 
the non-state agents that design tactics to interact with the state. The process is dualistic and 
co-constituted. The state nonetheless tends to have more resources to successfully 
implement such tactics compared to non-state actors.   
2.2.3 Resources as instruments of power 
A majority of studies in Africa-China relations have focused on the economic, military and 
political power aspects of the Chinese as an explanatory variable to presuppose its domination 
in the decision-making patterns when engaging African agents. Following on Hagmann and 
Peclard (2010), I define resources as attributes for and of individual or collective action which 
are derived from “tangible and intangible assets such as bureaucratic capacities, 
organisational skills, finance and ability to mobilise funding, knowledge and technical 
expertise, control over physical violence, international networks, and political alliances31” 
(2010, p. 547). Resources become a set of attributes that are possessed by state agents or 
non-state agents. Resources wield power and access to them is dependent on history and 
context  (Sayer, 2004). However, not all agents are equal; some have more resources at their 
disposal than others32. At the same time, having a range of resources at your disposal does 
not necessarily translate to having power, it is instead in the “effective mobilisation” (Law, 
2004, p. 794) of those resources that one assumes the power to successfully or unsuccessfully 
condition social action. It is through effective resource mobilisation that agents may condition 
                                                          
30 It is not only and always the non-state-agents that design and employ tactics in order to meet the criteria of being strategically 
selected by the state agents. The processes are co-constituted and relatively mutual although the state may have more 
‘resources’ than the non-state agents.   
31 Even access to land which we shall see in the proceeding chapters.  
32 Influenced by George Orwell’s Animal Farm novel dictum: “all animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than 
others”.  
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engagement patterns through domination, coercion, seduction, inducement, and 
manipulation33— what  Allen (2003) terms modalities of power.  
In the context of Africa-China engagements, specific agents whether state or non-state, 
possess resources which are deployable to operationalise their power in the contexts they 
operate to achieve their goals. This relates to agents influencing other agents in vertical, 
horizontal and multi-directions in relation to structural hierarches. This is achieved through 
control of many variables such as physical access to land; capital mobilisation and utilisation 
(domestic or transnational); production and distribution of technology; deciding the rules of the 
game by elites, executives, bureaucrats and civil servants (Corkin, 2015; Soulé-Kohndou, 
2016); skills and technical know-how; resistance, and physical violence (Taylor, 2015) within 
and beyond the country, region, sector and project. African agents make use of the resources 
to manoeuvre and strategically influence engagement patterns with the Chinese.   
Control over rules of the game is a resource attribute that contributes to African agents’ ability 
to influence the engagement patterns with internal and external stakeholders. By rules of the 
game, I mean formal and informal (Hodgson, 2006, p. 2), laws, norms, “procedures, routines, 
and conventions embedded” in the institutional structures used by agents when engaging with 
internal and external stakeholders (Pojani & Stead, 2014, p. 2405). Institutions are thus used 
as resources of power and are deeply embedded in governance structures which resonate 
with history, culture and ideology (Kern, 2011). The governance and regulatory structures are 
likewise co-constituted in state-society relations (Migdal, 2001). It is again these respective 
institutions which will define and mediate state-society and market-relations (Levy & Newell, 
2002). Institutions do not only give agents regulatory power; they, in turn, govern agents’ 
behaviour when engaging other agents. Therefore, it is through the institution that the state 
agents (government) may choose or prioritise certain agents, interests, ideas, preferences, 
sectors, national strategies over the others through ‘strategic selectivity’ (Jessop, 2004). 
Overall, resources as instruments of power suggest that power is relational and is dependent 
on context and time. As such “unequal power resources do not equate to unequal power  […] 
those with fewer resources can prevail over those with more” (Haugaard, 2012, p. 354). 
2.2.4 Repertoires as discursive forms of power 
African agents in Africa-China engagements often use repertoires to influence and condition 
their decision-making patterns. Repertoires are dominant imaginaries or discourses, frames, 
norms, ideas, concepts, perspectives, beliefs, and identities which are symbolic but strong 
                                                          
33 Domination relates to power emerging from the centre (for example the top management of an organisation, enterprise etc.) 
distributed across the network; Coercion relates to use of force (or control someone against his/her will); Seduction and 
Inducement related to persuasion and choice; and Manipulation related to skilfulness to change perception if not behaviour. 
Importantly “some forms of power cannot be dissociated from face-to-face interaction” (Law, 2004, p. 795) or ‘during negotiations 
between co-present parties’. For more see Allen, J. 2003. Lost Geographies of Power, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Press. 
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enough to influence social action (Avelino & Rotmans, 2009; Hajer, 2006; Levy & Newell, 
2002). These repertoires are embedded in temporal socio-cultural settings and are 
reproduced time and again “to give meaning to action” (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010, p. 547). 
Barnett & Duvall (2005, p. 55) relates that repertoire is a discursive form of power that 
“emphasises social processes, systems of knowledge through which meaning is produced, 
fixed, lived, experienced and transformed”. As is the case with resources as instruments of 
power, repertoires as discursive forms of power likewise require effective mobilisation. 
Effective mobilisation of the repertoires allows agents to accrue dispositional power and 
popular support to the extent of developing capabilities to set and shape agendas, 
preferences, and interests (Geels, 2014). Geels further suggests that it is through discursive 
forms of power that agents can shape ‘what’ is being discussed, and also the ‘how’ component 
of the discussions. For Hagmann and Peclard (2010, p. 547) citing Bayart (2005[1996]:110) 
these repertoires are “not uniform bodies of language and thought, but mostly hybrid norms, 
discourses and ideas that have been amalgamated in past political interactions”—where 
reference is always made to them by agents to legitimize their actions. Within the Global North-
Africa engagement context, discursive interpretations relate “to references to ‘good 
governance’, ‘human rights’, ‘democracy’, ‘development’, ‘anti-Western ideologies’” 
(Hagmann & Peclard, 2010, p. 547). Likewise, in the context of Africa-China engagement and 
South-South Cooperation, ‘developmental state’, ‘developing countries solidarity34’, ‘win-win 
friendship’, and ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ are often cited repertoires shaping 
engagement patterns. As averred by Geels (2014) these discourses will increasingly become 
dominant resultantly shaping rules, resources and agents’ configurations. It is nonetheless 
difficult to measure repertoires, but one is certain of their ability to tremendously influence 
public discourses around Africa-China engagements including among others—China as seen 
as being a development predator and or, China as seen as a development saviour for Africa. 
Ultimately such imaginaries and narratives inform and influences how African agents view and 
interact with Chinese actors.   
2.2.5 Interests, ideology, ideas, preferences and values 
Realist informed thinking echoes the idea that agents engage with other agents in pursuit of 
self-interest. Self-interest relates to “needs, desires, concerns, fears—the things [actors] cares 
about or wants. They underlie people’s positions—the tangible items they say they want” (Ury, 
Brett, & Goldberg, 2010, p. 2). As such self-interest drives behaviour and outcomes. From an 
IR perspective, states engage other states influenced by the need to promote their national 
interests. These national interests may vary depending on the economic and political elites, 
or general populations’ considerations. Such interests range from security, peace and 
                                                          
34 As in of shared underdevelopment experience and selected moments of shared colonial history.  
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development and cascades to the national, regional, local, industry and sector. This brings a 
multiplicity of competing interests. Current debates on Africa-China engagements present 
scenarios which justify why African countries’ national interests have pushed them to look 
East, to Asia in general and China in particular (Obala, 2014; Ojakorotu & Kamidza, 2018; 
Tombindo & Tukić, 2016). It is argued that China does not interfere in the domestic political 
and governance affairs of host countries. This is a welcome policy approach by a majority of 
African political elites because it reduces their political accountability, including for the 
establishment of good governance systems, a pre-condition for successful engagement 
patterns with Euro-American countries and donor agencies (Ojakorotu & Kamidza, 2018). 
Questioning the role of African agency in Africa-China relations presents an opportunity to 
scrutinise how African agents’ national interest priorities define and condition the engagement 
patterns with Chinese actors. It is through this scrutiny of interests that I will be able to establish 
what drives Africa-Chinese engagements.   
Whereas national interests play an important role in conditioning African agents’ engagement 
patterns with Chinese actors, they are also equally influenced and guided by wider ideological, 
ideas, preferences and values which are discursive but powerful enough to shape attitude, 
behaviour, thinking and possible outcomes. For that matter, African agents rely on “ideological, 
historical, domestic politics and geopolitical factors” (Fraser & Whitfield, 2008, p. 5) as 
motivational considerations for engaging with Chinese actors. This challenges the long 
existing assumption of external factors as more determinant in conditioning the African agents’ 
interests and preference identification. As Leftwich & Adrian (2014, p. 89) argue:  
“the centrality of ideas in the political process is seen in the politics of ideas35, the battle 
for hearts and minds, political rhetoric, ideology, evidence-based policy, public and 
political values, policy learning, think tanks, public attitudes, opinion and perceptions, 
deliberation and participatory development. The very language of politics conjures up 
the centrality of conflict and struggle over values and ideas”.  
Ideology, ideas, preferences and values are part and parcel of the fabric of the political context. 
They are ‘social facts’ which are collective and not individual, have structural and agential 
components to them, and can work through causal or constitutive channels (Ibid, p. 91). 
Leftwich and Adrian (2014) aver that ideas can be disaggregated into a tripartite dimension: 
level, content and purpose. The level here relates to the ideological or philosophical stances 
that influence and shape agents’ attitude, behaviour and thinking. The ideological stances 
relate to the adoption of a governance framework (economic, social, and political) which 
                                                          
35 See Mohan, G., Asante, P.K., & Abdulai, A-G. 2017. ‘Party Politics and the Political Economy of Ghana’s Oil’, New Political 
Economy, DOI:10.1080/13563467.2017.1349087   
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resonates with history, identity, culture and interests of the country or industry. Examples 
include among others, developmental state or state-led development (in the case of Ethiopia) 
identity, free-market beliefs (market liberalisation), democracy, and authoritarianism. The 
content relates to programmes which create roadmaps and concrete strategies for agents 
(Hudson & Leftwich, 2014). It is through programmes that ideological or philosophical stances 
are put into practice. The purpose relates to policy framework through which programmes are 
implemented. Policies further “contain ideas about what works best where to achieve the 
values driving the programme” (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014, p. 93). Studying ideas, ideology, 
values and preferences in Africa-China relations allows one to question how African agents 
can influence and control engagement patterns with Chinese actors.  
Given the multiplicity and complexity of the range of actors involved in Africa-China relations, 
this study will specifically focus on Ethiopian agents’ interactions with the Chinese 
stakeholders in the financing and development of Adama wind farms. I will unpack how 
ideology, ideas, preference and values influenced the engagements patterns and dynamics 
between the two countries. It is within these imperatives that agency is exercised (Fraser & 
Whitfield, 2008) and one should question how much, and to what extent were Ethiopians able 
to control, influence and have embedded autonomy in the interactions. Who designed the wind 
energy policy position? Who set the national development targets for wind energy? Who 
coordinated the methodological and implementation strategies, and who was in charge of the 
two wind farms’ development objectives? Did the Ethiopians reject, if need be, imposed 
onerous conditions? It is in these “realms of decision making”  (Fraser & Whitfield, 2008, p. 4) 
where interests, preference, ideas and values are protected and promoted. So how do these 
play out in the brokering, negotiation and modalities of engagement processes in such mega-
infrastructure deals? 
2.3 Negotiations processes   
 
2.3.1 Brokerage processes  
Brokerage processes (deal brokering) as part of the negotiation processes appears to be a 
black box and remains nonetheless missing in research and scholarship for not only Africa-
China engagements but broader African engagement within and beyond the continent. I define 
negotiation as “a process by which [actors] attempt to influence others to help achieve [their] 
needs while at the same time taking their needs into account” (Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, 
2010, p. v). By brokerage processes, I question who initiated the need for engagement 
between African agents and Chinese stakeholders. In other words, who brokered the deals? 
This allows me to probe the factors which drove and motivated the engagements to occur. In 
so doing, I will be able to understand not only the factors behind that but also the levels at 
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which the engagements begin, operate and end, with who and with what implications. 
Additionally, this will allow me to reconstruct the processes from engagement initiation to the 
agreed course of action and implementation. I will be able to track the decision-making through 
the projects’ life cycles. Good or bad deals are sealed at the brokerage stage and it is where 
the scrutiny of agency should begin. As I conceptualise African agency as the ability of African 
agents to be self-reflective and projective of their possible actions in future, interrogating deal 
brokering allows me to move from structural determinism to relationality where context and 
time become important. In the brokerage process at the state level in particular, I unpack how 
political leadership—the strong man and woman phenomena, a committed entrepreneurial 
elite as well as efficient and well-trained bureaucratic workforce significantly influence the 
exercise of agency by Africans.   
2.3.2 Negotiating strategy 
Negotiating strategy is one of the prisms where African agency can be operationalised in the 
context of Africa-China engagements. African agents negotiating strategies with the Chinese 
actors have among other alternatives36 been based on collaboration “in which they always 
attempt to maximise their outcomes while preserving or enhancing their relationship” (Lewicki, 
Hiam, & Olander, 2010, p. 17). As is the case in any negotiation, the negotiation processes 
always have a “starting point, a target, and an ending point or walk away” (Lewicki, Hiam, et 
al., 2010, p. 20). The starting point in this regard is where the negotiations begin, a target is 
the intended outcome of the negotiation, while an ending point or walk away is where agents 
are prepared to let go of the negotiations—what Lewicki, Hiam, et al., (2010) terms ‘the cut-
off point’. However, for the negotiating strategy to be effective, agents are supposed to operate 
within the basis of negotiating tactics. Negotiating tactics include but not limited to: 
“Behavioural tactics such as bluffing, being aggressive, and threatening, which can 
give the competitor power over the other party. While these tactics work sometimes, 
they also have problems as they can potentially backfire on the person using them, so 
they must be employed carefully” (Lewicki, Hiam, et al., 2010, p. 21).  
Furthermore, agents may likewise set limits as part of the negotiating strategy in which 
negotiations will occur “only under certain conditions, in a certain location, at a certain time, or 
in a certain manner” (Nierenberg & Calero, 2010, p. 52). This resembles “management skills 
for negotiations” (Collins, 2009, p. 3). Other than the behavioural tactics, African agents also 
use resources and repertoires (as explained earlier) as part and parcel of the negotiating 
                                                          
36 Alternatives being passivity and contestation. A bias towards collaboration as reflected above does not signal that Africa-China 
negotiations are always based on collaboration. Passivity scenarios would imply Chinese stakeholders’ engagement with African 
agents being left to operate freely, unchallenged. Contestation is reaction to instances where Chinese operation or interests, are 
conflictual to African agents’ norms, values and interests. Contestation therefore resembles resistance or opposition to 
engagement practices that undermine or threatens the fabric of African agent’s interests. 
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strategies to influence the outcomes in their favour. Also, the political leadership interventions 
also steer negotiations towards intended outcomes and have often been used by Meles 
Zenawi when engaging the Chinese. Hudson and Leftwich (2014) term it ‘classic great man’ 
explanation. For some, astute technical and bureaucratic skills help African agents to 
manoeuvre and influence outcomes (Taylor, 2005). It is within these confines where the 
negotiating strategies emerge.   
2.4 Modalities of engagement 
Reconstruction of modalities of engagement between African agents and Chinese 
stakeholders involved in the decision-making processes is always a challenge because of data 
unavailability and secrecy behind these deals. I attempt to bridge this gap by reconstructing 
the decision-making processes of Ethiopian and Chinese stakeholders who were involved in 
these projects. This allows me to get a deeper and wider perspective of the strategies 
employed by Ethiopian agents when interacting with the Chinese. I undertake a nuanced 
approach of agency seen as not entirely the rejection or resistance of Chinese domination, as 
if all Afro-Sino engagements are conflictual and detrimental to African progress, but of ability, 
capacity and capability of African agents to shape the terms and conditions of engagements 
at the negotiating tables. That said, African agency in the context of Africa-China engagements 
should not, therefore, be seen as “opposition to external forces […] [as] we may miss the wide 
range of African actions that […] are simply geared towards coping and survival within a highly 
unequal global system” (Murray-Evans, 2015, p. 1847). As modalities of engagement are 
context (sector) dependent, it is through empirical cases that one will be able to reconstruct 
“decision-making processes as far as possible by accessing the perspectives and strategies 
of the actors” (Fraser & Whitfield, 2008, p. 8) who were involved in the projects under study. 
Modalities of engagement in this regard imply the course of action undertaken by African 
agents at different stages of the negotiation when engaging with the Chinese counterparts 
aimed solely at safeguarding their interests.   
2.4.1 Negotiation zone 
Negotiation zones are important avenues where Africa-China engagements unfold. 
Negotiation zones are defined as venues, social spaces or theatres where agents contest one 
another’s interest and agenda to influence the outcome of the engagements. It is in the 
negotiation zone that “power and authority are vested [and] need to be traced empirically on 
a case by case basis” (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010, pp. 550–551). Negotiation zones are 
dynamic and vary between context and time. It is within the negotiation zones that African 
agent’s vis-à-vis Chinese actors contest for influence. Hagmann and Peclard (2010, p. 551) 
argues that the negotiation zones include but are not limited to: 
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“A varying number of actors, some of which are recognised as participants of formal 
decision making […] (typically ‘big men’, politicians, businessmen, diplomats, but also 
religious leaders, NGO representatives) and others who have been denied access to 
the negotiation table (typically minority groups, women, groups with a lower socio-
economic status)” (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010, p. 551).  
Negotiation zones are in essence ‘contact zones’ (Santos, 2014) spaces where political 
decisions and or the political agendas are set for engagement, within and between African 
agents, and Chinese actors. Negotiation zones, therefore, shape African agents but do not 
entirely determine their behavioural practices and actions in decision making. This makes 
negotiation zones not only “difficult to locate geographically” but also complex to “distinguish 
between formalised/ recognised and non-formalized/non-recognized negotiation settings” 
(Hagmann & Peclard, 2010, p. 551). This is because they “are embedded in social relations 
between contending groups and are characterised by spatiotemporal dynamics and a certain 
informality” (Ibid, 551).   
2.4.2 Negotiation tables 
Negotiating tables are important frontiers or formalised/recognised settings where African 
agents meet the Chinese stakeholders in their engagements. Negotiation tables vary from one 
case to another and include “diplomatic conferences involving heads of states, through donor 
consultations between international financial institutions and local NGOs, to meetings by 
customary chiefs under the village tree” (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010, p. 551). This is where 
negotiations occur and are governed by procedures or protocols of engagement in the form of 
diplomatic conventions; Memorandum of Understanding; sovereignty (in the case of state to 
state engagements) where counterparts are recognised as “legitimate stakeholders in 
deciding upon a particular political matter” (Ibid, 551). In the context of Africa-China 
engagements, negotiation tables relate to the bilateral state to state level, multilateral level 
such as the African Union (AU), Forum on China Africa Cooperation and other regional 
economic blocs such as East African Community (EAC), ministerial level (Finance, Energy, 
Trade, Infrastructure), sectoral level and project implementation level. Negotiation tables are 
dependent on the political interests of the stakeholders of the particular space and time, while 
negotiation zones are broad and involve multiple stakeholders making them relatively difficult 
to change over time and challenging to locate empirically. That said, negotiation zones evolve 
from agendas which are negotiated over multiple negotiation tables and stakeholders—a 
reason to explain their long term patterns. In this study, negotiation tables, therefore, provide 
a window to see and understand the spatiotemporal context where power and authority are 
vested in decision-making processes. Furthermore, it will allow me to understand how different 
sectors and projects use different negotiation tables, and how such influence African agency. 
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2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter began by historicizing the exercise of agency by African actors when engaging 
external stakeholders traced and located from, during and after the colonial and post-colonial, 
cold war and post-cold war, and the structural adjustment periods. Although African actors 
were not passive when interacting with the external actors in these periods, there appears to 
be a lack of understanding of what constituted agency, and how internal factors influenced the 
exercise of agency. Such shortcomings could be traced from an incomplete or inappropriate 
definition of the African state. As such, I revisited the definition of the African state in which I 
argued that the African state should be seen as a negotiated entity located and embedded 
primarily in the social forces that operate within its territorial jurisdiction. The state-society 
approach was helpful especially in framing the African agency argument as it provided an 
opportunity to explore potential drivers and motivations of an African country to engage 
external stakeholders. It also provided an angle to analyse how such engagements are 
structured and implemented, and the development implications thereof. The second part of 
historicizing African agency explored how the rise of Global South countries such as China 
presents an opportunity for the reinvigoration of African actors’ practice of international 
relations and politics. These emerging economies provide leverage or triangulation for African 
actors to play one donor against another to their advantage.  
Apart from historicizing African agency, this chapter also presented a contextual and a 
theoretical basis to apply African agency as an analytical framework to examine Africa-China 
engagements. It does so by engaging with realism, constructivism and institutionalism 
theories. Relying heavily on Colin Wight’s (1999; 2004; 2006) work on agency, William 
Brown’s (2006; 2012; 2013) and William Brown and Sophie Harman’s (2013) work on African 
agency in international relations and politics I have conceptualised state, state-based actors 
and non-state actors as agents involved in the practice of international relations with Chinese 
stakeholders. I further located such a conception in the sociological reading of agency 
proposed by Emirbayer and Mische’s (1998) work. To understand the agential dimensions of 
the agents, I unpacked two attributional factors of power; resources and repertoires that actors 
deploy to influence the engagement patterns and achieve their intended objectives. However, 
these two dimensions of power go hand in hand with interests, ideology, ideas, preferences 
and values of the agents involved, and substantially condition the interactions. The chapter 
concludes by locating and discussing the practicalities of the spheres where African agency 
is exercised. Discussions were thus centred on the negotiation processes and the modalities 
of engagement involved between African and external actors in the practice of international 
relations. Finally, while the existing literature on African agency in its broadest sense certainly 
exists, little research has been conducted which applies African agency as a theoretical 
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framework to understand Africa-China engagements in the financing and development of wind 
energy infrastructure. As such what drives African agents to exercise agency is in the state-
society relations and it is through an empirical exploration of the drivers, motivations, 
engagement modalities, negotiation processes, development outcomes and impacts of these 
interactions that I will be able to establish the operational nature of agency.  
Using Ethiopia-China engagement in the financing and development of the Adama wind farms 
as case studies, I propose a conceptual and analytical framework of African agency which is 
highly contextual, relational, historical and political but opens possibilities of generating new 
epistemological and methodological approaches of normatively and empirically framing and 
studying African agency in Africa-China engagements. As I shall present in the later chapters, 
this framework will make it possible to understand the form, outcomes and implications of 
African actors’ exercise of agency when engaging the Chinese in infrastructure development 
projects. Therefore, it is suggested that the application of an African agency framework in the 
context of Africa-China engagements in infrastructure financing and development might be 
particularly helpful in generating an understanding of what African agents want, and how they 
innovatively get what they want in those tight corners which they operate. The next chapter 
provides a methodological approach deployed to answer the research questions set in this 
study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
Appendix 2. 1 Conceptualisation of African agency 
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
3. 0 Introduction 
In order to understand Ethiopia-China engagement in the financing and development of the 
wind farms, this chapter discusses the research design and methodology of this study. Given 
the research gap and the theoretical foundation presented in chapter one and two respectively, 
I adopt a research philosophy centred on interpretivist and critical realist paradigms. These 
paradigms not only guide and shape what one knows and consider as reality but also 
constructions of knowledge and research around Africa-China relations. I proceed with a 
discussion of the qualitative case study research design adopted for this study to answer the 
set research questions. Discussions here centres on the selection and justification of the case 
studies, negotiating fieldwork and adoption of the process tracing approach, and the methods 
for data collection and analysis. Building on this, I discuss aspects of rigour and validity which 
is followed by a critical examination and deconstruction of my positionality, which affects the 
relationship between the researcher and the researched. It is through reflexivity that the 
positionality divide is addressed. Building on the reflexivity process, I engage with the politics 
of knowledge production and how this contributes to the shaping of discourses and narratives 
on Africa-China relations. Contextual mediation of this debate is important because it reveals 
“how Chinese knowledge of Africa and African knowledge of China is produced and 
assimilated […] [and] how this newer knowledge feeds into government policies, Western 
discourse and understanding, and attitudes and experiences on the ground” (Strauss & 
Saavedra, 2009, p. 551). Finally, I discuss the challenges I encountered during the fieldwork 
and the ethical issues that guided the conduct of this research. The last section summarises 
and concludes the chapter.  
3.1 Research philosophy: epistemological and ontological considerations   
Research philosophy relates to the way, nature and belief in which knowledge in research is 
viewed, gathered, analysed and used (Creswell, 2003). There are two main research 
philosophies namely epistemology and ontology. Ontology is defined as the “study of ‘being’, 
existence, or the way the world is” (Fleetwood, 2013, p. 3). It relates not only to the physical 
reality but also anything that has a causal effect. While ontology relates to reality, epistemology 
relates to the study of reality and how one understands that which is known and exists. It 
further questions how one gains knowledge of the so-called ‘reality’. Broadly, epistemology, 
therefore, is “the study of how knowledge is possible” (Fleetwood, 2013, p. 3) and how that 
“knowledge is validated” (Olsen, 2009, p. 29). Although epistemology and ontology are two 
different but interrelated concepts, it is challenging to “keep ontology and epistemology apart” 
(Crotty, 2006, p. 10) because ontology is the study of reality and epistemology the study of 
how one knows and understands reality. As noted, “to talk of the construction of meaning is to 
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talk of the construction of meaningful reality” (Crotty, 2006, pp. 2–3). As such, the two co-
emerge and cannot be conceptually separated. 
This study’s central question is to understand how African agency shapes and influences the 
relations between Ethiopian and Chinese stakeholders in the financing and development of 
Adama wind farms. It is through an examination of drivers and motivations, modalities of 
engagement and negotiation processes and interrogation of outcomes and local development 
impacts of the wind farms that I will be able to tell if the Ethiopians exercised agency. As such, 
the exercise of agency as presented in chapter two is relational and context-dependent. To 
capture this contextual specificity and relationality, I adopt critical realist and interpretative 
epistemologies. The rationale is that the former is tied to an objective while the latter is aligned 
with a subjective construction of reality. It is through the application of these epistemological 
paradigms that I will be able to reconstruct the knowledge and the meaningful reality of the 
Ethiopian and Chinese actors who were involved in the projects.  
3.1.1 A critical realist reading  
Critical realism questions the reality and views knowledge as objective (Gray, 2009). Critical 
realism challenges and rejects a naturalistic and (anti)positivist epistemological reading of 
causality “according to which value judgements are portrayed as subjective, and perhaps 
irrational, expressions of emotion or personal feeling” (Hammersley, 2009, p. 2). Critical 
realism sees knowledge in research as fallible, meaning empirical knowledge is rationally 
justified and accepted even though it cannot be proved with certainty (Roberts, 2014, p. 3). 
This is because there is always a possible doubt, an unavoidable reality caused by human 
cognitive capacities37 (Hammersley, 2009). Responsible rationality, therefore, entails 
objectivity is reached through the evaluative process of reflexivity. 
Critical realism proposes a layered domain of reality in which mechanisms and patterns of 
social actions are observable from causal relationships between and among variables 
(Roberts, 2014). The layered domains of reality can be observed as ‘the real’ (structures and 
powers of an object—mechanisms), ‘the actual’ (what event, what situation, what scenario), 
and ‘the empirical’ (observable events, situations, scenarios) (Sayer, 2000). Layered domains 
in this regard relate to understanding “of the world as stratified, [distinguishing] the domains 
of the real” (Scott, 2014, p. 1). The relationship between these layered domains helps to 
explain “the causal mechanisms and their effects” (Pawson & Tilley, 1997, p. 69). This implies 
that causality is relational and dependent on the context in which the objects under inquiry 
operate.  
                                                          
37 For Hammersley (2009, p.3), its trivial because “it can, of course, be argued that this value principle is deeply entrenched 
within, or even constitutive of, human social life”.  
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The use of a critical realist paradigm is consistent with other studies around Africa-China 
relations (see Brautigam, 2009; Wilbertz & Rehling, 2014). As is the case elsewhere, the 
construction and interpretation of African agency in Africa-China engagement are conceived 
from existing perceptions, preferences, stereotypes, interests and ideologies (see Adem, 
2016; Geerts, Xinwa, & Rossouw, 2014; Le Corre, Sun, Sy, & Trinkunas, 2015; Rebol, 2010). 
The use of critical realism in this study is necessary and justified to puncture rosy (Marks, 
2010) and anti-Chinese assumptions with realistic accounts.   
One limitation of a critical realist reading is that it only explores the observable actions of the 
object under enquiry, and “thus fails to ask enough questions about an object’s internal 
ontological properties” which are not observable (Roberts, 2014, p. 6). The internal ontological 
properties reflect the dialectical interplay between structure and agency of that object. Taking, 
for instance, African agents in their engagements with Chinese actors, a critical realist 
approach fails to recognise the internal properties that characterise the agents and how they 
impact their behaviour and social action. Given this limitation, I propose an interpretative 
epistemological reading of knowledge. The rationale is that critical realism can be used 
together with the interpretive paradigm. Critical realism “acknowledge(s) the value of 
interpretivist methodologies that focus upon discourse, human perception and motivation” 
(McEvoy & Richards, 2006, p. 70). This underscores the “underlying social structures, which 
may enable or constrain the actions of individuals or to the social networks in which social 
actors are embedded” (Ibid, p.70). As a researcher, I am part and parcel of the social world I 
am studying and, similarly, I may construct the reality of the social phenomena out there 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007).  
3.1.2 An interpretive reading 
Denzin and Lincoln (2003) relate the interpretive paradigm as a subjective construction of 
meaning and reality. Knowledge in research is seen as relational and is context tied. An 
interpretive approach focuses on the finer and situational analysis of the details of an event, 
intervention, and/or process (Dean, 2018). According to the interpretive paradigm, knowledge 
in research is value bound, and the researcher is intrinsically synced with the study (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2003). As a researcher, I “seek to understand values, beliefs and meanings of 
phenomena, obtaining verstehen (a deep and sympathetic understanding) of human cultural 
activities and experiences” (Kim, 2003, p. 10). Due to the subjective nature of the interpretive 
epistemological foundation, there is a multiplicity of realities, and for that matter, employs 
mainly qualitative research design and techniques in both data collection and analysis 
(McEvoy & Richards, 2006). There is a need to adopt a subjective stand in order to harness 
all potential existing narratives, then triangulate them to achieve rigour and validation of claims 
(Oliver-Hoyo & Allen, 2006; Olsen, 2004). In this study, I acknowledge that knowledge and 
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meaning around Africa-China engagements are socially constructed and bound to subjective 
interpretation. Such subjective interpretations go with the politics of knowledge production on 
what constitutes reality in these engagements. 
The interpretive paradigm is adopted in this study because it is “appropriate for studies of 
complex human behaviour and social phenomena” (De Villiers, 2005, p. 111). It focuses on 
understanding phenomena that occur in their natural settings and mostly rely on verbal data 
where the researchers’ “values and human experiences are relevant” (Ibid, p. 111). A study of 
this nature which questions the motivational factors for Ethiopia and Chinese stakeholders 
about financing and developing the wind farms seeks to understand the reasons for such 
intervention which can be interpreted from multiple realities. As such, the reasons for MOWIE 
are different if not conflictual to those of a farmer, who has just lost a piece of land to develop 
the wind farms, an economist who is aware of the debt burden, or a business person whose 
firm has been allocated more electricity. It is through an interpretive approach that such 
multiple realities can be captured. Finally, this study adopts a case study approach which sits 
well with interpretivism. Use of an interpretive epistemological paradigm is consistent with a 
majority of studies in Africa-China relations (see Benabdallah, 2017; Maparure, 2014; Nunoo, 
2017; Qichen, 2016; Wolbrink, 2017; Youngman, 2017). A combination of critical realism and 
interpretivism establishes that on the one hand meaning is socially constructed and bound to 
multiple subjective interpretations and, on the other hand, knowledge production in research 
is objective, fallible and is based on causality. Overall, to understand the conditions and 
processes under which events occur, the time and context of the phenomena under enquiry 
is important to ground one’s responsible rationality and objectivity.   
3.2 Qualitative case study research design   
A case study approach relates to the study of a phenomenon in its natural setting in which the 
researcher employs multiple methods to gather and analyse data (triangulation) (Yin, 1994). 
Creswell (2007) conceptualises a case study as an inquiry which provides an in-depth 
interpretation of processes, events or individuals, in scenarios where the phenomenon is 
unfamiliar/less familiar or even unknown. By definition, it is a study in which “the investigator 
explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through 
detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information, and reports as case 
description and case-based themes” (Creswell, 2007, p. 73). Therefore, the case study 
approach offered a microscopic and contextual investigation of the cases which allowed me 
to obtain rich data necessary for answering the research questions.   
3.2.1 Ethiopia as a country case study 
Ethiopia was chosen as a single country case study on Africa-China engagement to have 
more grounded and robust discussion where more space was allocated to one country as 
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compared to many38. Using of single country case study is consistent with other studies in 
Africa-China relations. Single country case study advances the quality of research as focus 
will be on depth rather than breadth. There are several explanations for this. First, Ethiopia is 
one of the second largest non-oil and non-mineral resources rich recipient countries of 
Chinese loans (Chen et al., 2015; Pilling, 2017) (see figure 4.7; figure 4.8). Additionally, the 
Chinese are not only financiers, but also the largest builders of Ethiopian infrastructure 
(Scoones et al., 2016)—roads, railways lines, telecommunication, aviation, industrial parks, 
hydroelectric dams, and wind farms (see appendix 4.2). Secondly, as of 2018, China became 
Ethiopia’s largest goods and services export partner, with Somalia and the USA coming 
second and third, respectively (Workman, 2018) (see appendix 4.5). Thirdly, China is now the 
largest provider of foreign direct investment in Ethiopia, ahead of India, Turkey, USA and UK 
(Nicolas, 2017) (see figure 4.9; 4.10). Finally, Ethiopia is presented as one of the few African 
countries able to meaningfully and strategically exercise agency when engaging with not only 
Chinese but any external actors. It is argued that Ethiopia is not a “passive recipient” or a 
“pawn” (Alemu & Scoones, 2013, p. 91) in the wider power games (Mohan & Power, 2008) 
and yet is a highly aid-dependent country (see figure 4.5). For Brautigam (2011, p. 1), “China 
sees Ethiopia as a land of business opportunities, but the African country remains in charge 
of any deals”. Despite that “Ethiopia’s ties to China have until recently escaped much 
academic and mainstream literature as it is not a resource-rich country […] yet is important in 
other ways” (Gadzala, 2015, p. 85). Gadzala further claims that Ethiopia has a “unique makeup 
[as] Chinese engagement in that country diverges from that in other states” (Ibid, p. 85). The 
preponderance of othering and (re)presenting Ethiopia as a unique case juxtaposed with other 
African countries drove my zeal to explore why that was the case. As such, Ethiopia was 
selected because to the best of my knowledge no studies exist to date where the African 
agency lens has been applied to Ethiopia-China cooperation in the financing and development 
of wind energy infrastructure. The area remains a niche, and this study generates new 
knowledge and contributes to debates on African agency in Africa-China relations.   
3.2.2 “Cases within a case study”: Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind farms 
Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind energy infrastructure projects are my case studies. Adama 1 is 
about 3 kilometres from Adama town. It has 34 units of GW77/1500 kilowatts each with a 76.9 
metre diameter Goldwind turbine model. The central location of Adama 1 lies at 39°13'48'E, 
8°32'41′N and ranges between 1824 and 1976 metres above sea level. The wind farm has 
installed electricity generation capacity of 51 MW. It has a 55 mega volts-amp transformer with 
a 132/33 kilovolt line connected to Nazret substation by a 132kilovolt single circuit overhead 
                                                          
38 Several studies have adopted a single country case study to ensure finer disaggregated analysis of Africa-China relations. See 
Soule-Kohndou, 2016; Taylor, 2015; Hogwe & Banda, 2017; Corkin, 2013; 2015.  
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line (HydroChina-CGCOC JV, 2010; HydroChina Corporation, 2009). Adama 2 is about 7 
kilometres from Adama town and has installed electricity generation capacity of 153 MW from 
102 units of SE7715/1500 kilowatts each with a 77.7 metre diameter SANY turbine model. 
The central location of Adama 2 lies at 39°12' 10''E, 8°34′ 18'N, and ranges between 1741 
and 2173 metres above sea level. It has a 230kilovolt sub-station with two 90 mega volt-amps. 
The high voltage terminals are connected to Koka Switch Station by a 230kilovolt single circuit 
overhead line (HydroChina Corporation, 2013).    
Several reasons led me to select the two wind farms39. First, Adama wind farms are the first 
Chinese financed and developed wind energy projects in Africa (PowerChina, 2016a). 
Currently, Adama 2 is the second largest wind power project in Africa40. Financing and 
development of wind energy is not normally associated with Chinese engagements in Africa. 
Instead, China is known for developing roads, railways, stadiums, hydroelectric dams, fossil 
fuels, telecommunication infrastructure (Sun et al., 2017). The two wind farms have made 
Ethiopia the 4th largest African country using wind energy (GWEC, 2016b; Tiyou, 2016). 
Globally, Ethiopia sits at number 40 in wind energy installed power, with China being the 
largest manufacturer of wind turbines and the largest country using wind energy (GWEC, 
2016b). These two wind farms have opened Ethiopia’s market for wind energy development 
(GWEC, 2016b; Renewable Energy Policy Network for 21st Century, 2016).  
Second, the impact of climate change because of greenhouse gas emissions and other natural 
factors motivated me to select the two projects. The wind farms qualify as part of Goal 7 of the 
sustainable development goals (SDGs) centred on ensuring access to clean, reliable, modern 
and affordable energy for all41 (United Nations Development Programme, 2016). Globally, 
electricity generated from wind energy contributes to carbon dioxide emission reduction by 
more than 3.3 billion tonnes per year (GWEC, 2016a). In the case of Adama wind farms, the 
technical documents suggest that the two projects are recorded to have zero greenhouse gas 
and other pollutants. This sits well with the Ethiopian government’s Climate Resilient Green 
Economy Strategy (CRGES) and the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) 
which targets to slash per capita emissions by 64% in 2030 (Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia, 2015, p. 1). The two wind farms qualified for Certified Emission Reduction (CER) 
funding from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) arrangement of the Kyoto protocol 
on climate change adaptation financing. For Adama 1, the CER revenue was estimated to be 
                                                          
39 For Brautigam “I think the case study approach is hugely useful. There’s so much that we don’t know, and good research 
comes when people stick with one case study and I’m not talking about just one country, but a project in general and find out all 
they can about it” (2013). 
40 It was the largest in 2015 before the Kenyan Lake Turkana wind farm.  
41 By 2030, expand infrastructure and upgrade technology for supplying modern and sustainable energy services for all in 
developing countries, in particular least developed countries.  
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around US$5.21 million over the estimated 21 year project lifespan42 (HydroChina 
Corporation, 2009).  
Third, developing (wind) energy infrastructure is key to Ethiopia’s social and economic 
structural transformation. It contributes to economic growth by powering industrialisation and 
transforms beneficiaries of electricity services. More than 70% of the 109 million population 
do not have access to electricity which affects essential and industrial services. For example, 
“only 24% of primary schools and 30% of health clinics have access to electricity” (World Bank, 
2018b, p. 2). About 80% of the total Ethiopian population live in rural areas and the majority 
use biomass for cooking and heating which has serious health effects associated with 
pneumonia, chronic lung disease and lung cancer. As part of the Ethiopian government’s 
National Electrification Program (NEP), the two wind farms fall within the scope of the ‘100% 
electricity access target’ by 2025 (World Bank, 2018d). As such (wind) energy infrastructure 
is crucial as it contributes to the building of resilient infrastructure which promotes inclusive 
and sustainable industrialisation and fostering innovation (United Nations Development 
Programme, 2016).  
Finally, less attention has been given to the academic study of Chinese investments in 
Ethiopia’s wind energy sector. There has been a rapid growth of Chinese financing and 
contracting in Ethiopia, and yet the academic community is silent about this topic43. This could 
be attributable to an “absence of detailed information at individual project level [which] further 
restricts developers’ and policymakers’ understanding of the [wind energy] market” (Mukasa, 
et al, 2013, p. 1). As argued, “China’s involvement in the continent’s utility-scale renewable 
energy sector is a relatively recent development and is thus an area that warrants further 
research” (Baker & Shen, 2017, p. 4). Additionally, South-South Cooperation is being given 
attention in international development as an essential implementation platform of the SDGs. 
It is through academic research that one will be able to contest, verify and recognise the 
importance of such partnerships (United Nations Development Programme, 2016). For these 
reasons, the two wind farms were selected as case studies. Use of case studies in this 
research is consistent with conducting academic studies around Africa-China relations (see 
Baker & Shen, 2017; Brautigam, Hwang, & Wang, 2015; Chen, 2016).      
 
 
 
                                                          
42 During fieldwork, no data was readily available for Adama 2.    
43Except for Chen’s (2016) working paper.  
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Figure 3. 1 Adama wind farms location and layout  
 
Source: Google Earth Pro, 2019.  
3.3 Negotiating fieldwork: a process tracing approach  
To holistically capture the engagement patterns and dynamics of what happened in the 
financing and development of the wind farms, I adopt a process tracing approach. Informed 
by the critical realist and interpretivist paradigms, the process tracing approach entails 
unpacking procedures and principles undertaken to reconstruct the timeline and course of 
action taken along the project life cycle. The purpose is to “establish [a] causal relationship 
between one or more explanatory variables” (Yarhi-Milo, 2015, p. 1). This approach is time 
intensive and requires prolonged, systematic engagement with various stakeholders, in 
collecting a large amount of data on the case under reconstruction. Process tracing is 
employable in circumstances where the researcher has: (i) “in-depth knowledge of the cases”, 
(ii) “solid understanding of the general knowledge relevant to the cases”, and (iii) “strong ability 
to formulate a coherent argument that integrates case-specific facts and general knowledge” 
(Mahoney, 2015, p. 202). High-quality process tracing was made possible by my personal 
experiences of previously staying in Ethiopia for over ten months combined with prior 
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knowledge of the two wind farms and a robust understanding of the debates around Ethiopia-
China engagement. These were significant factors which led me to develop historical 
explanations of the case studies. Although there are several approaches to process tracing44, 
I use a historical explanation which is consistent with the majority of studies in Africa-China 
relations (see Carbone, 2011, p. 204; Malm, 2016, p. 60). A historical explanation approach 
has two essential aspects: causal analysis and sequence analysis, where attention is on the 
“identification of causes of outcomes that have already occurred” (Mahoney, 2015, p. 202).  
A historical explanation approach is useful where data is not publicly available or difficult to 
come by. Given that the wind energy industry is still in its infancy in Ethiopia, very few people 
have access to information on how the negotiations and decision-making processes were 
carried out. Through the interviews with Ethiopian and Chinese ministries, institutions, 
agencies and local communities, I obtained important information which enabled me to 
reconstruct sequentially the processes undertaken to develop the two wind farms. I, therefore, 
conducted prolonged and intensive fieldwork for nine months in Ethiopia (Addis Ababa, 
Mekelle and Adama) and an additional three days in South Africa (Johannesburg) from 17-19 
December 2017. The fieldwork was divided into two phases. The first phase was from 4th 
October 2017 to 31st August 2017 and the second phase was from 2nd October 2017 to 21st 
January 2018. As part of the Home Office requirement an international student under the Tier 
4 Visa regime is not allowed to be outside the U.K. for more than six months. This forced me 
to split fieldwork into two phases. Initially, I thought it was disadvantageous as I had planned 
an evolutionary approach to data collection which required an elongated time in the field 
without any break. However, it later worked to my advantage as I had one month break from 
the field in September 2017. The break allowed me to reflect on the content, patterns and 
themes of the data I had already collected.    
For the entire duration of data collection, I was co-hosted by MU (see appendix 3.4; 3.5) and 
Addis Ababa University (AAU) (see appendix 3.6;3.7) because of personal relations I had 
established in my previous endeavours with the two Universities. I also had personal 
connections with Ethiopian bureaucrats and civil servants especially in MOWIE which helped 
to negotiate and gain access to some of the research participants. Regardless of the personal 
contacts and networks, negotiating access and developing trust with research participants was 
not easy at all. Most if not all research participants requested support letters or introductory 
letters, and fortunately, based on my previous experience of undertaking fieldwork in Ethiopia, 
                                                          
44 See Derek Beach & Rasmus Brun Pedersen. 2013. Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan; Joachim Blatter & Markus Haverland. 2012. Designing Case Studies: Explanatory Approaches in Small-
N Research, New York: Palgrave Macmillan; James Mahoney. 2012. "The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences”. 
Sociological Methods & Research; Stephen Van Evera. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Cornell 
University Press.  
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I had obtained the necessary supporting letters from the Open University (OU), MU (see 
appendix 3.4; 3.5), AAU (see appendix 3.6;3.7) and Adama City Administration. The support 
letters were prepared in English, Mandarin and local languages.  
My first interview was on 12 May 2017 in Mekelle with the Vice President of Tigray regional 
state, former ambassador of Ethiopia to China, central committee and politburo member of 
both the TPLF and EPRDF45. Getting an appointment with him was not easy. Appointments 
were set and unset several times. By persistently knocking at his door, he finally gave me the 
interview. Little did I know that my experience with the former ambassador resembled what 
would define my entire data collection process in Ethiopia. Getting appointments was a big 
challenge. Surprisingly, while one would expect that high-level stakeholders are difficult to set 
and fulfil appointments with, I realised that even low-level stakeholders behaved the same. 
This was also the case with Chinese stakeholders. It made me realise that basically everyone, 
regardless of social status either purposefully or unwittingly never took appointments 
seriously46.  
The majority of interviews were conducted at three locations in Ethiopia: Addis Ababa where 
federal government agencies and institutions are located; Adama (Lome Woreda47, Adama 
Woreda, Qachema, Mukiye, Sere-robi, Adama, Kobolito, Tede-dildima, Mele-mele, Jogo 
Gudedo, Bubisa Kusaye Kebeles48) where the two wind farms are located; and Mekelle—the 
capital city of Tigray and home to TPLF. Again, MU’s Department of Mechanical Engineering 
participated as the consultant team leader for Adama 2 together with ASTU in Adama. Informal 
conversations with people in the streets in Tigray pointed to the unmeasurable role of TPLF-
EPRDF in bringing about economic development and prosperity to the country, with the 
backing of Beijing. As such, my experiences in Tigray points to an informal consensus that 
development comes first, and democracy comes later— one reason to explain why China is a 
close development partner.   
Negotiating and gaining access to research participants in Adama town had its complexities. 
In phase 1, I conducted interviews with medium to high-level stakeholders from Ethiopia and 
China in Addis Ababa and not Adama. I could not conduct interviews in Adama during phase 
1 because of physical and personal security reasons49. Instead, I resorted to conducting a 
                                                          
45 Although I arrived in Ethiopia in April, I was not legally allowed to undertake research until a resident permit/visa was issued.    
46 With reference to the research participants I invited to participate in this study. This observation does not apply to anyone 
outside the research environment.  
47 Woreda is an Amharic word which refers to a lower local government administration unit in Ethiopia equivalent to ‘district’.  
48 Kebele is an Amharic word which refers to the lowest administration unit in Ethiopia equivalent to a ‘ward’. 
49 The state of emergency had been extended in Ethiopia and several places in Oromo were not safe for an outsider. Also, 
Sharon Gray a post-doctoral researcher was killed in Ethiopia when conducting fieldwork in October 2016. See: Nashelly Chavez 
& Cathy Locke. 2016. UC Davis scientist killed in Ethiopia had ‘bright future ahead of her’ available at 
58 
 
comprehensive fact-finding mission without conducting any interviews. This included soliciting 
support letters from Adama city administration and Adama Woreda. It was not easy to get 
those letters. I secured the letters after I took a bold move by approaching the Oromo regional 
state President’s office where I was referred to Adama city administration. Adama city 
administration then referred me to Adama and Lome Woreda administration. From the Woreda 
level, I was referred to the Kebele administration level where several support letters were 
issued, clearing me to conduct interviews.  
During data collection, I had to carefully negotiate the interviewing approach as ‘anti-Chinese’ 
elements were present although not explicitly expressed so by the general public in Adama 
(and the surrounding villages). For them, China is seen as propping up a ‘repressive regime’ 
through massive development finance in industrial parks (see appendix 4.1), infrastructure 
sector, and technology for security surveillance of those expressing discontentment to the 
regime. These narratives partly emanated from the expansion of Addis Ababa into Oromia 
region which led to massive protests in which some of the Chinese industries were affected50. 
The Integrated Master Plan of Addis Ababa and the Nearby Oromia Towns (now cancelled51) 
further exacerbated the situation leading to massive protest which led to the death of 140 
people, and also the enactment of a state of emergency (Chala, 2016). Furthermore, there 
was growing discontentment by the farmers and youth, who saw their land52 taken and given 
to Chinese, Indian, South Korean and Turkish enterprises without being adequately 
compensated. Oromia residents complained that the enterprises did not give their children 
employment opportunities, and those employed were poorly remunerated. Add to that there 
was a preponderance of protests caused by the demand for opening political space and 
equitable distribution of the economic dividends; the argument being that Oromia which is at 
the centre of economic growth in Ethiopia, is often side-lined in infrastructure development 
and various other public goods/services provision53 (Fortin, 2016).  
Several factors motivated me to spend a long time in the field. Firstly, as part of the process-
tracing approach of reconstructing the case studies, I had to ‘search’ for the stakeholders who 
were involved in the projects. The process involved mapping out, ‘screening’ and ‘qualifying’ 
                                                          
http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/education/article106530142.html. My Ethiopian friends strongly advised against traveling to 
Oromia region.   
50 Addis Ababa is an autonomous city-state which is in and surrounded by Oromia Regional State in Ethiopia. It is the capital of 
Oromia Regional State and Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
51 The Integrated Master Plan of Addis Ababa and the Nearby Oromia Towns was rejected by the Oromo because of mistrust 
generated from lack of genuine participation and anticipated repercussions on the identity, culture and livelihood of the Oromo. 
See Asebe Regassa Debelo .n.d. Why do the Oromo Resist the Master Plan? Available at 
https://advocacy4oromia.org/articles/why-do-the-oromo-resist-the-master-plan/.  
52 Land in Ethiopia is owned by the federal state, there is no private land ownership. The federal state provides only long-term 
lease agreements to the tenants.   
53 My experiences show that the idea of side-lining was not only confined to Oromia, even in Tigray and Amhara, the resentments 
were present.  
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the stakeholders if indeed they were involved and at which stage of the projects. I achieved 
this by employing referral sampling (see section 3.4.1) which entails asking stakeholders to 
identify other stakeholders they worked with or engaged in the negotiations, implementation 
and management of the two wind farms. Secondly, I wanted to immerse myself in the social, 
cultural, political and economic context of the phenomena I was studying (Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 2007). This emic approach allowed me to understand how Ethiopians and local 
Chinese (those based in Ethiopia) enterprises constructed, produced and interpreted the 
meaning of interactions in the wind farms. Additionally, the study of negotiation processes and 
modalities of engagement in decision making cannot be observed by tapping into official policy 
positions, but by “painstaking in-depth fieldwork” which required considerable time ( Lee, 2013, 
p. 2).  
Thirdly, I wanted to gain trust and establish rapport with institutions I was researching. In every 
institution, some gatekeepers blocked or provided access to my targeted research participants 
(Johl & Renganathan, 2010). Some of these gatekeepers were individuals and institutions. 
The more time I spend interacting with them, the better I began to understand their institutional 
agendas, interests, values and ideologies which I later exploited to my advantage (Johl & 
Renganathan, 2010). Gaining access to the institution did not loosely translate into gaining 
access to the targeted research participants. In most cases, gaining access to targeted 
research participants was more demanding, complex and required a high level of skills and 
tactics than for gaining access at an institution level. Mostly, the targeted research participants 
needed assurance that their participation in the study was not going to jeopardise their work 
and relationship with their superiors. This was primarily the case, especially in Adama area. 
For such reasons, targeted research participants would take often longer than expected to 
accept electronically distributed invitation letters. Some accepted only face to face invitations, 
of course after three or four times of knocking at their doors. Finally, writing and approval of 
introductory or support letters targeted to each stakeholder was a long process. These letters 
were written in English and translated to Amharic, Tigrigna, Afaan Oromo and Mandarin. They 
had to be reviewed to check if the information provided in those letters was not political and 
‘damaging’ and had to go through several ‘hands’ before being approved and put on the official 
letterhead. For these reasons, it was justified spending nine months in the field. 
3.4 Data and methods for data collection   
Researching engagement and decision-making patterns is challenging. It requires one to 
consult from several sources of data, and adoption of multiple data collection techniques. 
Generally, access to official data from the relevant authorities involved in Africa-China 
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engagements is a challenge54(CHINAFRICA Project, 2013). In the context of this case study, 
quantifiable data was difficult to obtain, and where it existed was incomplete making it 
unreliable. The Chinese and Ethiopians rarely publish such data, making it difficult to adopt a 
quantitative research design. As a result, a qualitative research design guided data collection 
and analysis in this study. The central justification for adopting the qualitative research design 
relates to complementarity and completeness of the approach in understanding the agential 
dimensions of the Ethiopia actors when interacting with the Chinese. Conclusions about 
African agency in this study are relational and context-dependent and cannot be arrived at by 
“just recycling aggregate statistics or official policy announcements” (Lee, 2013, p. 2).   
Primary and secondary sources of data largely collected from the field are used in this 
research. Access to some of the technical documents had its challenges. In some cases, I 
was given copies of the confidential documents and in others I was only granted access to 
review them in the office under strict monitoring. Other sources of data were obtained from 
the internet, books, media outlets, reports and policy documents which are publicly available 
and accessible. The main documents reviewed in this study are:  
i. Literature (academic; media; archival; policy; reports) on Africa (Ethiopia)-China 
relations was consulted to gain a broader understanding of the area studies context; 
ii. Tender invitation and bidding documents were consulted to review and corroborate 
evidence of Ethiopian stakeholders’ request for the projects, terms of references and 
circumstances under which the contracts were awarded;   
iii. The project cooperation agreements were consulted to review the project terms and 
conditions and also understand the level and nature of Ethiopian agents’ participation; 
iv. Technical documents (contract agreement; particular conditions of contract; general 
conditions of contract; employer’s requirement; contractor’s proposals (commercial, 
technical, and financial); feasibility study report, and environmental and social impact 
assessment report were consulted to understand the structure of the agreements;   
v. Project management reports during construction, operation and maintenance of the 
two wind farms were consulted to review project implementation processes and 
dynamics, labour relations, challenges and successes;  
vi. Project commissioning and capitalisation reports were consulted to review completed 
project implementation, successes, challenges and way forward.  
 
                                                          
54 As mentioned by Deborah Brautigam “this is not easy research to do. The Chinese have been having such bad press that 
they’re very reluctant to speak. It’s very hard to get interviews […] I face the same difficulty with high-level African politicians” 
(CHINAFRICA Project, 2013).   
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3.4.1 Sampling procedures  
Sampling is the process of selecting a representative sample from the total population of the 
study (Morse, 2004; Robinson, 2014). It is done to ensure tight control of the study participants 
for objectivity and economic (time and resources constraints) reasons. Participants for this 
study were carefully and purposefully selected using referral and judgemental/purposive 
sampling techniques. Referral, also called snowballing sampling technique, is defined as the 
sampling procedure in which the researcher continuously ask respondents for additional 
research participants who were involved in the study under research (Showkat & Huma, 2017). 
As I intended to reconstruct the cases, I targeted ‘experts’, ‘high-level’ actors, and ‘affected 
community members55’, who were difficult not only to identify but also to access. It was through 
snowballing that such challenges were addressed. Respondents were at liberty to participate 
in the study having been referred to me by other participants whom they had interacted with 
in the projects. Although snowballing proved useful in identifying and accessing the study 
participants, the representativeness of the research population was questionable (Babbie, 
2013) until I combined it with judgemental or purposive sampling.  
Judgemental sampling technique relates to the use of the research questions as a judgement 
mechanism to select respondents who will participate in the study (Showkat & Huma, 2017). 
I employed this technique to ensure that the referred respondents were representatives of the 
total population. The aim was to capture the most possible perspectives and views. My 
judgemental element emanated from a ‘tight’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994) inclusion criteria 
(Mason, 2010) based on (i) accessibility to research participants, (ii) knowledge of the wind 
farms, (iii) participation in decision making during the initiation, negotiation, implementation 
and project management of the wind farms, and (iv) the level and nature of impact-induced on 
the respondent by the development of the wind farms. Referral and judgemental sampling 
techniques were the most useful and impactful sampling procedures in this study as they 
allowed me to navigate the complex, secretive (black box), bureaucratic terrain— for high-
level stakeholders, and also emotive terrain—for villagers, farmers, the majority of which lost 
their pieces of land to make way for the wind farms. Table 3.1 below shows the research 
participants’ database and sample size.  
Table 3. 1 Research participants 
STAKEHOLDER UNIT MALE FEMALE  TOTAL  
African Union  AUC   3  3 
MOWIE 8  8  
                                                          
55 Some farmers who were negatively affected by the construction of the wind farms, especially in the case of Adama 2, were 
difficult to identify and access perhaps because of fear of intimidation from authorities, if for what so ever reasons they wanted to 
go public about it.    
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Ethiopian federal state 
institutions   
MOFEC/D  1  1  
MEFCC   1 1  
ESLSE 1  1  
MFA  2  2  
EEU  1  1  
EEP  13  13  
EIC  2  2  
Ethiopian regional state 
institutions  
Oromia regional state  2  2 
Tigray regional state 1  1  
District level 
administration   
Adama Woreda 2  2  
Lome Woreda  1  1 
Ward level administration  
 
  
 
  
Jogo Gudedo Kebele 5 1 6 
Bubisa Kusaye 
Kebele 
3  3 
Mele-mele Kebele 2  2 
Tede-dildima Kebele 2  2  
Adama Kebele 9 5 14  
Qachema Kebele  10 1 11 
Mukiye Kebele 3 1 4 
Kobolito Kebele  1 1 2 
Sire-robi Kebele  1 2 3 
Non-governmental 
organisations in Ethiopia  
Oxfam International-
Africa-China 
Dialogue Platform 
1  1  
Forum for 
Environment  
1  1  
Energy consultancy in 
Ethiopia 
Private Energy 
Enterprise  
1  1  
Media institutions  Addis Fortune 
English Edition  
 1 1  
The Reporter English 
Edition  
2   2  
Xinhua News Agency 
English Edition  
1   1  
Chinese government 
institutions 
MFA  1   1  
Chinese Embassy in 
Addis Ababa 
1   156  
                                                          
56 Spoken to the official at a highly informal level  
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Chinese Consular in 
Addis Ababa 
1   157  
Chinese private and 
quasi-state enterprises  
HydroChina 3  3  
CGCOC  1 1 2 
Goldwind  2  2  
Academic institutions  
 
AAU  6  6 
MU  1  1  
ASTU  1  1  
Ethiopian Foreign 
Relations Strategic 
Studies Institute 
(EFRSSI) 
2  2  
University of St 
Andrews & Renmin 
University of China 
1  1  
Zhejiang Normal 
University 
 1 1  
African Development 
Bank  
African Development 
Bank (AfDB)- 
Ethiopia country 
office 
1  1  
Embassy in Ethiopia  British Embassy in 
Ethiopia 
1  1  
 Total  101 15 116 
  
3.4.2 Interviews    
This study used interviews as a tool for gathering primary data. Use of interviews was 
important because it allowed me to unpack participant’s perceptions and views based on their 
engagement experiences before, during and after the development of the two wind farms. As 
part of critical realist and interpretivist paradigms, the interview approach was a flexible (Young 
et al., 2018) data gathering tool. It “encourage[d] respondents to talk freely often around 
emotionally58 loaded topics in order to gain insight into how people feel and think about the 
research topic under investigation” (Roberts, 2014, p. 5). Also, interviews allowed me to probe 
further the responses which were given by the respondents. It was established that interviews 
were “more attuned to the messiness and openness of real social life which inevitably 
affect[ed] the outlook of respondents in their everyday lives” (Roberts, 2014, p. 5). As a result, 
                                                          
57 Spoken to the official at a highly informal level  
58 Farmers who were dispossessed from their land 
64 
 
I was able to gain a more profound and detailed insight (Young et al., 2018) of how the 
respondents constructed meaning and attached value to the engagements.  
Unstructured and semi-structured interviews were used as instruments to collect primary data. 
An unstructured interview relates to open-ended questions posed in a conversational mode 
between the interviewer and the interviewee. An unstructured interview encompasses probing 
complex aspects of the phenomenon under inquiry without imposing categorisation which 
leads on or “impose[s] an interpretation on the situation” (Patton, 2002, p. 343). Unstructured 
interviews were helpful because they exposed me to unanticipated themes but required too 
much time during the interview process. It also entailed strict control, direction and pace of the 
conversation. Due to this limitation, semi-structured interviews were also used. A semi-
structured interview is defined as a combination of both open-ended and close-ended 
questions posed by the interviewer to the interviewee in a conversational manner. They are 
‘open’ which allows flexibility and closed to limit the respondents’ choices/answers to the 
options provided by the interviewer.  
I applied unstructured and semi-structured interviewing techniques to gather data from elites, 
experts and ordinary people who met the inclusion criteria I had set. In this study, elite 
interviews are defined as an interview process between the interviewer and an individual or a 
group of powerful actors who have the capacity, credibility and ability to influence choice and 
decision making in an intervention (Harvey, 2010, 2011). Elites also control material, symbolic 
and political resources to effect change which is usually deployed through institutions to 
safeguard and promote their interests, values, ideology and preferences. The elites were 
drawn from TPLF-EPRDF, executive management of public utilities and ministries (EEP, EEU, 
MOWIE, MFA); and the C-MFA African Affairs Department who provided valuable information 
on critical decisions. Aside from elites, I also interviewed experts, who in the context of this 
study are individuals or a group of people who held technical/professional and 
functional/obligatory related knowledge about the implementation processes of the two wind 
farms (Audenhove, 2017; Dexter, 2006; Littig, 2013). The experts were from MOWIE, MOFEC, 
MEFCC, MFA and public utilities (EEP, EEU, ESLSE) and Chinese quasi-private and state-
owned enterprises—CGCOC, HydroChina, Goldwind) and some from AU, academics; Oromia 
regional state Woreda and Kebele administration levels (see table 3.1). During the fieldwork, 
I noticed the difference between elites and experts. The elites were more powerful, and the 
experts were more knowledgeable (Audenhove, 2017). Besides the two groups of participants, 
I also interviewed ordinary people in the Kebeles where the wind farms are located to ensure 
that no voices, perspectives and opinions were neglected.  
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A total of 116 respondents participated in both unstructured and semi-structured interviews 
(see table 3.1). Each interview would take on average between 45-90 minutes dependent on 
the participants’ willingness to talk and the researcher’s control of the interviewing process. 
The unstructured and semi-structured interviews were used to respond to all three sub- 
questions, although the former was used precisely on the third question which was probing 
the local development impacts of the two wind farms. I did not want to be suggestive of the 
impacts of the two wind farms. The first theme covered the factors or motivations which led 
both Ethiopian and Chinese stakeholders to develop the two wind farms. The second theme 
covered the negotiation and decision-making processes between Ethiopian and Chinese 
stakeholders. The last theme covered the local development impacts of Chinese involvement 
in the financing and construction of the two wind farms.  
Several approaches were used to recruit and gain access to potential research participants. 
Most of the participants were recruited through face to face means. I would physically visit the 
offices/homesteads/communities of the possible participants. Most of the Ethiopian 
stakeholders preferred face to face recruitment as it gave them the chance to personally vet 
me before they could accept to participate in the study. It should be noted that the Chinese 
stakeholders who participated in this study were interviewed either in Ethiopia or South Africa. 
This was for two main reasons. Firstly, the researcher was interested in constructing and 
presenting an argument informed by African social realities on Africa-China relations. 
Secondly, gaining access to Chinese stakeholders in China was challenging. After several 
emails and phone calls, no potential respondents replied to my invitations. However, this is 
not unique in Africa-China relations research (CHINAFRICA Project, 2013). Most Chinese 
actors are not willing or interested in participating in studies which question their engagements 
in Africa because of the ‘bad press’ fear. As such, I did not conduct fieldwork in China. 
However, I also observed that most China-based stakeholders often hold limited information 
and knowledge on Chinese projects in Africa. As alluded to by Brautigam, Chinese 
stakeholders in Beijing “have little or no practical experience of how the projects work in Africa” 
(Ibid, p.1).  
Apart from face to face participant recruitment procedures, electronic recruitment through 
various technological platforms such as Electronic Mail and social media networks—LinkedIn, 
WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, and WeChat (especially for Chinese participants) were used 
although the acceptance rate was poor. The Chinese in Africa and Africans in China WeChat 
and Google Group were very useful as they provided up to date information with regards to 
research on Africa-China relations. Occasionally, there were also intellectual engagements 
which further enlightened me on broader Africa-China relations. It was again through the 
platform that I met two Chinese students (Ma Jie and Weiwei) who were researching on 
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Ethiopia-China relations in agriculture and manufacturing sectors. The two Chinese students 
assisted me with negotiating access to Chinese stakeholders in Ethiopia.       
3.5 Data capture, analysis and presentation  
Primary and secondary data were captured using various methods. For document-based data, 
‘notes’ in the form of reviews were used. During the interviewing process, I asked the 
participants whether they consented to be tape-recorded or not, in which a majority willingly 
and voluntarily accepted (see appendix 3.2; 3.3). This was perhaps because the subject/topic 
that I was investigating was less sensitive, or participants saw nothing damaging to the status 
quo of the authorities, except on a few occasions when I rigorously questioned compensation, 
bidding and tendering procedures. Nonetheless, some participants declined to be tape-
recorded and only allowed me to take notes especially on project bidding and tendering 
procedures. In such cases, after the interview, I would go through the notes together with the 
participant where he or she would confirm the notes, add or ask for certain words or sentences 
to be removed. A case in point is when I was interviewing experts from EEP who were involved 
in the early phases of negotiations in the two projects. High-level negotiations are always kept 
a secret, and very few participants were willing to ‘just talk’ about that let alone be recorded. 
Those recorded interviews were then transcribed from audio to Microsoft Word format and 
then uploaded to NVivo 11 Plus for coding and analysis.   
In this thesis, I used two methods to analyse the data collected: content and thematic. Use of 
content and thematic analysis is consistent with critical realism and interpretivism paradigms. 
The two methods were chosen to analyse the data as they are complementary in the sense 
that content analysis, “focuses more on the frequency of occurrence of various categories”, 
while thematic analysis, specialises on “identifying themes and building up the analysis in the 
most cohesive manner” (Yadv, 2016, p. 1). The two methods provide more in-depth analysis 
of the data (Clarke & Braun, 2017). Content analysis is defined as the process of identifying 
words or concepts and their relationship in the data, then make interpretations on their 
meaning about research questions or research objectives (Creswell, 2003; Vaismoradi, 
Jaqueline, Turunen, & Snelgrove, 2016). The content analysis relates to the systematised 
nonlinear, often complex coding and categorisation as a means to explore “large amounts of 
textual information unobtrusively to determine trends and patterns of words used, their 
frequency, their relationships” (Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013, p. 400). Furthermore, 
it is suggested that content analysis is concerned with the description of the what, to whom, 
and with what effect characteristics of the text (Bloor & Wood, 2006). Thematic analysis is 
defined as “essentially a method for identifying and analysing patterns in qualitative data” 
(Clarke & Braun, 2013, p. 123). Consistent with all other studies which use thematic analysis, 
I follow six phases suggested by Clarke & Braun (2006, pp. 77–101) in which I had to: (i) 
67 
 
familiarise and immerse myself with the data59, (ii) code the data and generate brief but 
detailed labels for important features of the data of relevance to the research question60, (iii) 
search for themes, (iv) review the themes61, (v) define and name the themes62, and finally, (vi) 
writing up63.  
3.6 Towards reliability and validity    
While reliability and validity are methodological practices often associated with largely 
traditional quantitative studies (Hammersley, 2007), the two have also found way into 
qualitative studies—albeit, for some, having acquired different names (for example, 
‘trustworthiness’, ‘credibility’, and ‘dependability’) for different reasons (Lincoln, 1995, p. 277). 
At the same time, some researchers have rejected the use and applicability of quantitative 
studies quality assessment criterion to qualitative studies because of incompatibility between 
ontological and epistemological paradigms (Schwandt, 1996; Smith & Deemer, 2000). In other 
accounts, some studies have gone to the extent of questioning the ‘necessity’ of assessment 
criterion (Clarke & Braun, 2017; Hammersley, 2007). Regardless of the debates on which 
terminology and the necessity of validation, it is imperative that every scientific study should 
be subjected to a form of assessment to ensure credibility and reliability of the findings 
(Creswell & Miller, 2000). As part of critical realism and interpretivism, I have adopted reliability 
and validity as terms of reference. 
Reliability relates to “the extent to which the results of a study or a measure are repeatable in 
different circumstances” (Roberts & Priest, 2006). A case study research approach is designed 
to collect bounded exploratory information and findings are in themselves difficult to replicate 
and by extension generalise. Meanwhile, in this study, social settings cannot be replicated for 
several reasons. First, the majority of the elites and experts who participated in this study had 
changed jobs where some have switched to the private sector and others to different sectors. 
These relocations together with fading memories of what transpired, challenges replicability. 
Second, as is the case on researching Africa-China relations, access to participants is highly 
                                                          
59According to Clarke & Brain (2006) the researcher must immerse themselves in, and become intimately familiar with, their data; 
reading and re-reading the data and noting any initial analytic observations.  
60 “Coding is not simply a method of data reduction, it is also an analytic process, so codes capture both a semantic and 
conceptual reading of the data. The researcher codes every data item and ends this phase by collating all their codes and relevant 
data extracts” (ibid).  
61“Involves checking that the themes ‘work’ in relation to both the coded extracts and the full data-set. The researcher should 
reflect on whether the themes tell a convincing and compelling story about the data and begin to define the nature of each 
individual theme, and the relationship between the themes” (Ibid). 
62“The researcher should ask ‘what story does this theme tell?’ and ‘how does this theme fit into the overall story about the data?” 
(Ibid).  
63 “Writing-up involves weaving together the analytic narrative and data extracts to tell the reader a coherent and persuasive story 
about the data and contextualising it in relation to existing literature” (ibid).  
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dependable on personal networks which are time intensive to build64. As a result, finding the 
right people to talk to is challenging. Despite that, a focus on Ethiopia as a country case study 
and Adama wind farms as energy sector case studies makes it impossible to isolate my study 
from other studies on Africa-China relations which are shaped by narratives and discourses 
that consciously and sub-consciously homogenise Africa, and or Africa-China engagements. 
This research is therefore essential and presents an opportunity for analytical replication and 
generalisation.  
While reliability is concerned with replication, validity concentrates on the accuracy of findings, 
or tools employed to measure the phenomena investigated (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982, p. 32). 
Validity relates to how well and accurately do the findings “represent participants’ realities of 
the social phenomena” (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 124). In order to achieve the reliability and 
validity of this study findings, I followed several procedures as explained below. The first 
technique was “intensive engagement with data” (Roberts & Priest, 2006, p. 44). Intensive 
engagement with the data is defined as the processes of moving forward and backwards 
between the data and the researcher’s coded interpretations and generated themes. In line 
with data-driven analysis adopted in this study, I did not impose pre-conceived ideas and 
categorisations. This was necessary for objectivity reasons (Yardley, 2017). The second 
technique was tape-recording of the interviews and co-production of interview notes with the 
participants through “respondent validation” (Roberts & Priest, 2006).  While I acknowledge 
that interviews are interpersonal and biases cannot be ruled out, I created rapport and 
generated trust with the participants. Because I was referred to them through snowballing, 
most participants were open and honest during the interviewing process. However, honesty 
cannot be guaranteed, and for that, I employed triangulation—implying the use of multiple 
sources of data, multiple methods of data collection, and multiple methods of data analysis. 
Finally, the validity and reliability of findings were ensured by a transparent discussion of the 
methodological process employed to arrive at the conclusions reached (Yardley, 2017). 
Transparency here implying being open to: (i) how the participants were recruited, selected 
and interviewed, (ii) the selection and justification of the case studies, (iii) the research context 
and the theory employed, (iv) methods for data analysis and their justifications, (v) use of 
verbatim references/examples of participants responses, and (vi) “prolonged engagement in 
the field” (Creswell & Miller, 2000, p. 127) during data collection for emersion and data 
saturation.      
                                                          
64 The positionality of the researcher affects how the research participants ‘open-up’. Because of positionality, it is likely 
impossible to achieve almost similar results in almost similar contexts as “other researchers will fail to obtain comparable findings 
unless they develop corresponding social positions or have research partners who can do so (LeCompte & Goetz, 1982, p. 37).  
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3.7 “Outsider but insider”: positionality and reflexivity  
How and to what extent does positionality affect the outcomes of a study? Positionality relates 
to how a researcher is situated and embedded inside or outside the social phenomenon under 
investigation. As a researcher, I was aware of three significant positionalities operating at 
different but interrelated levels. The first being the personal positionality which looks at the 
aspects of individual preferences, motivations and knowledge. These personal positionalities 
influence the choice of a topic. The second is professional positionality which affects my 
research practices and perceptions of participants. The final is disciplinary positionality which 
relates to researchers’ stance towards theory, methods and epistemological politics 
(Wilkinson, 1988 cited in (Gough, 2017, p. 311). For analytical considerations, I discuss these 
three positionalities concurrently.   
My insider’s perspective emanated from two standpoints: (i) the ten months I spent in Tigray 
at Mekelle University between 2014-2015, which allowed me to develop an understanding of 
the cultural, social, political and economic aspects of Ethiopia’s relations with China, and (ii) 
being an African researching on Africa (Ethiopia)-China engagements. This insider 
positionality played out well during the fieldwork as it helped me to negotiate access and 
establish rapport with the majority of Ethiopian and Chinese stakeholders. From the Chinese 
side, they considered me as Ethiopian, and that indirectly pushed them to open up on critical 
conversations65. I doubt some of the responses I got would be the same for an outsider. Being 
African in this regard was helpful, it gave me a first-hand emic information and understanding 
(Chidarikire, Cross, Skinner, & Cleary, 2018) of not only the missing African narrative to Africa-
China relations but also access to confidential information. Although I was an insider, I was 
also, by and large an outsider. Ethiopia-China engagement in wind energy infrastructure 
financing and development is a new field of study for me. I am not Ethiopian or Chinese, so 
how was I in a position to fully understand the social realities and the lived experiences of 
participants of the study? To bridge the gap between an insider/outsider, I employed reflexivity. 
Reflexivity is defined as a process of “continual internal dialogue and critical self-evaluation of 
positionality as well as active acknowledgement and explicit recognition that this position may 
affect the research process and outcome” (Berger, 2015, p. 220). I, therefore, practised 
reflexivity by situating the research in the larger context of Africa-China relations which then 
guided me during data collection and analysis, and interpretation of the findings of the study 
(Flores, 2018). This allowed me to carry out this research from a participants’ lived 
experiences angle, without imposing my ‘will’ or ‘categorisations’ on the findings of the study. 
                                                          
65 I am aware of the shortcomings of this. Participants may tell you what you want to hear—defeating objectivity.  
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3.8 Politics of knowledge production around Africa-China engagements  
Narratives, opinions and assumptions play an important role in influencing attitude and 
behaviour on conducting field-based research, and also broadly, the researchers and the 
researched understanding of the context where engagements occur. Not all narratives are 
uniform, true or false, and have differentiated impact. They bring positivity and negativity, 
courage and fear, hope and despair. Knowledge production around Africa-China 
engagements is political in the sense that geopolitical, ideological and economic factors 
(Mohan, 2008) weigh in on assessing two interrelated questions: (i) what is China doing in 
Africa and (ii) how does that impact the Western world’s supposed sphere of influence. It is 
political because “knowledge production and dissemination operate within specific political 
trajectories that may constrain or promote it” (Nyanchoga, 2014, p. 37). It is not surprising that 
a majority of Western media outlets and government institutions tend to demonise Chinese 
activities in Africa for various reasons. As noted “Western companies (actors) have gradually 
lost ground in the African market,” (Global Times, 2018, p. 1). This partly comes from the belief 
that Africa is a Western zone of influence. As a result, Western media outlets have generated 
discourses and narratives that tarnish China’s global image.   
Due to lack of empirical and rigorous research on Africa-China engagements, a majority of 
media and some government institutions speculate narratives in which few bad or negative 
examples of Chinese activities in Africa are cherry-picked and used to generalise its whole 
engagement with Africa. These criticisms are valid and justified, but they are embedded and 
entrenched in narratives that otherwise “represent Western approaches as morally and 
ethically superior”66 (Mohan, 2008, p. 156). The question is who becomes qualified here to 
discredit the ‘other’? The point is that both China and the West may have illicit, even illegal 
and at times questionable approaches when engaging Africans. Such honours of questioning 
the morality and ethical standards should be left to African governments and their people. 
They can decide which engagements are meaningful and beneficial to their development 
plans.   
There are several factors which lead Westerners to demonise and play the referee role around 
Africa-China engagements. Such factors include Chinese: (i) controversial labour practices in 
Africa (underpayment, overworked, and taking African jobs) (Hess & Aidoo, 2015), (ii) cheap 
and inferior quality goods and services which eventually crowd out local producers , (iii) Afro-
Sino extraversion (corrupt collaboration between the African elites and Chinese stakeholders 
in infrastructure projects contracting and controversial deals in the extractive sector), and 
recently (iv) piling of debt to African governments (Pandey, 2018). From the beginning of this 
                                                          
66 Former US ambassador Johnnie Carson remarked that China was “a very aggressive and pernicious economic competitor 
with no morals’ in Africa” (Odoom, 2011) 
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study, I was always aware of these narratives and how they potentially generate biases on 
how I viewed and gathered knowledge of Africa (Ethiopia)-China relations. Through the 
process of continual reflexivity and ‘de-linking’67 (Mignolo, 2009), I would interrogate the 
source, motivation, significance and quality of the data to eliminate the biases of politicised 
reporting on Africa-China engagements. As argued “geopolitics of knowledge goes hand in 
hand with geopolitics of knowing. Who and when, why and where is knowledge generated” 
(Mignolo, 2009, p. 160). As part of the critical realist epistemological foundation underpinning 
this study, I used this ‘critical’ element to critique the type and sources of data on Africa-China 
relations. 
3.9 Fieldwork and study-related challenges   
Researching multi-cultural context has several challenges (Scott, Miller, & Lloyd, 2006). My 
inability to speak Ethiopian languages was a major problem I encountered during fieldwork. 
Although I had previously stayed in Ethiopia for ten months, I had not developed speaking 
proficiency for Amhara, Afaan Oromia and Tigrinya. Amharic, Afaan Oromia, Tigrinya, 
Mandarin and English were the main languages spoken by the research participants. I hired 
a local research assistant, who assisted with not only translation but also with negotiating 
access to Ethiopian research participants who were not comfortable to be interviewed in 
English. Fortunately, all Chinese stakeholders I interviewed were comfortable being 
interviewed in English. Secondly, the theme of African agency in Africa-China relations is new 
with very few publications on the subject matter. At the same time, there is a limited academic 
scholarship on Ethiopia-China engagement in the wind energy sector. This was a challenge 
as there was limited literature to engage. I resorted to attending conferences to get first-hand 
information and debates on the topic68. Thirdly, the first phase of fieldwork fell into the State of 
Emergency period in Ethiopia which made it difficult to visit and access certain places because 
of personal security reasons. This also affected some respondents’ acceptance of an invitation 
to participate in the study because of increased civilian surveillance by the Command Post.  
Fourthly, while I acknowledge the multiplicity of Chinese stakeholders around Ethiopia-China 
relations, only African (the majority in Ethiopian and one in South Africa) based Chinese 
government institutions, state and semi-state owned and private enterprises involved in the 
two wind farms participated in this study. The justification for sticking to African based Chinese 
actors was informed by the challenges of accessing the China-based stakeholders. Several 
emails and calls were made to C-EXIM Bank and SANY Group but with no success. However, 
the absence of the two Chinese actors’ perspectives did not undermine the findings of the 
                                                          
67 De-linking here relates to challenging and if need be, as Mignolo (2009, p. 161) suggests, disobedience to the narratives that 
are entrenched and situated in the thinking of superiority of Western morals and ethics of engagement.  
68 For this I am very grateful to Wei Shen and Folashadé Soulé-Kohndou short conversations during the 2016 Development 
Studies Conference, and 2019 Oxford University China-Africa Network Conference at Oxford University.   
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study as much of the information was obtained from other sources. Precisely, HydroChina and 
CGCOC provided valuable information that detailed the role of C-EXIM Bank and SANY Group 
in the two projects. Also, additional information was obtained from the contractual documents 
and Ethiopian stakeholders. Fifthly, I had to carefully navigate and reflect on the ‘official’ 
versus ‘unofficial’ positionalities of the respondents. Elites presented an official position while 
middle to lower level experts would sometimes provide a contradictory position to their 
superiors. This presented a learning opportunity, and I used that to evaluate the implications 
and significance of the two positionalities and identify the best possible representation of the 
phenomena I was investigating. Finally, there is a huge gender misbalance as more men 
participated in this study than females. Top decision-making positions in Ethiopia and also 
China in the context of this study were men. However, from the community perspective where 
the wind farms are located, a considerable number of women participated in the study. This 
could be explained by the entrenched patriarchal system in African societies, and probably in 
China where women empowerment is lagging, and institutions tend to under-employ women 
in key positions.  
3.10 Ethical considerations  
This study involved interviewing people who were either involved in key decision-making 
processes with regards to the brokering, negotiations and implementation, or vulnerable 
community members who were positively or negatively affected by the development of the 
wind farms. Recognising the possibilities of my research to tap into personal identity, 
confidential information and invocation of emotional memories of victimhood, pain, sorrow and 
anger, joy and happiness, I applied for an ethical review which was approved by the Open 
University Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) reference number 
HREC/2017/2469/Chiyemura/1 (see appendix 3.1). The review process was important 
because contrary to the assumption that ethical considerations are concerned with the 
research participants’ welfare, the OU committee feedback triggered me to consider the 
potential risks and threats I was likely going to face in the field.  
When undertaking interviews with Ethiopian and Chinese stakeholders involved in the two 
case studies, I would explain what the research was about, then ask for their consent to 
participate in the study voluntarily. I also asked if they agreed to be tape-recorded or not (see 
appendix 3.2 and 3.3). I would spell out the risks and potential impact of their participation and 
the reasons for collecting and use of data. The majority agreed verbally or by signing the 
consent form, some refused to sign the consent form but agreed to participate in the study. A 
recall of one participant, a farmer by profession goes this way: “you are here for the 
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information, not my signature. Why do I have to sign? I have agreed to talk with you—beka69”. 
I came across a few ‘experts’ who were not comfortable in being tape-recorded and preferred 
that I take notes. Where such cases occurred, I would respect the participants’ rights and 
would then go through the notes together with the participant after the interview, to ensure 
respondent validation. I would also ask the participants whether they were willing and 
comfortable with verbatim quotations in the text with their names. The majority were not 
comfortable with the use of their actual names and requested that I should use pseudonyms 
as part of the confidentiality and anonymity clause of the Informed Consent form (see appendix 
3.3).   
3.11 Chapter summary  
I have discussed the methodological imperatives undertaken to answer the research 
questions. I have explained critical realism and interpretivism as two epistemological 
paradigms guiding how I view, collect, analyse, interpret and write the findings of this study. 
Process tracing was identified as an important methodological process that helped me to 
reconstruct the case studies following a sequential narrative. A case study design was 
discussed identifying and providing the rationale of why Ethiopia and the two wind farms were 
chosen. This study relies heavily on interviews and document reviews as dominant sources of 
both primary and secondary data. The research’s findings are reliable and valid because of 
the use of the triangulation technique. Recognising the fact that knowledge is situated and 
hence a construction, I critically and continuously reflected on not only the methodological 
imperatives of data collection and analysis but also broader geopolitical, economic and 
ideological factors that influence knowledge production around Africa-China relations. This 
criticality allowed me to identify and de-link knowledge that seeks to demonise China and 
present Western approaches and activities in Africa as moral and ethically superior. I conclude 
the chapter through a discussion of ethical considerations that guided me in this research. In 
the next chapter, I explore Ethiopian state, society and development orientation and how that 
laid the foundation for relations with China.   
 
   
 
 
 
                                                          
69 Amharic word, which in this context means enough.    
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Appendix 3. 2 Research participant information sheet  
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Appendix 3. 3 Research participant consent form   
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Appendix 3. 4 Mekelle University support letter English version  
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Appendix 3. 6 Addis Ababa University support letter English version  
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Appendix 3. 7 Addis Ababa University support letter Mandarin version  
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CHAPTER FOUR: ETHIOPIAN STATE, SOCIETY AND DEVELOPMENT ORIENTATION 
  
4.0 Introduction  
To understand how domestic political and socio-economic factors influence the exercise of 
African agency in the context of Ethiopia-China engagement in the financing and development 
of the Adama wind farms, it is imperative to examine the Ethiopian developmental state. As 
such, this chapter critically examines Ethiopia’s state-society relations after 1991 when 
EPRDF under Meles Zenawi came into power. It traces the Ethiopian socio-political and 
economic development policy based on the authoritarian developmental state model adopted 
by Meles Zenawi’s government traced from the 2001 TPLF split70. Post-2001 was an era of 
‘revival’, of state-sponsored and sanctioned development emulating the East Asian Tigers. 
For TPLF, economic growth and development were an instrument for survival and legitimacy. 
At the same time, I argue that the apparent economic failures of the Western prescribed 
neoliberal policy in Africa versus the state-led economic success in East Asia (Japan, Taiwan, 
and South Korea) created a drive for Meles to look East. Ethiopia’s emulation of the East Asian 
Tigers—China coincided with the internationalisation of Chinese state, quasi-state-owned and 
private entities. This coincidence, whether natural or planned, led Ethiopia to open and 
strengthen economic ties with China.  
This chapter begins by discussing the Ethiopian socio-political environment since 1991. The 
second section of the chapter proceeds with a discussion of Ethiopia’s alternative paradigm 
to development inclined towards the authoritarian developmental state. The third section 
unpacks the factors that condition and influence Ethiopia’s domestic and foreign policy, and 
how they shape its agency. The fourth section delves into Ethiopia-China engagement in its 
broadest sense looking at how the cooperation emerged. It procced with the provision of 
statistics and figures of the engagements since 1991. The final section offers the chapter 
summary.   
4.1 Ethiopia: from the land of poverty and starvation to land of hope and opportunity?  
Ethiopia is the oldest country in Africa with a civilisation that spans over 2000 years. It is the 
only African country that resisted European colonialism (except for the 1936-1941 occupation 
by the Italian fascist regime) when it defeated the Italians at the battle of Adowa in 1896. 
Demographically, Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa, after Nigeria, with a 
population estimated to be over 109 million as of 2019 and has over 85 ethnic tribes defined 
                                                          
70 Split between Tewolde-Siye group and the Sebhat-Meles group in TPLF. The split was to some extent ideological, but mainly 
driven by corruption, nepotism and power struggle. Sebhat-Meles group emerged victorious and the Tewolde-Siye group was 
expelled from the party. For more see Paulos Milkias. 2001. “Ethiopia, the TPLF and roots of the 2001 political tremor”. 
International Conference on African Development Archives; Medhane Tadesse and John Young. 2003. TPLF: Reform or Decline? 
Review of African Political Economy, 30(97): 389-403 
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by the constitution. Oromo (34%) is the largest ethnic tribe followed by Amhara (27%), Somali 
(6.2%), Tigray (6.1%), Sidama (4%), Gurage (2.5%), Welayta (2.3%), Afar (1.7%), Hadiya 
(1.7%), and Gamo (1.5%) (World Population Review, 2019). The most common religious 
alignment is with Orthodox Christianity (+44%), followed by Islam (+34%), Protestant, Catholic 
and other traditional religions (Fiseha, 2012, p. 438). The population is young, contributing to 
the labour force pool, and a potential source of social and political instability should the 
government fail to create enough jobs. This nonetheless also implies that Ethiopia has a large 
market for goods and services.   
From 1930 to 1974, Ethiopia was ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie I, who was finally toppled 
by a committee of low-ranking military officers under the leadership of Atnafu Abate popularly 
referred to as the Derg71 military junta. After a series of internal contestations in the Derg 
regime, Lt. Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam soon rose to power after killing Atnafu Abate. The 
Derg regime adopted a single party state, the Marxist-Leninist Party which introduced 
unpopular reforms and oppressive legislations. Such reforms contributed to poor economic 
performance resultantly incapacitating the state to equitably distribute national resources. 
Most of the few resources were thus channelled to the Amhara at the expense of other ethnic 
groups, in particular, the Tigray72 (Gadzala, 2015b). This led to a civil war from 1974 to 1991 
involving various rebel groups, with the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party assuming 
initially, the central leadership of the revolution. From the late 70s, TPLF grew in rank and file 
and began assuming central leadership of the revolution by co-opting other rebel groups, later 
materialising in the formation of the TPLF dominated EPRDF party in 198973 (Tadesse, 2015). 
The TPLF coming from a rural and agrarian driven revolution subscribed to a strong ideological 
orientation of Maoism, later blended with revolutionary ideologies of Leninism and Marxism. 
Regardless of many catastrophic blows74 encountered by TPLF from the Soviet-backed Derg 
regime, the revolution continued which eventually led to the defeat of the Derg ushering in a 
Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) led by Meles Zenawi (TPLF-EPRDF) in 1991 
(International Crisis Group, 2009).  
The dominance of TPLF in the EPRDF led to the withdrawal of other parties in the transitional 
government resulting in EPRDF becoming a de facto one-party state ruling Ethiopia75. As 
                                                          
71 The Provisional Military Administrative Council 
72 For example, replacement of Tigraen government officials by bureaucrats from the Amhara, heavy tax leveeing, expropriation 
of land and produce by soldiers.   
73TPLF; Ethiopian People’s Democratic Movement; OPDO; Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement. These four 
parties served as an umbrella for the expanding membership of allied rebel groups. After 1991, some of the parties were 
neutralised and merged creating a coalition made of TPLF; OPDO; ANDM and SNNP.  
74 According to oral accounts given by TPLF, more than 50 000 Tigraens died in the civil war.  
75 For example, the Sidama Liberation Front withdrew and was replaced by Sidama People’s Democratic Party, Oromo Liberation 
Front was neutralised and replaced by Oromo Peoples Democratic Organisation. Some of the regions were merged into a 
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noted, “the influence of TPLF was so pervasive that its political orientation, logically became 
the political game of the new umbrella” (Tadesse, 2015, p. 273). This led to the adoption of 
left-wing policies such as democratic centralism traced from the hybrid Maoist-Leninist-Marxist 
ideologies which are still guiding practices today (Gerard Prunier & Ficquet, 2015). Democratic 
centralism entails the domination and control of the ideological, policy and organisational 
direction of the party, state and government by the top leadership of the ruling party (Bayu, 
2019). The bottom or peripheral members of the party, state and government, are obliged to 
implement policies and decisions of the party elites. This results in top-down channels of 
accountability where only a few elites assume the responsibility to make critical decisions that 
affect the party, state and the government. With this approach, power becomes centralised in 
the TPLF-EPRDF where policy decisions reached at the top are naturally binding on all 
members (see table 4.1 below). This comes from the assertion that the vanguard party is best 
placed to understand the ‘genuine’ needs and demands of the people, and when policy 
decisions are made, it is always in the best interest of the masses. The party is, therefore, the 
state and the government which create “organisations, leaders, and vanguard elites who all 
spread and impose the party’s ideology” (Bach, 2011, p. 648). This ideology is resultantly 
“presented to both domestic and international audiences as democratic and revolutionary” 
(Ibid, p. 648). 
Table 4. 1 EPRDF party structure and peripheral allies  
Member Party  Congress Council  Executive  
TPLF-Tigray  250 45 9 
Amhara National Democratic Movement -Amhara  250 45 9 
Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization -Oromo 250 45 9 
Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement 
-Debub 
250 45 9 
Total 1000 180 36 
 
EPRDF peripheral allies 
Afar National Democratic Party   Afar 
Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party Somali 
Hareri National League Harari 
Benishangul-Gumuz People's Democratic Unity 
Front 
Benishangul-Gumuz 
Gambela People's Democratic Movement Gambela 
Source: Author compilation. The table above shows the distribution of representatives of the four core 
political parties of the EPRDF at the Congress, Council and Executive members levels. It also shows 
the peripheral allies of EPRDF drawn from five regional based political parties.  
                                                          
region—a case in point being the Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s region which was drawn from five different ethnic 
tribes.  
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The TGE facilitated the constitution-making process and by 8 December 1994, the constitution 
was ratified and entered into force on 21 August 1995. In May 1991, national elections were 
held and in the absence of significant opposition parties, TPLF-EPRDF won (Tadesse, 2015, 
p. 275). On 24th August 1995, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was announced 
under the leadership of Meles Zenawi as its Prime Minister and Negaso Gidado as the 
President (International Crisis Group, 2009). The TPLF considered a centrally administered 
country to be a limitation76 and the 1995 constitution introduced a federal state system which 
composed nine ethnic-based regional governments and two city-states77. Drawing on Stalin’s 
idea of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples, the nine ethnic-based regions were allowed the 
right to self-determination as stipulated in section 39 of the 1995 Ethiopian Constitution 
(Bihonegn, 2015) These included:   
“(1) an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession. (2) 
[…] the right to speak, to write and to develop its own language; to express, to develop 
and to promote its culture; and to preserve its history. (3) […] the right to a full measure 
of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of government in 
the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in state and federal 
governments” (FDRE, 1995). 
The decentralised system further divided each of the nine regions into Zones, Woredas and 
Kebeles to balance ethnic forces while at the same time promoting self-development and self-
governance. The Ethiopian ethnic federalism, “bases key rights— to land, government jobs, 
representation in local and federal bodies— not on Ethiopian citizenship but on being 
considered ethnically indigenous in constituent ethnic states” (Mamdani, 2019, p. 1). 
Consistent with this ethnic and rights-based approach, the idea was to move away from an 
assimilationist centralisation by one ethnic group which had proved (Amhara being the 
example here) unjust and incapable of managing ethnic diversity. Therefore, ethnic federalism 
was seen (especially by TPLF) as a silver bullet to avert ethnic tensions and conflicts by 
creating two tiers of government—the regional and the federal78. This model, therefore, 
contributed to regionalisation by ethnicity in which ethnonationalism became a tool for political, 
economic and socio-cultural mobilisation and state organisation (Kefale, 2014).  
                                                          
76 Because of the Amhara domination and oppression traced from Menelik II, Haile Selassie I and the Derg 
77 Tigray, Afar, Amhara, Oromia, Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz, Southern Nations, Gambela and Harari. A region was further 
divided into Zones, Woredas and Kebeles. The Woreda and Kebele were inherited from the Derg regime.  
78 Major criticisms of the model relate to how, firstly, TPLF exclusively made ethnicity the only basis of state organisation. 
Secondly, the right to self-determination applies only in as far as language and culture is concerned nothing else beyond these 
two. Thirdly, TPLF has emerged as the only centre of power undermining the promises of democracy. Fourthly, there are more 
than 85 ethnic groups but only 9 ethnic regions exit. Fifthly, ethnic federalism at least from 1991 onwards, became a struggle for 
big 3: Tigray, Amhara and Oromo.  
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In principle, the decentralisation aspect was contradictory to the ideals of democratic 
centralism. The majority of leaders in the respective Regions, Zones, Woredas and Kebeles 
were directly or clandestinely appointed by TPLF-EPRDF to neutralise any potentially 
conflicting views. Increasingly, regional governments became weak as the majority of the 
posts were occupied by party loyalists thereby creating patronage networks. Additionally, 
decision-making became a top-down approach moving away from the promises of 
decentralisation and democratisation (Clapham, 2017; Jebena, 2015). As noted by an 
embassy official in Addis Ababa: 
“Ethiopia is one of the most centralised and the most decentralised country in Africa. 
That sounds ironic, but that is also true because the Ethiopian politburo has the highest 
grip on every decision. At the same time, regional states have an extended level of 
freedom in making their own decisions” (Interview 20170724143353). 
The 1995 constitution created room for democratisation processes in which rule of law and 
respect for civil and political liberties were guaranteed. A new dawn and approach to 
governance was introduced through the federal bicameral parliamentary system. A Prime 
Minister became the head of the government, and a President became a ceremonial head of 
state. The parliament would elect the Prime Minister while the House of People’s 
Representatives elects the President. The constitution granted executive power to the 
government and the legislative power to the parliament. The judiciary power was considered 
independent since the Prime Minister would then recommend candidates for appointment by 
the House of People’s Representatives. However, in practice, these guarantees were short-
lived (Kefale, 2011). When the Ethio-Eritrea war (1998-2000) broke out followed by the 2001 
TPLF split, and the 2005 elections, civil and political liberties, and political space for opposition 
parties were curtailed, as the country degenerated into an authoritarian regime (Jalata, 2015). 
Specifically, the 2005 elections were marked by violence and claims of vote fraud by the ruling 
party, which led to demonstrations where more than 200 people were killed followed by 
arbitrary arrests of journalists, protestors, opposition leaders and civil society organisations 
(HRW, 2010). Clapham (2018) argues: 
“The culture of statehood in Ethiopia has long been– and remains– hierarchical and 
intolerant of dissent, and imposes limitations which are not only responsible for much 
of the conflict from which the country has suffered, but also constitute a significant 
barrier to the development enterprise itself”. 
Post the 2001 TPLF-split and the humiliating EPRDF defeat in Addis Ababa in the 2005 
elections TPLF remainers underwent an ideological gim gima (self-evaluation) process that 
materialised with the adoption of the (authoritarian) developmental state. Below I discuss the 
86 
 
origins of the Ethiopian developmental state and how it laid the foundation for engagement 
with China.  
4.2 Alternative paradigm: democratic or authoritarian developmental state?  
The idea of a developmental state in Ethiopia is traced back to Haile Selassie I Imperial era. 
Then, he sent a group of officials to study the Japanese model of development which had 
contributed to economic and structural transformation in Japan within a short space of time. 
The 1931 Ethiopian constitution was modelled from the Meiji (Japanese empire 1868-1912) 
constitution of 1890. Upon the messengers’ arrival in Japan, Blatten Geta Hiruy, former 
Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Minister under the Haile Selassie I government relays that:  
“On behalf of Emperor Haile Selassie […] Ethiopia and Japan, have unbroken lines of 
imperial rule, and that Haile Selassie had been determined to follow the model of 
Japan’s charter to develop his country” (cited in Kebede, 1999, p. 272).  
While the Meiji Empire and Haile Selassie imperial governments had some similarities in terms 
of political and historical imperial continuity, the Ethiopian government’s attempt to modernise 
was not successful (Jalata, 2015). Critics argue that the Ethiopian officials who were tasked 
with conducting studies of the development model did not undertake in-depth studies—
implying there were several omissions (Ibid). Second, it is argued that Haile Selassie’s 
government did not have the political will and commitment to achieve reform. Third, the level 
of technological development between the two empires was not matched. Finally, the 
Ethiopian government’s attempt to modernise the economy was halted by the Italian invasion 
in 1936 and the eventual outbreak of World War 2 in 1939 (Keller, 2005). From 1974 to 1991, 
the revolution left no space for development policy experimentation as initially planned by 
Haile Selassie.  
Fast forward to the Meles led government, a developmental state was seen as the only 
survival strategy. Economic transformation was necessary especially after a series of TPLF 
internal contestations. The first tensions can be traced from the ideological differences 
amongst the old guard—which eventually led to the split in 200179. The second source of 
tension was the 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea war in which Meles was accused by Tewolde-Siye 
group of being too soft and not taking the advice of his TPLF comrades seriously 80. The third 
                                                          
79 Several authors have written at length about this split between Tewolde-Siye group vs the Sebhat-Meles group (See 
Milkias2001; Tadesse & Young, 2003).  
80 Meles’ mother was from Adi Quala, Eritrea. He was accused of having not unleashed a comprehensive counter attack against 
Eritrea. Ethiopia however won the war.  
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reason being the humiliating TPLF-EPRDF Addis Ababa defeat of the Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy (CUD) in 200581.  
Meanwhile, the failures of the neoliberal reform project in Africa instigated by the Bretton 
Woods institutions (World Bank and IMF) created room for Meles and the TPLF-EPRDF 
leadership to drive the agenda for an alternative paradigm to address the challenge of 
underdevelopment in Ethiopia and Africa in general. As argued by Meles:  
“The key message is that the neo-liberal paradigm, which has devastated our 
economies over the past decades and which has now come back home to roost needs 
to be discarded before we can do any of the things that we need to do to transform our 
economies […]. We need to free ourselves from the constraints of that ideology and 
pragmatically select our own path of development, based on an empirical evaluation 
of what works and does not work for us” (cited in Jalata, 2015, p. 21).   
Meles mainly criticised the Bretton Woods institutions’ prescriptions that developing countries 
should get the prices right (especially for commodity-based economies) and withdraw the state 
so as to allow the market and its so-called efficiencies and competition to drive development 
(Zenawi, 2012). His ideological basis challenged the idea of allowing the market to set the 
preferences for African countries’ development pathway. He argued that the private sector is 
obsessed with rent-seeking82 rather than value creation and technological accumulation which 
are necessary pre-requisites for structural economic transformation. Being interviewed by De 
Waal, Meles notes that: 
“You cannot change a rent-seeking political economy just by reducing the size and role 
of the state. The neo-liberal paradigm does not allow for technological capacity 
accumulation, which lies at the heart of development. For that, an activist state is 
needed, that will allocate state rents in a productive manner […]. If the state guides the 
private sector, there is a possibility of shifting to value creation. The government should 
choose when and how to partner with the private sector” (De Waal, 2012).   
For Meles’ government, failure to achieve economic progress was therefore seen as an 
existential threat without which the TPLF probability of survival was close to zero. The TPLF 
split allowed Meles to centralise power and all potential threats were neutralised. Several old 
TPLF comrades were arrested, some were killed, and some went into exile. This created an 
                                                          
81 At the federal level, EPRDF was announced to have won 327 seats followed by CUD at 109, UEDF at 52, and others at 58. It 
is reported that CUD won all the seats for Addis Ababa.   
82 Defined as all largely unproductive, expropriate activities which bring positive return to the individual or an organisation but not 
to the state or society. Some of the activities are legal but tend to degenerate into bribery and corruption. Rents are sought in 
different circumstances but the rents of primary interest for economic analysis derive from public-policy decisions (See Krueger 
1974; Hillmana & Ursprung, 2015).   
88 
 
opportunity for Meles to create a new line of party elites and loyalists who subscribed to his 
ideological orientation to build a capitalist society so as “to establish a class basis for 
development and democracy” (De Waal, 2015, p. 163). As noted, “for Meles, Marxist-Leninism 
was not about a socialist society, but a question of developing the country’s political economy” 
(De Waal, 2015, p. 163)—hence the transition from abiyotawī ye dīmokirasī (revolutionary 
democracy) to ye dīmokirasī lematawi Mengistu (democratic developmental state).  
Meles reiterated that: 
“There has to be more political space for experimentation in development policy than 
has been the case so far in Africa […]. The international community has a role in 
creating such a space by tolerating development paradigms that are different from the 
orthodoxy preached by it. Africans have to demand and create such a space” (Zenawi, 
2006, p. 39).  
“We in Ethiopia have embarked on a reform programme that is based, on […] the 
establishment of a developmental state […] that we have called democratic 
developmentalism” (Ibid). 
So, what was Meles’ idea of a democratic developmental state? Meles’ TPLF-EPRDF sense 
of democracy83 was drawn from the Leninist democratic centralism where in particular “the 
ruling party enjoys effective monopoly of political power” (Clapham, 2017, p. 77) and equally 
economical, through the creation of party endowment funds84 (Vaughan & Gebremichael, 
2011). For Clapham, the EPRDF’s “aspirations are explicitly hegemonic, and challenges to its 
control have been suppressed with whatever level of force has been required for the purpose 
[…]. The EPRDF regime remains a classic case of illiberal state-building” (2017, p. 77). 
Consistent with Clapham’s judgement of the EPRDF, Meles being interviewed by De Waal 
categorically states that: 
“What meaning did liberal civil and political rights have in a context of abject poverty 
or political chaos. Development and a strong state were prerequisites for human rights, 
and Ethiopia needed to establish these first” (De Waal, 2012).  
For Meles, the Ethiopian democratic (though authoritarian) developmental state was to be 
identified with the following. It should have hegemony of value creation in which the leadership 
should be obsessed with economic growth and structural transformation. The leadership was 
                                                          
83 For Meles and his EPRDF this rested on the democratic institutions and constitutionalism, elections processes and multi-party 
system. 
84Tumsa—Endowment Fund for the Development of Oromia; Wendo—Endowment Fund for the Development of SNNPRS; 
Tiret—Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Amhara; EFFORT—Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray. These 
business entities were formed in close association with the constituent parties of the EPRDF and they derive considerable 
advantage to win government tenders because of their political connections (Clapham, 2018).  
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to be relatively uncorrupted. The state was expected to have relative and embedded autonomy 
to independently formulate and implement policies against contending social and market 
forces. This was dependent on the domestic creation of growth-oriented financial institutions 
that had undivided attention and commitment to massive state-led investment in hard and soft 
infrastructure. It is, however, important to mention that, one of the defining pinnacles of 
developmental state has to do with a strong, efficient, merit-based, performance-oriented 
bureaucracy (Taylor, 2012)—which Meles was silent about (Lefort, 2013).  
The idea of an active state in directing and influencing the pace and direction of development 
in Meles’ TPLF-EPRDF perspective hinged on two central principles: (i) the centralisation of 
the state revenues and their eventual redistribution and, (ii) guiding the private sector towards 
value creation (Lefort, 2013, p. 460). Learning from the Asian countries—in particular, Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea, and later China, Meles’ emphasised the collective rather than the 
individual as a focal point of development (Gadzala, 2015b). As a result, the ruling political 
elites capture the rents from the party affiliated endowments, businesses and state-owned 
enterprises and distribute them to themselves and their cronies (Abegaz, 2011), and also to 
the national development priorities to stabilise their political power and maintain regime 
legitimacy (Gebregziabher & Hout, 2018). However, this model had challenges: 
“Resource allocation for industrial policy is not fully transparent. It is not clear when 
firms are eligible to get preferential treatment in terms of access to licenses, land, credit 
and foreign exchange. On what condition ailing firms will be bailed out, and whether 
these conditions vary between state-owned enterprises, firms affiliated with the ruling 
political parties, and independent private firms […]. Party-affiliated endowments have 
taken many of the business opportunities left for private engagement. Discretionary 
allocation of public resources lends itself to political capture by interest groups” 
(Altenburg, 2010, p. 2). 
Regardless of this limitation, for Meles, hagerawi lemat (national development) was rooted in 
the state which had the necessary organisational power to consistently provide economic 
guidance through formulation and implementation of growth targeted macroeconomic 
planning and policies compared to the private sector (Zenawi, 2012). Several policy 
instruments were thus formulated and implemented contributing to high growth rates over the 
years. Such policies include the Agricultural Development Led Industrialisation (ADLI) 
(1994)—which was mainly targeted at improving the performance and modernisation of the 
sector, given that it was, and continues to be, the backbone of Ethiopia’s economy. ADLI was 
followed by the Industrial Development Strategy (IDS) (2003) which targeted creating and 
improving the manufacturing base, and export-led industrialisation, development of 
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infrastructure and the introduction of small to medium enterprises as a vehicle for employment 
creation, poverty reduction and alleviation (Oqubay, 2018). IDS was followed by the five-year 
Plan for Accelerated and Sustainable Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) (2005-10) 
which was aligned with the Millennium Development Goals aimed principally at alleviating 
poverty. The fourth and current policy framework is the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 
I (2010/11-2014/15) and II (2015/16-2019/20) aimed at long term public infrastructure 
investment (power, transport and communication), human capital development and export-
oriented industrial zones.  
As a result of the various policy instruments, Ethiopia is one of the fastest growing economies 
in the world with an average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 10.5% over the past 
decades and reaching $80 billion in 2018 (World Bank, 2018c) (see figure 4.1). Growth has 
been aided by a boom in manufacturing, construction and service sectors (see figure 4.2 & 
4.3) and in 2017, the service sector contributed 43.6% to GDP followed by agriculture at 
34.8%, industry at 21.6% and others. In 2013, agriculture remained the dominant sector for 
employment (72%) followed by the service sector (19.9%) and industry(7.4%) (CIA World 
Factbook, 2018).   
Figure 4. 1 Ethiopia annual GDP growth indicators 1980-2018 
 
Source: IMF: World Economic Outlook October 2018 
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Figure 4. 2 Ethiopia’s manufacturing sector performance 1990-2011 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 2018. NB: Manufacturing sector covers food, beverages 
and tobacco, textiles and clothing, machinery, transport equipment, chemicals and others.   
 
Figure 4. 3 Ethiopia’s service sector annual growth (%) 2000-2017 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2018). 
The economic growth is positively impacting on social development in Ethiopian. Millions of 
people have been lifted out of extreme poverty. According to the World Bank (2018c), the 
national poverty headcount ratio decreased from 30% in 2011 to 24% in 201685 (see figure 
4.4). Infant mortality rate per 1000 live births decreased from 88.2 to 41 per 1000 live births 
from 2000 to 2017 (see table 4.3), and under-five mortality rate decreased from 123 to 88 per 
1000 live births between 2005 and 2010 (WHO, 2013). The government’s expenditure on 
health increased, of which out-of-pocket health expenditure (OOP) and external donor support 
sources account for 37% and 39% respectively of total health expenditure (WHO, 2013, p. 
21). Total annual per capita health expenditure increased from $7.14 in 2005 to $16.10 in 
2007/2008 (WHO, 2013, p. 21). Meanwhile, hospitals (all types) increased from 79 to 116 by 
                                                          
85 According to World Bank, national poverty headcount ratio (country specific) is the percentage of the population living below 
the national poverty lines. National estimates are based on population-weighted subgroup estimates from household surveys.  
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2009/2010 followed by the addition of 15 000 new health posts and 3200 new health centres 
(Ibid).  
Table 4. 2 Ethiopia’s education enrolment (%gross) 2000-2015 
Year  Pre-Primary  Primary Secondary  Tertiary  
2000 1.6 54.4 13.5 1.2 
2005 2 79 24.7 2.7 
2010 4.2 91.8 34.8 7.3 
2015 30.2 101.9 35.1 n/a 
 Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2018). 
 
Table 4. 3 Ethiopia’s selected health performance indicators 2000-2017 
Year  Infant Mortality Rate 
(/1000 Live Births) 
Life Expectancy (Years) 
2000 88.2 51.9 
2005 n/a n/a 
2010 55.3 61.6 
2015 44.2 65 
2016 42.5 65.5 
2017 41 n/a 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2018). 
 
Figure 4. 4 Ethiopia’s poverty level indicators in Ethiopia  
 
Source: World Bank 2018 
Despite the progress, Ethiopia remains a poor, low-income and heavily aid-dependent country 
(see figure 4.5). The manufacturing sector remains underdeveloped, while the service sector 
is undergoing positive and promising structural transformation. Technology, industry and 
innovation capabilities remain largely underdeveloped partly because of inadequate 
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infrastructure. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2017, p. 39), 
electricity shortages and supply interruptions were identified by both private and public firms 
as a significant challenge affecting manufacturing and industrial capabilities. The increased 
demand for electricity can be explained by the industrial parks boom where 12 industrial parks 
were in operation or under construction by October 2018 (see appendix 4.1). More than $5.1 
billion will be required to meet the infrastructure development plans out of which the power 
sector will require a sustained annual expenditure of $3.3 billion from 2010 to 2020 (Foster & 
Morella, 2010, p. iv). This suggests that there is a significant electricity infrastructure deficit 
with most of the existing ones being dilapidated due to poor maintenance, causing severe 
bottlenecks, and limiting the country’s industrial potential. Nonetheless, this trend has been 
changing due to the public-led infrastructure investment with capital borrowed mainly from 
China as concessional loans, specifically targeting transport, power, and information and 
communication technology.  
Figure 4. 5 Net disbursements of ODA to selected Sub-Saharan Africa by recipient 
 
Source: OECD Statistics on resource flows to developing countries. Ang—Angola, DRC—Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Ethio—Ethiopia, Ken—Kenya, Maur—Mauritius, Rwan—Rwanda, Tan—Tanzania, 
Uga—Uganda and Zim—Zimbabwe. As of 2016/17 primary aid uses for combined DAC donors as a % 
of total commitment were as follows: social and administrative infrastructure at 33.8%; economic 
infrastructure at 17.3%; agriculture 4.4%; industry and other production 1.5%; commodity aid and 
programme assistance 2.4%; humanitarian aid 12.8%; other 27.7%.  
Trade has remained unbalanced for Ethiopia since 1995 (see figure 4.6). The Economic 
Complexity Observatory database (2019) depicts that in 2017, Ethiopian exports were $2.2 
billion and imports of $8 billion implying a negative trade balance of $5.8 billion. Top exports 
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for 2017 were coffee ($712M), other oily seeds ($348M), gold ($242M), cut flowers ($207M) 
and dried legumes ($116M). Top imports for 2017 were planes, helicopters, and spacecraft 
equipment ($660M), gas turbines ($351M), packaged medicaments ($322M), telephones 
($235M) and delivery trucks ($194M). In the same year, China (see appendix 4.5) was the top 
export partner ($343M) followed by Switzerland ($287M), the USA ($264M), the Netherlands 
($245M) and Germany ($183M)86. At the same time, China was the top import origin for 
Ethiopia at the value of ($2.65B), followed by France ($938M), India ($691M), Germany 
($369M) and Turkey ($337M) (The Economic Complexity Observatory Database, 2019).  
Figure 4. 6 Import and export values for Ethiopia 1995-2017 
 
Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity 2019 
4.3 Conditioning factors and setting the scene for foreign cooperation  
Ethiopia has often been presented in the literature as a unique African country that has been 
able to meaningfully shape and influence its engagement with foreign powers over the last 
two few decades (Brautigam, 2011; Gadzala, 2015b). Which factors make Ethiopia 
exceptional (Fry, 2017; Manson, 2015) ?. Alemu and Scoones (2013, p. 91) argues that:  
“In terms of the […] state power and capacity in Africa, the Ethiopian state has ‘agency’, 
and is able to negotiate with powerful external actors for its own ends, avoiding the 
position of being a passive ‘recipient’ or a ‘pawn’ in wider power games”.  
There are several explanations for this. The significance of history and cultural continuity in 
political organisation and state formation is the first factor. Apart from being the only African 
country that resisted colonialism, Ethiopia is one of the oldest civilisations in the world with 
recorded modern state formation and political organisation traced from 1855 during the reign 
                                                          
86 CIA World Factbook suggest a different list: Sudan 23.3%, Switzerland 10.2%, China 8.1%, Somalia 6.6%, Netherlands 6.2%, 
US 4.7%, Germany 4.7%, Saudi Arabia 4.6%, and UK 4.6% (CIA World Factbook, 2018).  
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of Tewodros II. Menelik II who took over after the Tewodros II, expanded the borders of 
Ethiopia creating a fully modern and technologically advanced country by the standards of that 
era. He is famous for his political and military organisational capabilities that saw the defeat of 
the Italians at Adowa in 1896. From this history and political organisation, Ethiopia has a strong 
institutional memory which has come about because of continuous learning processes 
(Interview 20170802154843). As explained by a Professor at Addis Ababa University: 
“Historically, Ethiopia has always had a strong state, even before colonisation, had a 
relatively strong state. It never had the problems of other post-colonial states which 
had to erect a government from nothing when they got independence. The current 
government when it took over from the Derg, the Derg also was obviously a very strong 
regime, and a lot of civil servants stayed behind but also the methodology of the 
government, the structure of the way in which the state is organised in Ethiopia has 
always been competent and efficient. That’s not to say there is no corruption, but its 
less than other places and you will notice that a lot of the top officials in Ethiopian 
government have been educated overseas, they were in exile, they have a lot of 
experiences, that’s different from many African countries. What that means is that the 
Ethiopian state is able to enter into negotiations with Chinese, not on an equal footing 
because, you know the size of China, but much more on a kind of place where they 
would like to get benefits and not be walked over” (Interview 20170526121908).  
The quote above suggests that the EPRDF led government adopted a relatively well-
functioning institutional base and bureaucratic ecosystem which has allowed the government 
to independently experiment with its development pathway without succumbing to external 
influence and demands (Feyissa, 2011; Fraser & Whitfield, 2008). In fact, Ethiopia is 
considered to be the first country in Africa to have engaged with the World Bank in the late 
1940s when it received the World Bank assistance package (Furtado & Smith, 2007). This 
was indeed a learning curve for Ethiopia. Because of this long history of engaging with 
development agencies further back than other African countries, Ethiopia has gained 
negotiating capital and has rich experience of when and how to resist, comply and conform to 
the pressure—a variable many African governments lack—when engaging with foreign actors. 
This experience has allowed Ethiopia:  
“To keep donors at arm’s length and to play off Cold War rival sponsors without 
allowing any too close. Upon coming to power after the end of the Cold War, the 
EPRDF government aligned Ethiopia as a key geostrategic ally of the United States. 
The Horn of Africa has only increased in interest to the US, especially under the US 
administration’s War on Terror since 2001. Aware of its strategic importance, the 
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government knows that it had and continues to have significant room for manoeuvre” 
(Fraser & Whitfield, 2008, p. 12).  
Further to this, even though Ethiopia is natural resources limited, it “does not just wait for 
donors to suggest something, and allow them to get on with it; the government always has a 
plan” (Alemu & Scoones, 2013, p. 92). This implies there is no free ride in Ethiopia because 
of “tight political oversight of bureaucratic systems” aimed specifically at controlling and 
directing donors and investors to where the government wants them (Alemu & Scoones, 2013, 
p. 92). As such, investors and donors are expected to respect and comply. Therefore, it goes 
without saying that “the Ethiopian regime is independent-minded, proud, and unwilling to bow 
to the whims and wishes of donors and the international community” (Borchgrevink, 2008, p. 
217). 
The second explanation has to do with the nature of the political regime and system of 
governance. The government has created a closed space for donors and investors who may 
wish to engage with the government outside the blueprint of the set development plans 
(Interview 20170802142852). The centralised political organisation and uninterrupted time 
spent by the EPRDF in power due to continued manipulation of the electoral cycles in its 
favour, has created development policy pathway stability. Added to this, the party-affiliated 
and party-controlled public and private sector businesses have further created a hegemony 
that ensures the continued success of the government’s economic transformation agenda 
setting. The EPRDF-affiliated businesses and state-owned enterprises allow the government 
to have strong ownership of the national vision including the manner and timeframe under 
which such development interventions can happen. This intentionally or unintentionally limits 
investor/donor influence in national development planning. At the same time, the federal 
government retains the power to broker engagements with investors/donors, while 
decentralising only development project implementation to regional states, creating complex, 
vertical and horizontal layers of bureaucracies (Furtado & Smith, 2007). This makes it equally 
difficult for investors/donors to understand the structural features of the government. As noted: 
“Often donors in Ethiopia only have a limited understanding as to how policy decisions 
are made. The extent to which the government seems unwilling to accept input from 
the donor community—due, in part, to unpredictable donor support in the past—sets 
Ethiopia apart from other low-income countries where donors have more easily 
embedded themselves in government structures, thereby potentially facilitating a more 
ready exchange of information and policy ideas” (Furtado & Smith, 2007, pp. 22–23).  
The complexity in understanding the roles and responsibilities of the federal and regional 
government is partly intentional to give room for executives to discretionally make decisions 
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in development projects. For example, the former Chief Executive Officer of EEP Mihret 
Debebe intervened several times during the construction of Adama wind farms when there 
were clashes between the contractor and the consultancy team (Interview 20170801090344). 
These interventions, for better or worse, somehow affected the professionalism and 
effectiveness of the civil servants in administering their jobs. It nonetheless shows the power 
and influence of executives in intervening in development projects in cases where the 
government’s planned outcome is threatened.  
The third explanation relates to Ethiopia’s geographical location and position as the diplomatic 
capital of Africa. It host the permanent seat of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa, the African Union headquarters, and several other international organisations and 
diplomatic representations (Feyissa, 2011). Ethiopia thus provide a diplomatic gateway to the 
rest of the continent. Such a position comes with bargaining power. The Horn of Africa is one 
of the world’s most unstable regions and Ethiopia has been regarded as a regional stabiliser 
(Clapham, 2018).  Although Ethiopia has been accused of serious human rights abuses which 
have recently led to social and political instability, it has remained a vital partner for the USA 
and western Europe global war on terror (Whitfield & Fraser, 2010). All these variables allow 
Ethiopia to yield a powerful strategic capability when engaging with investors/donors 
(Hackenesch, 2018).  As noted:   
“Ethiopia has placed itself diplomatically, as a force for ‘stability’ in an unstable region: 
as a leading partner in the ‘global war on terror’, a major supplier of peacekeeping 
forces to help control conflicts in neighbouring states, and a generally responsible 
mediator in disputes such as those in Somalia and South Sudan” (Clapham, 2018, pp. 
1156–1157).  
Finally, the level and nature of Ethiopia’s economic performance, especially since 2002, has 
considerably improved its economic clout in East Africa if not in Africa. Ethiopia provides an 
interesting case study where state-led development planning, effective aid use and FDI 
generates new evidence to debates on poverty reduction in Africa. The double-digit GDP 
growth, the massive state-led infrastructure development, the ability to attract capital (whether 
domestic or foreign) to finance the national development plan has created the sense of profit 
possibilities especially for foreign entities wanting to invest in Ethiopia. Despite the limitations 
of Ethiopia in meeting good governance indicators, the country has attracted remarkable 
investments from both the West and the East regardless of its disapproval of “economic 
policies ostensibly favoured by the principal Western donors” (Clapham, 2018, p. 1157). This 
all comes from the government ability to proficiently play one donor against the other to its 
advantage and also the ability to show value for money through high and “visible returns on 
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their investments” (Clapham, 2018, p. 1157). As a result, Ethiopia’s sovereign credit rating 
outlook has been stable (see table 4.4) (although it remains high risk) creating further 
confidence for investors and financial institutions.  
“This gives the [Ethiopian] government substantial bargaining power, which it 
exercises at times by refusing to compromise on its policy agenda, and at times by 
dividing the donor community. This involves a degree of gamesmanship (on both 
sides) with the potential for positions and strategies being misjudged in either direction. 
There are instances in which the government may not realise the extent to which the 
donor community’s interest in Ethiopia enhances its negotiating position; conversely, 
the government also seems capable of over-estimating the strength of its position” 
(Furtado & Smith, 2007, p. 24).  
Table 4. 4 Ethiopia’s sovereign credit rating  
Agency Rating Outlook Year  Rank/100 
S&P B stable 2014 30 
Moody's B1 stable 2014 35 
Fitch B stable 2014 30 
Source: countryeconomy.com 2019. NB: Sovereign credit rating relates to how credit worth is a country 
measured out of 100. B1 and B here shows a high-risk factor and the probability to repay the loans is 
highly speculative.   
4.4 Ethiopia—looking up to and from China 
Official engagement between Ethiopia and China is traced to 1956 when Ethiopian cultural 
delegation visited China. A reciprocal visit by the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to 
Ethiopia followed in 1964 paving the way for the establishment of official diplomatic relations 
between the two countries in 1971 (see table 4.5). It is argued that Ethiopia played an 
important role in pushing for the recognition of People’s Republic of China as the legitimate 
‘China’ to have a United Nations Security Council seat against the Republic of China (Taiwan) 
(Adem, 2012; Venkataraman & Gofie, 2015). Although that was the case, for Thakur (2009) 
relations between Ethiopia and China were rather mild, and somehow strained because 
Ethiopia supported the USA and Britain’s alliance with South Korea against Chinese-aligned 
North Korea in the Korean War. The Derg military regime which overthrew Haile Selassie 
aligned itself with the Soviet Union further limiting cooperation with China. Productive 
engagements resumed in 1988 when Mengistu Hailemariam visited China, possibly upon 
noticing the imminent collapse of Soviet power (Venkataraman & Gamora, 2009). This visit 
signalled the switch from the Soviet Union to the Chinese culminating in the signing of Sino-
Ethiopian Agreement for Economic and Technological Cooperation (Adem, 2012).  
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When the EPRDF came to power in 1991, Ethiopia had severe budgetary challenges due to 
severe economic and resource mismanagement as a result of the almost 20 years revolution 
(Lejeune, 2015). This put the EPRDF between a rock and a hard place as they had to survive 
by foreign aid initially. The aid came with conditionalities which according to the TPLF old 
guard were against the revolutionary ideology. Ethiopia struggled to find a way forward and 
policy autonomy against all-powerful Western institutions (Balema, 2003). An alternative was 
thus devised to counter the unacceptable Western agencies prescriptions by partnering with 
an anti-Western like-minded country—China. China was appealing because it offered practical 
lessons for the EPRDF to learn from without necessarily bending to the over-prescriptive 
powerful Western financial institutions and development agencies. It is therefore not surprising 
that Meles visited China in 1995 to express his willingness to learn from Beijing. In 1996 Jiang 
Zemin, the then General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and President of China, 
visited Ethiopia further cementing the commitments. It is important to mention that the current 
Ethiopia-China relations started at the Party to Party level, and as alluded to by an embassy 
official in Addis Ababa, all deals are thus reached at that level before being transferred to the 
government level, something Western institutions have failed to grasp (Interview 20170724 
143353). To cement the Party to Party relations, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
between EPRDF and CCP in 2010, and since 2008, each Party has sent representatives to 
their congresses (Lejeune, 2015).  
Table 4. 5 Ethiopia-China official cooperation framework 
YEAR COOPERATION FRAMEWORK  
1971 Ethiopia-China Economic & Technique Cooperation 
Framework  
1971 Ethiopia-China Trade Agreement 
1976 Ethiopia-China Trade Agreement 
1984 Ethiopia-China Trade Protocol 
1986 Ethiopia-China Trade Protocol 
1988 Ethiopia-China Trade Protocol 
1988 Ethiopia-China Agreements for Economic & Technological 
Cooperation 
1988 Ethiopia-China Agreement for the Mutual Promotion & 
Protection of Investment 
1996 Ethiopia-China Agreement for Trade, Economic & 
Technological Cooperation 
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1998 Ethiopia-China Agreement Concerning the Encouragement & 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
1998 Joint Ethiopia- China Commission (JECC)  
2002 Ethiopia-China Agreement for Economic & Technological 
Cooperation 
2003 Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership 
2010 Memorandum of understanding on exchange and cooperation 
between the CCP and EPRDF 
 
In 2003, Ethiopia became the first African country to host the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC). In 2006, again Ethiopia co-hosted the Forum with China. Various high-
level officials have visited each other’s country87, and to date, Ethio-China relations have 
diplomatically88, politically, socio-culturally and economically matured to qualify as a close 
relationship (Cabestan, 2012). Both sides advocate mutuality in their engagement, joint 
enterprise in development projects, and share similar ‘repertoires’ on development paradigms 
(Fourie, 2015), non-intervention, and respect for each other’s sovereignty (Lejeune, 2015).  
China is an important partner in Ethiopia’s economic structural transformation trajectories 
particularly as a source for foreign direct investment (see appendix 4.3 & 4.4), infrastructure 
development (see appendix 4.2 & 4.6) and trade89 (see appendix 4.5). Since official statistics 
remain murky, lack of transparency in official data reporting creates substantial uncertainty 
and avenues for misconceptions to thrive. Loan, aid, foreign direct investment and 
development finance are not separated, creating problems of duplications and unreliable 
statistics (China Africa Research Initiative [CARI], 2018a; Desta, 2016). Nonetheless, several 
sources were consulted here. According to the Chinese Global Investment Tracker (2019) 
database from 2005 to 2018, Chinese investments and construction contracts in Ethiopia were 
estimated to be $23.85 billion across all sectors, with transport sector receiving the largest 
share (see figure 4.8). From 2000 to 2017, CARI (2018a) suggests that Ethiopia received 
                                                          
87Ethiopian Premiers have all visited China: Meles Zenawi (1995; 2004; 2006 &2011) Hailemariam Desalegn (2013; 2015; 2017) 
and Abiy Ahmed Ali (2018; 2019). Chinese high-level officials have likewise visited Ethiopia: Former President Jiang Zemin 
(1996); Premier Wen Jiabao (2003); Former National People’s Congress Chairman Wu Bangguo (2008); former Commerce 
Minister Chen Deming (2009); Premier Li Keqiang (2014); State Councillor Yang Jiechi visited Ethiopia in 2017; Jia Qingling 
(2012); Li Zhanshu (2018); State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi (2019). NB. These are just selected few cases for 
illustrative purpose.  
88 Ethiopia was one of the African countries that sided with China during the UN Human Rights Commission case against China 
in 2007. Ethiopia parliament also supported China’s anti-secession law (regarding Taiwan). Similarly, China distances itself and 
never comment on Ethiopia’s human rights abuses. For China, Ethiopia is an ally to have on your side given its influence in Africa.   
89 Trade between Ethiopia and China remains unbalanced in favour of China. Cumulative trade volume from 1992 to 2016 saw, 
Ethiopia experiencing a negative trade balance of more than $27 billion. By 2015, trade volume reached more than $3 billion (see 
appendix 4.5). 
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$13.74 billion (see figure 4.7 & 4.8) of Chinese loans across all sectors, with transport and 
power receiving a substantial chunk.   
Meanwhile, by 2016, Chinese FDI stock in Ethiopia was estimated to be more than $2 billion 
in which the manufacturing sector accounted for over 60% (Hailemariam, 2016). CARI (2019)  
also estimate Chinese FDI stock in Ethiopia to be around $1.976 billion by 2017 (see figure 
4.9). These two data sets show that Chinese FDI in Ethiopia is still very low, which is not 
surprising given that cumulative Chinese FDI stock in Africa is estimated to be $43 billion from 
2003-201790. Chinese FDI in Africa shows that Ethiopia is seventh-ranked in terms of top 
Chinese FDI stock and flow destination (see figure 4.10) (China Africa Research Initiative, 
2018a). By 15 January 2019, data obtained from Ethiopia Investment Commission (2019) 
shows that more than 1368 FDI projects from China had been licenced. Out of this, 319 were 
under pre-implementation, 210 under implementation and 839 in operation (see appendix 4.3 
& 4.4). More than 95% of Chinese firms in Ethiopia are private, and the majority are in 
manufacturing, followed by construction and real-estate sectors. What is evident in Ethiopia-
China relations is that Chinese loans and FDI in Ethiopia’s transport, energy infrastructure and 
manufacturing sector is now indispensable in terms of Ethiopia’s development trajectories 
(Brautigam, 2011; Cheru, 2016; Geda & GebreMeskel, 2010). As the relationship between 
Ethiopia and China continues to grow, questions of the Ethiopian government’s ability to 
strategically manage Chinese influence in its national development plan will emerge.  
Figure 4. 7 Total Chinese loans to Ethiopia by financier 2000-2018 ($million) 
 
Source: Data retrieved from CARI database 2018. C-EXIM Bank remains the largest lender in Ethiopia. 
Other lenders include the China Development Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China. 
                                                          
90 According to UNCTAD World Investment Report (2017), by 2015, the USA had the largest FDI stock in Africa ($64bn) followed 
by the UK ($58bn), France ($54 billion), China ($35bn), South Africa ($22bn), Italy ($22bn), India ($17bn), Singapore ($16bn), 
Switzerland ($14bn) and Malaysia ($12bn). 
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Majority of these loans were under a concessional arrangement with usually below market interest rate 
and grace period.  
 
Figure 4. 8 Chinese loans to Ethiopia 2000-2017 by sector ($million) 
 
Source: Data retrieved from CARI database 2018. Transport remains the largest Chinese funded sector 
followed by communication, power, industry, water, trade and others. Among the big projects is the ZTE 
C-EXIM bank financed $1.5 billion Telecommunication deal; Addis-Djibouti $2.4 billion railway project; 
Adama expressway $800 million and many more (see appendix 4.2 for a selected few big projects that 
were majorly funded and contracted to the Chinese).    
 
Figure 4. 9 Chinese FDI stock and flow in Ethiopia 2003-2017  
 
Source: Data retrieved from CARI database 2018.   
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Figure 4. 10 Top 10 Chinese FDI stock in Africa 
 
Source: Data retrieved from CARI database 2018. Chinese FDI in Ethiopia shows a gradual growth 
especially in the manufacturing, construction and real estate sector (see appendix 4.3).   
4.5 Chapter summary  
This chapter has presented a post-1991 history of Ethiopia and how that era is notable for 
laying the foundation for deepening and cementing of economic and political ties with China. 
It also traced the transition from the Derg regime to the TPLF-EPRDF led government and the 
adoption of an ethnic-based federal system for political mobilisation and organisation. This 
political setting provides a window of opportunity to examine the current Ethiopian political 
economy. The chapter also traced the evolution of the Ethiopian version of developmental 
paradigm, an authoritarian one in which TPLF-EPRDF, especially under the intellectual and 
ideological guidance of Meles Zenawi, devoted itself to economic progress at the expense of 
civil rights and political liberties. Although the authoritarian development state model has so 
far contributed to changes and progress in the economy, there is still a lot to be done especially 
on improving the hard infrastructure endowment. These changes are largely explained by a 
continued stay in power of TPLF-EPRDF party which has until recently, created stability and 
lock-in in terms of development policy planning and orientation.  
The chapter also explained the Ethiopian particularism and exceptionalism which creates both 
normative and practical influence when engaging and negotiating investment and 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
South Africa 45 59 112 168 702 3049 2307 4153 4060 4775 4400 5954 4723
Zambia 144 148 160 268 429 651 844 944 1200 1998 2164 2272 2338
Algieria 6 34 171 247 394 509 751 937 1059 1305 1497 2452 2532
Sudan 1 172 352 497 575 528 564 613 1526 1237 1507 1747 1809
Zimbabwe 37 38 42 46 59 60 100 135 576 875 1521 1696 1799
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infrastructure deals with foreign powers. These conditioning factors create avenues and 
pockets of effectiveness to intentionally and unintentionally influence if not shape the 
engagement dynamics with external powers, including China. The chapter has presented the 
nature and depth of both political and economic ties between Ethiopia and China and how in 
particular engagements at the Party to Party level create room for engagement in other areas. 
As such, the deepening of relations between the two countries is a direct result of strong 
relations between EPRDF and the Communist Party of China. Therefore, the Party to Party 
level of engagement sets the tone and direction of cooperation through which deals are 
negotiated and sealed at the political level before they are transferred to the ‘state/government 
level’. This suggests a thin line that separates the Party and the state in Ethiopia. The state is, 
therefore, an extension of the Party. In the following chapter, I examine the drivers and 
motivations for Ethiopia and China to finance and develop the two wind farms.  
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Appendix 4. 1 Industrial park in Ethiopia as of October 2018 
Name Location  Eligible Sector Status  Remark # Sheds 
Bole Lemi –I Addis Ababa Apparel and 
textile 
Operational Fully 
occupied 20 
Bole Lemi –Ii Addis Ababa Textile and 
garment 
Under 
construction 
Serviced 
land 
available 
2 sheds & 
Serviced 
land 
Kilinto Addis Ababa Pharmaceutical 
Hub 
Under 
construction 
Serviced 
land 
available 
Serviced 
land 
Hawassa Phase- 
I, Cycle 1 
Hawassa Textile and 
Garment 
operational Shed 
available 37 
Hawassa Phase- 
I, Cycle 2 
Hawassa Textile and 
Garment 
operational Sheds 
available 15 
Adama Adama Garment, Textile 
& Machinery, 
Under 
construction 
Sheds 
available 19 
Dire-Dawa Dire-Dawa Garment, Apparel 
and Textile 
Under 
construction 
sheds 
available 15 
Mekelle Mekelle Apparel & Textile operational sheds 
available 15 
Kombolcha Kombolcha Apparel & Textile operational Fully 
occupied 9 
Jimma Jimma Not Decided Under 
construction 
Sheds 
available 9 
Bahir-Dar Bahir-Dar Garment & 
Apparel 
Under 
construction 
Sheds 
available 8 
Debre-Birhan Debre-
Berhan 
garment Apparel 
& agro processing 
Under 
construction 
Sheds 
available 8 
Source: Industrial Park Development Corporation 2018  
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Appendix 4. 2 Selected major Chinese financed and contracted projects in Ethiopia  
Y
e
a
r 
 Project name Lender/Contra
ctor 
Cost 
$m 
Chinese 
contribution  
Size  Sector 
1
9
9
8
 
Addis Ring 
Road 
 86  $13m  Transport  
2
0
0
2
 
 
Tekeze  Sinohydro & 
Gezhouba 
365 unclear 300 MW Power 
2
0
0
6
 
Ethio-Telecom- 
ZTE 
ZTE  1500 unclear  Telecommunication  
2
0
0
7
 
Finchaa-
Amerti-Neshe 
C-EXIM   155 75% 97 MW Power 
2
0
0
8
 
Eastern 
Industry Park 
C-EXIM, 
Zhangjiagang 
Municipal & 
Jiangsu 
provincial govt.  
100  64 Ha 
construct
ed 
Industry  
2
0
0
8
 
Gotera 
Intersection  
C-EXIM  $12.7m  Transport  
2
0
0
9
 
Adama 1 C-EXIM   117 85% 51 MW Power 
2
0
1
0
 
Genale-Dawa 3 C-EXIM   455 60% 254 MW Power 
2
0
1
0
 
Gibe 3 Electric 
& 
Hydromechanic
s  
ICBC   1888 25% 1870 MW Power 
2
0
1
0
 
Transmission 
Project of 
Genale Dawa 
III-Yirgalem II-
Wolayita Sodo 
II-Hawassa II 
C-EXIM   unclear $250m   Power 
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2
0
1
0
 
Addis Ababa-
Adama 
Expressway  
C-EXIM   1400 $800m 84.7km Transport  
2
0
1
1
 
Adama 2 C-EXIM   345 85% 153 MW Power 
2
0
1
1
 
Addis Ababa-
Light Railway  
C-EXIM   475 $403m   Transport  
2
0
1
1
 
Addis Djibouti 
Railway line  
C-EXIM; ICBC; 
CDB 
3400 $2400m 752km Transport  
2
0
1
1
 
Tsehay Real 
Estate (Poli 
Lotus) 
unclear  $60m 30 000 m² Real Estate 
2
0
1
2
 
Bole Airport 
Expansion  
C-EXIM 340 $225m 80Ha Transport  
2
0
1
2
 
African Union 
Conference 
centre 
Government of 
China 
200 $200m 112 000 
m2 
Real Estate 
Source: Author compilation NB: CDB-China Development Bank; ICBC-Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China 
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Appendix 4. 3 Licenced Chinese FDI projects by sector in Ethiopia (27/08/98-15/01/19) 
Sector 
L
ic
e
n
c
e
d
 
P
re
-
Im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 
Im
p
le
m
e
n
ta
ti
o
n
 Operation 
Projects Investment 
‘000’(ETB) 
Perm 
workers 
Temp 
workers 
Agriculture 11 4 4 3 13 771.28 64 53 
Manufacturing 957 228 155 574 29 170 
708.47 
49 709 27 385 
Mining 4 
 
1 3 36 500 58 42 
Education 1 
  
1 530 6 4 
Health 12 1 1 10 15 417.44 60 42 
Hotels (Resorts, Motels, 
Lodges) & restaurants 
45 10 4 31 101 402.49 717 236 
Tour operation, 
Transport and 
Communication 
10 1 
 
9 24 920.73 203 60 
Real estate, Machinery & 
Equipment Rental & 
Consultancy Service 
153 38 11 104 924 074 86 891 27 239 
Construction contracting 
including Water Well 
Drilling 
169 35 33 101 6 728 874.03 10 886 30 808 
Others* 6 2 1 3 56 000 70 245 
Grand Total 1 
368 
319 210 839 37 072 
198.46 
148 664 86 114 
Source: Data obtained from the EIC (2019). *This includes copper, gold, gemstone & tantalum 
concentrates, export & imports of chemicals for the leather industry, bonded warehouse system. ETB—
Ethiopian Birr 
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Appendix 4. 4 Licenced Chinese FDI projects by region in Ethiopia (27/08/98-15/01/19) 
R
e
g
io
n
  
L
ic
e
n
c
e
d
 
P
re
-
Im
p
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thousands 
(ETB) 
Perm 
workers 
Temp 
workers 
Addis Ababa 735 167 85 483 16 011 467 26 692 41 941 
Afar 2     2 1 800 5 35 
Amhara 66 39 14 13 1 565 585 4 458 3 244 
Benishangul-Gumuz 4 4           
Dire Dawa 12 2 3 7 515 964 81 097 20 273 
Gambella 3 1   2 20 239 20 100 
Multiregional 38   3 35 405 591 1 731 2 198 
Oromia 489 104 100 285 18 277 687 34 048 11 787 
SNNPR 14 2 4 8 163 767 503 6 473 
Tigray 5   1 4 110 097 110 63 
Total  1368 319 210 839 37 072 198 148 664 86 114 
Source: Data obtained from the EIC, 2019   
 
Appendix 4. 5 Total trade volume of Ethiopia with China & USA 1992-2016 (million $ 
unadjusted) 
 
Source: Data retrieved from CARI database 2018 
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Appendix 4. 6 Chinese workers in Ethiopia (contracted projects & labour services) 
 
Source: Data retrieved from CARI database 2018 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DRIVERS AND MOTIVATIONS FOR ETHIOPIAN AND CHINESE 
FINANCING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADAMA WIND FARMS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
Ethiopia-China engagement in wind energy infrastructure financing and development remains 
an understudied topic and yet is important, especially in this age of South-South Cooperation’s 
role in the implementation of SDGs (Chen, 2018). Where such studies exist, more focus has 
been paid to the Chinese side, paying little or no attention to the African countries’ drivers and 
motivations (Baker & Shen, 2017; Conrad et al., 2011; Lema et al., 2013; Shen & Power, 2017; 
Tan et al., 2013). To address this gap, this chapter analyses Ethiopia and China engagement 
in wind energy. Using data drawn from the interviews with the Ethiopian and Chinese 
stakeholders involved in the projects, and documents review, I answer the first sub-question 
posed in this study. Empirical evidence suggests that the drivers and the motivations in each 
of the two wind farms are similar and consistent, and therefore, the drivers and motivations in 
the two case studies will be discussed and analysed simultaneously. As such, I make two 
contributions to the literature on (i) the drivers and motivations of Ethiopian and Chinese actors 
to develop the wind farms, and (ii) the economic and political determinants of the Ethiopian 
government to award the contracts to the Chinese.  
In this study, I define drivers in a schematic manner which relates to the enabling context and 
factors that pushed the decision makers to develop the wind farms. I define motivation in a 
similar way, entailing a spectrum of variables concerned with internal and perhaps external 
factors that influenced decision making. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
section begins by unpacking the drivers for both Ethiopian and Chinese financing and 
developing of the wind farms. By examining the Ethiopian drivers, I simultaneously explain the 
Ethiopian government’s choice of developing wind energy and not other renewable energy 
technology. At the same time, examining the drivers of the Chinese enterprises’ involvement 
in Adama wind farms, permits analysis of new and future directions of the Chinese 
commitment in Africa’s renewable energy sector. The second section interrogates the 
economic and political factors which influenced the Ethiopian government to award the 
contract to the Chinese enterprises. The last section summarises the chapter.  
5.1 Drivers for Ethiopia to develop Adama wind farms    
5.1.1 Technology maturity and other considerations  
Wind energy technology maturity was identified by Ethiopian government officials from 
MOWIE, EEP, EEU and MOFEC as one of the main drivers that led the government to develop 
Adama wind farms. Modern wind energy was first deployed as a source of electricity 
generation in 1979 by Vestas, Nordtank, Kuriant and Bonus—Danish wind technology 
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manufacturers (International Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA], 2018). Since then, massive 
improvements in the technology have led to increased efficiency, capacity and performance 
optimisation. As a result of the wind energy revolution attributed to having started in 2008/9, 
“higher hub heights and larger swept areas by blades” (IRENA, 2016, p. 51) have increased 
performance predictability and capacity factor91. Wind levelized cost of electricity/energy 
(LCOE)92 is attractive and competitively cheaper (see graph 5.1). Between 2010 and 2017 the 
“average cost of electricity from onshore wind fall by 23%. Projects are now routinely 
commissioned at 4 cents/kWh, and the global weighted average is around 6 cents/kWh” 
(IRENA, 2018, p. 2). As a result, many wind farms have been commissioned globally. For 
example, in 2008, 17,000 MW was the global installed capacity compared to 63,467 MW in 
2015, where China emerged as a big market and developer of the technology. That also meant 
the emergence of a larger pool of experienced, internationally active project developers 
(IRENA, 2018; Shen & Power, 2017). These factors, therefore, contributed to the Ethiopian 
government developing Adama wind farms. As noted by a MOWIE official:   
“Today, when you compare the life cycle cost and repairs, they are very cheap. What 
looks expensive is the first two years of operations because of the larger amount of 
capital spent, the capital spend constitute the fuel or energy cost, and there is no 
energy cost because wind is free. In terms of what we call levelized cost of energy over 
a 20-year period, it is very cheap and competitive, and whatever problems or questions 
we have now with this technology for wind, technology is almost year by year solving 
that problem for us. Economies of scale, especially when China seriously took up wind 
for itself, the cost has also gone down, they have a large market for it” (Interview 
20171011140053).  
Alongside technological considerations, two other considerations were identified by the 
Ethiopian government officials as having contributed to the development of Adama wind farms 
against solar, which had also been planned for development in GTP I & II. First, the time taken 
to complete the project was a priority. In 12- and 24-months’ time, Adama 1 and Adama 2 had 
been completed. As argued by an ASTU professor involved as a consultant in Adama 2, “wind 
farms are fast track projects, we can construct them within a short time. Within 24 months, we 
have constructed this big wind farm of 153MW—hydro would have taken much longer” 
                                                          
91 “Ratio of realised over potential output” (Boccard, 2009, p. 2680). 
92 Defined as a “measure of the overall competitiveness of different (electricity) generating technologies. It represents the per-
megawatt hour cost of building and operating a generating plant over an assumed financial life. Key inputs capital costs, fuel 
(energy) costs, fixed and variable operations and maintenance costs, financing costs, and an assumed utilization rate for each 
plant type” (Energy Information Administration, 2018, p. 1).  
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(Pombo-van Zyl, 2015, p. 1). Similarly, an executive member of the TPLF-EPDRF further 
explains that: 
“Hydropower construction takes a lot of time. For example, the Renaissance Dam, we 
can say that is being constructed very fast, but it has already passed its fifth year, and 
it may require may be about 2 to 3 years to complete, but it takes a long time” (Interview 
20170512172020).  
Second, the social acceptability factor of wind with regards to permanent effects on direct land 
use was identified as a major consideration. The TPLF-EPRDF executive member further 
argue that “solar is also open, but the problem with solar, it takes a lot of land” (Interview 
20170512172020). Instead, wind was picked because it allowed farmers to use almost 90% 
of the land, unlike solar (United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification [UNCCD] & 
IRENA, 2017). This would mean less social resistance from farmers, especially in the Oromia 
region, known for militancy against the TPLF-EPRDF government. Wind, therefore, reduced 
the potential conflict, relocation and compensation costs.  
Graph 5. 1 Global Levelized cost of electricity generation technologies 2010 and 2017 
 
Source: Data retrieved from IRENA renewable cost database (2018). The graph shows levelized cost 
of electricity by generation technology. Red is 2010 and green is 2017.  
5.1.2 Natural driver: availability of abundant and ideal wind resource 
Ethiopia is naturally endowed with abundant and harvestable wind mainly along the Great 
East Africa rift valley, which “is comprised of gently rolling terrain that creates a wind-tunnel 
effect on the crest of hills. The valley sustains the winds” (Consumer News and Business 
Channel Africa, 2018, p. x). In 2001 the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and 
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Assessment (SWERA) program in 13 countries93. In Ethiopia, Deutsches Zentrum fuer Luft- 
und Raumfahrt e.V (German Aerospace Centre) conducted the studies, and a final report was 
released in 2004. Measured at 50m above ground and on a 5 km2 resolution, SWERA 
classified Ethiopia into seven wind regimes based on wind speed and wind power density (see 
table 5.1). The study found that significant wind concentration zones were along the Great 
East Africa rift valley which stretches from the north through the centre and towards the east 
(Ethiopian Rural Energy Development and Promotion Center, 2007). Additionally, using a 5 
MW/km2 and 80% turbine operation time, the study estimated a total of 100 gigawatts (GW) 
potential which translates to about 890 terawatt-hours (TWh) from an area of about 166 
000km2 in which more than 20 000km2 was utilizable for grid-connected electricity generation 
(Ethiopian Rural Energy Development and Promotion Center, 2007; Hydrochina Corporation, 
2012).  
Table 5. 1 Wind resource classification by SWERA    
Wind regime Classification Wind speed range Wind power density  
Regime 1 Poor 3.5–5.6 m/s 50–200 W/m2 
Regime 2 Marginal  5.6–6.4 m/s 200–300 W/m2 
Regime 3 Moderate 6.4–7.0 m/s  300–400 W/m2  
Regime 4 Good 7.0–7.5 m/s  400–500 W/m2 
Regime 5 Excellent  7.5–8.0 m/s 500–600 W/m2 
Regime 6 Excellent 8.0–8.8 m/s  600–800 W/m2  
Regime 7 Excellent Above 8.8 m/s   Above 800 W/m2 
Source: Data obtained from Ethiopian Rural Energy Development and Promotion Center  
After the completion of SWERA, the Ethiopian government invited the German Society for 
International Cooperation (GIZ)-Technical Expertise for Renewable (TERNA) in cooperation 
with EEPCo to conduct a feasibility, financial, environmental and social impact assessment 
for wind farm development. Several reports were released94 which created a wind atlas for 
Ethiopia and also identified Ashegoda, Mossebo, Aysha, Debre Berhan, Nazareth (Adama), 
Assela, Sululta, Harena Tele, Gondar and Maymekden as feasible sites to develop wind farms. 
TERNA sub-contracted Lahmeyer International to conduct feasibility studies for Harena, 
Ashegoda and Nazareth sites which as per TERNA findings had sufficient wind energy 
potential with annual averages of 6.86 m/s, 8.50 m/s and 9.36 m/s respectively (GTZ-TERNA, 
2005; Kebede, 2011). Of the 10 SWERA identified sites, Lahmeyer International conducted 
                                                          
93 Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Bangladesh, China, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Brazil, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.  
94 GTZ, Wind Energy Program TERNA-Ethiopia; Information for project appraisal: Ethiopia, June 2004; GTZ, Wind Energy 
Program TERNA-Ethiopia; Wind data evaluation after 6 months, August 2005; GTZ, Wind Energy Program TERNA-Ethiopia; Site 
selection report: Ethiopia, April 2005; GTZ, Wind Energy Program TERNA-Ethiopia; Feasibility study for Wind park development 
in Ethiopia and Capacity building: Mesobo-Harena Wind Park Site; Final report, August 2006, and GTZ, Wind Energy Program 
TERNA-Ethiopia; Feasibility study for Wind park development in Ethiopia and Capacity building: Ashegoda Wind Park Site; Final 
report, August 2006. 
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the feasibility studies for Ashegoda95 and Mossebo-Harena96 only. It is noted that Gondar 
lacked additional topographic information and did not have sufficient space for a 50 MW wind 
farm (GTZ-TERNA, 2005). Adama was avoided because of the presence of the Ethiopian 
Television Network booster (GTZ-TERNA, 2006). Findings from the two feasibility studies 
concluded with the prioritisation of Ashegoda, later developed by Vergnet, a French firm.  
Meanwhile, as part of Going Abroad strategy, the Chinese government funded HydroChina to 
undertake a Wind and Solar Energy Master Plan for Ethiopia in 2010. The study, like SWERA, 
classified Ethiopia into seven wind regimes. The study found that Ethiopia is endowed with 
3.03 TW wind resource reserve of which 1.599 TW was exploitable, out of which 1.35 TW 
could be potentially installed. Fifty-one wind farm sites were identified and proposed for 
development with a potential installed capacity of 6720 MW (Hydrochina Corporation, 2012). 
Therefore, existence of abundant wind resources in Ethiopia drove the Ethiopian government 
to develop Adama wind farms.  
5.1.3 Global climate change agenda and the push for renewable energy   
Human-induced climate change and variability has created a significant drive towards global 
deployment of renewable energy. The climate change problem is mostly an energy problem, 
so to fix the climate problem, there is need for new ways of generating energy. As such, over 
the past decade, financing for energy development is shifting towards renewable energy in 
line with global commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. According to United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), African countries contributes 
less than 4% to global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from energy and industrial sources, 
yet are stricken mostly by the effects of climate change and variability (UNFCCC, 2006). 
Ethiopia contributes 141 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO₂e), which is 
0.3% of the global GHG emissions of  46,906 MtCO₂e (USAID, 2015). To reduce its share of 
GHG emissions, Ethiopia has adopted a Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy (CRGES) 
policy framework which aims to lower emissions from a Business As Usual forecast of 400 Mt 
CO2e to 145 Mt CO2e or lower by 2030 (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2015). 
Consistent with the SDGs and international efforts such as Africa Renewable Energy Access 
Program (AFREA I & II)—Energy Sector Management Assistance Program97, Sustainable 
Energy for All—African Hub98, and Power Africa99, Ethiopia and other African countries are 
seen as  having the “opportunity to leapfrog into a new era of economic growth and expansion 
                                                          
95 GTZ, Wind Energy Program TERNA-Ethiopia; Feasibility study for Wind park development in Ethiopia and Capacity building: 
Ashegoda Wind Park Site; Final report, August 2006. 
96 GTZ, Wind Energy Program TERNA-Ethiopia; Feasibility study for Wind park development in Ethiopia and Capacity building: 
Mesobo-Harena Wind Park Site; Final report, August 2006.  
97 http://www.esmap.org/re_mapping  
98https://www.se4all-africa.org/fileadmin/uploads/se4all/Documents/CountryRAGAs/MWH-Updated-RapidGapAnalysis.pdf  
99 https://www.usaid.gov/powerafrica/ethiopia  
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driven by clean power generation” (Shen & Power, 2017, p. 679 ). As argued by a lecturer 
from EFRSSI, a government-funded think tank, “one of the drivers for the Ethiopian 
government to develop the wind farms is because of global policy orientation where the focus 
has shifted to renewable energy due to climate change factors” (Interview 20170712135318). 
Similarly, an official from the AU also claims that “there is also generally a global push towards 
renewable energy. Most financial institutions will hardly finance non-renewables. So, there is 
a constraint for African countries to develop non-renewable energy” (Interview 
20170711143359). The fact that global financing of energy infrastructure development is 
shifting towards renewables suggest that Africa’s transition to renewable energy is and will be 
shaped by large international players (Power et al., 2016). In the next section, I explore the 
drivers for Chinese involvement in the financing and development of Adama wind farms.   
5.2 Drivers for Chinese involvement in Adama wind farms   
5.2.1 ‘Going Abroad’: government-backed internationalisation  
A key driver for Chinese enterprises involved in the financing and development of Adama wind 
farms was the Chinese government-backed ‘Going Abroad’ strategy. The strategy is traced to 
1999 when the Chinese State Council issued Mandates on Encouraging Enterprises to 
Develop Overseas Processing and Assembly Business. In the 10th Five Year Plan, a directive 
was issued specifically targeting the promotion of state-owned enterprises to do business 
abroad. This strategy as argued by Conrad et al., (2011, p. 5) “does not merely focus on 
increasing exports, but relies on establishing a comprehensive presence of Chinese 
companies in foreign markets through asset acquisition and investments”. In 2009, report 
number 38 [2009] of the State Council promoted the international scaling-up of wind energy 
equipment to desaturate the domestic market (Chinese State Council, 2009). Two years later, 
the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and other concerned institutions released The 
Opinions for Promoting the Internationalisation Development of Strategic Emerging Industries. 
The report further promoted the internationalisation of Chinese entities by supporting them 
through fiscal incentives, financing, export credit and export credit insurance100 in strategic 
emerging industries including new energy (wind, solar) in other emerging markets in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America (Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 2011).  
Several Chinese enterprises involved in the manufacturing of wind turbines and the 
development of wind farms have received financial support from EXIM Bank and China 
Development Bank at a very low-interest rate to do business abroad. Research suggests that 
China Development Bank extended $6 billion to Goldwind and $5 billion to United 
                                                          
100 Such services have been provided by China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (SinoSure) which is a state-owned 
enterprise responsible at insuring against commercial and political risks. Data to validate the involvement of SinoSure in insuring 
for Adama wind farms was unavailable. But research conducted by Shen & Power (2017) suggest that they are generally involved 
in insuring such kind of investments. 
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Power/Longyuan to develop wind farms in Pakistan. It further extended $3 billion to Beijing 
Construction Engineering Group to develop a wind farm in Argentina, and $2.2 billion to 
Sinovel-Mainstream joint venture 16 GW deals in Europe (Tan et al., 2013; Zhang, Wang, 
Wang, & Zhao, 2015).  
Chinese enterprises also benefit from the support they receive from the Chinese government’s 
policy towards Africa. The Chinese government periodically design Africa Policy papers (2006, 
2010, 2013 and 2015), from which Chinese enterprises operationalise their engagement 
strategies with Africa. Also, in 2000, the Chinese government together with African countries, 
established the FOCAC as an institutional framework to organise the engagements. In the 
2009 FOCAC summit, China pledged to develop 100 clean energy projects. In 2015, during 
the 6th FOCAC summit, China pledged $60 billion. In 2018, the most recent forum, China 
committed $60 billion of which $15 billion was allocated to grants, interest free and 
concessional loans, $20 billion for credit lines, $10 billion for special fund for development 
financing, $5 billion for special fund for financing imports from Africa and $10 billion for 
investment in the next three years. As such, “the expansion of Chinese involvement in 
African’s renewable energy development is, in many ways, complementary to wider Chinese 
central government strategies for foreign cooperation with the continent” (Shen & Power, 
2017, p. 681). As noted by CGCOC employee:   
“The Chinese companies working in Ethiopia always take interest or we always pay 
attention into China relationship, in a bigger context. So the context I think is what we 
are looking for in line with the policy direction has an influence in our decision making 
for sure because we know if that’s what China want. If that is something that the 
Chinese government and Ethiopian government want, then is something that we are 
sure will get maximum support from both governments for financing, policy and 
investment and facilitation. But if it is something that is not on the current focus for both 
governments, we know it will not get the best attention” (Interview 20171020140152). 
Because of the depth of cooperation between Chinese and African governments, a majority 
of Chinese enterprises enjoy a great depth of political buy-ins in the majority of African 
countries they do business. This explains one of the drivers why the Chinese enterprises were 
involved in the financing and development of the Adama wind farms.  
5.2.2 Strategic ‘new’ market seeking  
Strategic new market seeking has been identified by Chinese enterprises as one of the drivers 
for their involvement in Adama wind farms. Several factors pushed the Chinese enterprises to 
strategically look for a new market in Ethiopia. The first factor was competition and saturation 
of the domestic market. The renewable energy policy and regulatory framework created 
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massive domestic industrial capabilities, which resulted in overcapacity and excess supply of 
technology (see table 5.2). As issued by the National Development Reform Commission and 
approved by the Chinese State Council in 2009: 
“In many areas, the problem of overcapacity and redundant construction is still very 
prominent. In particular, not only the traditional industries but also emerging industries 
such as wind power equipment severe shrinkage of external demand, the contradiction 
of overcapacity has intensified. We actively promote the large-scale and 
internationalisation of the wind power equipment industry (translation)” (Chinese State 
Council, 2009).  
In 2008 more than eighty companies had registered as manufacturers of wind turbine 
technology in China (Chinese State Council, 2009). As a result, from 2005 to 2010, installed 
electricity generation capacity increased from 1.3 GW to 44.7 GW, well above the targeted 5 
GW. By the end of 2015, cumulative installed capacity had reached 129.34 GW exceeding the 
targeted 100 GW (Sahu, 2018). This led to local market saturation and massive domestic 
competition, forcing companies to look for new markets elsewhere.  
Table 5. 2 Chinese renewable energy policy and regulatory interventions  
Year Policy/regulation 
2005 National Renewable Energy Law 
2007 Medium & Long-Term Renewable Energy Development Plan 2007-2020 
2008 Renewable Energy Development under the 11th Five Year Plan;  
Interim Measures on Management of Special-Project Funds for Industrialization of Wind 
Power Generation Equipment encouraging R&D in China. 
National Renewable Energy Development Fund 
2009 Notice on Policy to Improve Grid-Connected Power Pricing 
for Wind Power, set feed-in tariff for wind 
Curbing Excess Capacity and Redundant Construction of Several Industries and 
Promoting Healthy Development of Industries, including wind equipment and polysilicon 
2010 National Law for Renewable Energy amended guaranteed electricity generated from 
renewable sources to be purchased in full amount. 
Opinions on Promoting Healthy Development of the Wind Equipment Industry called for 
the internationalisation 
The decision of the State Council on Accelerating the Fostering and Development of 
Strategic Emerging Industries, including solar PV and wind. 
2011 Guidelines on Enabling Strategic Emerging Industries to Go Overseas, encouraging 
renewable energy industries to acquire key technology overseas. 
2012 12th Five-Year Plan for Strategic Emerging Industries Development 
Draft 12th Five-Year Plan for the Renewable Energy Development 
Source: (Tan et al., 2013).  
For the Chinese enterprises, the competition was not only limited to the domestic market but 
also in the American and the European markets. Between 2002 and 2012 Chinese enterprises 
were involved in eight wind energy projects in the USA, followed by 5 in Australia and some 
in South Africa, Pakistan, Singapore, Bulgaria and Canada (Tan et al., 2013). Despite the 
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Chinese having invested more than $12 billion in Europe’s and Australia’s wind energy sector 
between 2016 and 2018, (Nicholas, 2018) (see  in table 5.3) their  foreign market penetration 
has been low because of fierce competition from established European and American 
companies such as Vestas (Denmark), Siemens Gamesa (Spain), General Electric (USA) and 
Enercon, Nordex, and Senvion (Germany). Available data shows that by 2017, three Chinese 
companies were in the top 10 in terms of global installed turbine market share (see table 5.4). 
That said, the majority of the Chinese enterprises’ market share was in China. For example, 
Goldwind was globally ranked third in 2018, but more than 90% of the market share was in 
China (REN21, 2018). Envision and Mingyang were part of the global top 10 with no market 
share outside China as of 2017. This is not surprising, as of 2017, China was the largest wind 
energy market destination adding about 19.7 GW (REN21, 2018).  
Table 5. 3 Chinese wind energy acquisitions in developed countries 2016-2018 
 
Sources: Compiled from media, Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (Nicholas, 2018).  
Because of this competition, Chinese enterprises were forced to look elsewhere for alternative 
markets in which Ethiopia was one. As confirmed by a HydroChina engineer involved in the 
construction of the two wind farms: 
“First of all, is because we have finance for the project. We also get support to develop 
the wind farms. We needed to help Ethiopia develop the wind farms. We have the 
technology; we have the money, we needed the market also.” (Interview 
20171031142927).  
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Table 5. 4 Global market share of wind turbine manufactures in 2017  
Rank Enterprise Origin 
1 Vestas Denmark 
2 Siemens Gamesa Spain  
3 Goldwind China 
4 General Electric USA 
5 Enercon Germany 
6 Envision China 
7 Nordex Germany 
8 Ming Yang China 
9 Senvion Germany 
10 Suzlon India 
Source. (REN21, 2018).  
The second factor was the need to reduce transportation and logistics costs in overseas 
markets (Buckley et al., 2007). This was going to be achieved by setting up a factory to 
manufacture wind turbine equipment in Ethiopia, targeting the East African market. Part of the 
agreed plan between the Ethiopian government and Chinese enterprises included the 
establishment of a factory to manufacture blade and tower parts in Ethiopia. As noted in 2012 
by Wang Bin, the President of HydroChina:  
“HydroChina commits itself for long term development with investment in large 
construction machinery, which will improve the equipment status and construction 
capability of Ethiopia. We also plan to invest in manufacturing of blades and towers in 
Ethiopia” (Xinhua News Agency, 2012).  
According to Goldwind employee, “the Ethiopian government, together with HydroChina, 
wanted Goldwind to establish a factory to manufacture all the project towers and blades in 
Ethiopia” (Interview 20180120178596). A Chinese source alleged that Goldwind later refused 
to fulfil the agreement because of “unrealistic demands by Metal and Engineering Corporation 
(METEC)101 which demanded a more than 50% ownership of the project, and yet the capital 
was not coming from them” (Interview 20170801090344). Furthermore, Goldwind “refused 
because of fear of violation of the intellectual property rights issues” by Metals and Engineering 
Corporation (METEC) (Interview 20180120178596).  
Although the plan failed, setting up a factory in Ethiopia was aimed at the reduction of 
transportation and logistics cost thereby maximising profits. An engineer working for 
                                                          
101A military-industrial corporation run by the Ethiopian Ministry of Defence 
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HydroChina suggested that “we are interested in helping Ethiopia develop and also at the 
same time generate profit for our business” (Interview 20171031142927). Consistent with 
other studies (see Wang & Zhao, 2017) on the drivers of Chinese overseas investments, the 
involvement of Chinese companies in the Adama wind farms was driven by the desire for profit 
maximisation—where cost of production (labour, raw materials, transportation, tax breaks) is 
comparatively lower than in China.  
5.2.3 Climate change and reputational considerations   
The involvement of Chinese enterprises in Adama wind farms was driven by the need to 
portray China as an emerging but responsible (Newell et al., 2016) country on climate change 
mitigation. Conrad, Fernandez and Houshyani explain that “international climate policy has 
become one of the most prominent fields in which international reputation can be gained or 
lost” (B. B. Conrad et al., 2011). As such, “China’s investments in Africa's renewable energy 
sector can reaffirm its position as a lead nation among developing countries, protecting 
vulnerable countries from the impacts of global warming and fostering their economic 
development” (Ibid, p.20). A Chinese delegate at the 2017 China-Africa Think Tank Forum in 
Addis Ababa argued that “Adama wind farms is green development. So, we will enhance 
projects like these to make, for society and environment-friendly” (Interview 
20170621123109). For CGCOC, the two wind farms “can win you the reputation for green 
energy” (Interview 20170801090344).   
According to CGCOC, C-EXIM Bank was happy to finance the two projects for reputational 
considerations:  
“Since these are green projects, we cannot deny the pride and reputation motive, 
because these are high profile status projects. Projects like these we would want to do 
exceptionally well so as to promote our capabilities and abilities especially under the 
cooperation framework we have to make it exemplary since these are clean energy 
development projects” (Interview 20171020140152). 
While reputation and climate change considerations could have driven the Chinese 
involvement in the Adama wind farms, it is an outlier. The Chinese involvement in Adama wind 
farms “is not primarily driven by climate change imperatives” but by the need to build globally 
competitive wind energy industry players (Shen & Power, 2017, p. 681). This is confirmed by 
an employee of EEP that, “the Chinese do not really care about climate change issues, they 
are currently the largest emitters” (Interview 201731115916). As such, climate change 
reasons “do not appear to significantly drive or shape China’s actions in Africa’s renewable 
energy sector” (Conrad et al., 2011) but demonstrates Chinese future commitment to climate 
change. Such commitment is in line with the United Nations Principles for Responsible 
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Investment and SDGs. Next, I examine the motivations for Ethiopia to develop Adama wind 
farms.   
5.3 Motivations for Ethiopia to develop Adama wind farms 
5.3.1 Diversifying the energy mix and improving resilience capacity  
Diversifying the energy mix and improving resilience in the electricity sector was the primary 
motivation for the Ethiopian government to develop the two wind farms. Ethiopia’s location 
along the Intertropical Convergence Zone (ITCZ) makes it more susceptible to climate change 
induced droughts. Research suggests that Ethiopia is a drought-stricken country and has 
experienced severe droughts in 1965, 1969, 1972,  1976,  1978,  1982,  1984,  1987,  1990,  
1992,  1993,  1997,  2002, 2004, 2010 (Richman, Leslie, & Segele, 2016; Viste, Korecha, & 
Sorteberg, 2013) and recently in 2015/16 (Philip et al., 2017). Drought affects rainfall patterns, 
thereby forcing hydropower to operate below capacity as there will not be enough water to 
rotate the turbines. As of 20 August 2018, hydropower dominated Ethiopia’s electricity sector 
at 3814 MW (88.42%), followed by wind at 324 MW102 (7.51%), diesel at 143 MW (3.31%), 
geothermal at 7.3 MW (0.16%) and waste to energy at 25 MW (0.57%)103. The domination of 
hydropower poses massive challenges to grid stability, especially during the dry season and 
in times when the country experiences climate change induced droughts. Interview data with 
high-level government officials from MOWIE provides the following explanations: 
“Power generation is mostly from hydropower. In the dry season, there is a risk of low 
generation, and in order to compensate for those dry periods, we need to bring more 
wind power into the grid” (Interview 20170531143837).  
“We wanted to start diversifying a little bit because 100% dependent on hydropower 
also exposes your power system to risks, like frequent drought. The idea was to start 
introducing other technologies that are becoming mature technologically and 
economically at least competitive enough so that it also helps stabilises the system, 
improve resilience and energy security” (Interview 20171011140053).  
Energy security considerations thus motivated the Ethiopian government to develop the two 
wind farms. Wind was therefore explicitly chosen because of complementarity with 
hydropower. In the dry season (October-March) wind resource is high, and the water level is 
low and vice versa.  
 
                                                          
102 Including Adama wind farms.  
103 MoWIE and EEP provide contrasting statistics here. For MoWIE hydropower is 3810MW and 3814MW for EEP; for diesel, 
MoWIE states 143MW and for EEP is at 104MW; and for Geothermal, MoWIE states 7MW while EEP claims 7.3MW. By 
September 2018, only 25MW for waste to energy was commissioned although the targeted generation capacity was 50MW.  
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5.3.2 Targeting new electricity generation plants  
The Ethiopian government has set an ambitious installed electricity generation capacity of 
17000 MW by the end of GTP II (2015/16—2020/21). Hydropower will contribute 13817 MW104 
followed by wind at 1224 MW105, solar at 300 MW106, geothermal at 577 MW107, reserve fuel 
(gas) at 509 MW, waste at 50 MW, sugar at 474 MW and biomass at 257 MW (National 
Planning Commission, 2016, p. 179). Given its track record of quadrupling generation capacity 
from 850 MW to 4300 MW, Ethiopia is now third-ranked in terms of electricity generation in 
Africa (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2019). However, evidence on the ground 
suggests that it is highly unlikely that the Ethiopian government will achieve the target. The 
development of Adama wind farms was an effort to meet this target. Increasing electricity 
generation is strengthened by two arguments. First, electricity is a factor of production, and 
limited supply reduces manufacturing and industrialisation prospects. Access to electricity 
increases industrial productivity, which in turn contributes to poverty reduction (Bacon & 
Kojima, 2016). As identified by the CRGES policy framework:   
“Electricity is a fundamental enabler of modern economic development, from powering 
cities and fuelling industrial activity to pumping water for irrigation purposes in 
agriculture. If not adequately scaled up to support economic development, it also risks 
becoming a fundamental bottleneck to growth. To support economic development at 
an annual growth rate of more than 10% that the government aspires to, it is necessary 
to expand electric power supply” (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2011, p. 
25).  
With Ethiopia’s more than 109 million people and more than 10% GDP growth over the past 
few years, the demand for electricity is increasing. A MOWIE official notes that:  
“Now we have a huge demand for electricity. Our yearly demand is rising at 25%. If 
you look at demand per sector, the industry is much higher, more than 30% on yearly 
basis. This demand drives the market, and to satisfy this demand, you need to build 
more energy plants” (Interview 20170531143837).  
Second, Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in terms of per capita annual electricity 
consumption, estimated to be 100 kWh below the 510 kWh average for sub-Saharan Africa 
                                                          
104 Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) (6450 MW), Geba I & II (372 MW), Genale VI (246 MW), Sor (5 MW), Halele 
Werabessa (436 MW), Chmoga Yeda I & II  (280 MW), Genale V (100 MW), Tams (1700 MW), Gibe IV (1472 MW), Birbir (467 
MW), Upper Dabus (326 MW), Gibe V (660 MW), Lower Dedessa (550 MW), Tekeze II (450 MW), Lower Dabus (250 MW), Gojeb 
(150 MW) and Wabi Shebele (87 MW) (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2017). 
105Currently, there are about 51 wind farm sites that have been identified by MOWIE, EEP and HydroChina in which five are 
under development namely Assela (100 MW), Aysha (300 MW), Debre Berhan (100 MW), Adama 3 (150 MW) and Mossobo (42 
MW).  
106 Metehara (100 MW), Mekele (100 MW) and Humera (100 MW). 
107Corbetti (200 MW), and Tulumoye-Abaya (150 MW). 
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(Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2017). To address this challenge, the government 
targets 100% Universal Electricity by 2025 in which 65% will be grid and 35% off-grid 
connection (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2019). Ethiopia’s commitment to 
increase new energy generation plants paying limited attention to distribution and transmission 
aspects has been criticised by many, including those in MOWIE’s top echelons of decision 
making:  
“Coming from a revolutionary democracy philosophy, you will not be surprised that the 
government is adopting such an ambitious policy of increasing energy generation. But 
the challenge is not on energy generation but transmission and distribution. Yes, 
electricity is a public good, and any sitting government would strive to ensure that its 
citizenry has access each and every time, but the challenges, especially in the context 
of Ethiopia, is transmission and distribution. So far, we have a generation capacity of 
about 4300 MW. But more than 70% do not have access. Some are interested in the 
geographic grid distribution, but how much does that translate into household access?” 
(Interview 20170609111018).  
This quote provides a critique of the Ethiopian government’s over-commitment to increasing 
new electricity generation plants and doing less to develop new and rehabilitate existing 
distribution and transmission lines. Nonetheless, developing new plants in this regard, 
motivated the government to construct Adama wind farms.   
5.3.3 Electricity export motive 
Ethiopia is currently experiencing a foreign currency shortage due to poor export performance, 
declined diaspora remittances and increased illicit financial flows (Maasho, 2018). Electricity 
has been identified as a major export commodity and generator of much needed foreign 
currency that contributes to “financial sustainability of the sector and provide relief to the 
country’s balance of payments” (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2019, p. 6). The 
two wind farms were therefore developed to fulfil the electricity export motive. For an embassy 
official in Addis Ababa, “energy is Ethiopia’s first most important target which it aspires to 
achieve, actually not to meet the demand of the populace but to export it” (Interview 
20170724143353). According to the Director of Public Relations and Communications of 
MOWIE, from July 2016 to April 2017, the country exported electricity to Djibouti and Sudan 
earning $49.4million (Interview 20170608141010). Also, the 2017/18 financial year saw a 
doubled electricity export of 1.466 billion kWh to Sudan ($47.5 million) and Djibouti ($34.1 
million) generating $81.6million (APA News, 2018). Also, more exports are planned, and as of 
2017, the country had already signed power purchase agreements with Kenya, South Sudan 
and Tanzania while Rwanda and Burundi have shown interest. Already, a 2000 MW 
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transmission line for 1045 km is under construction, funded by African Development Bank and 
contracted to the Chinese.   
The desire to export electricity in the east African region also goes with a salient motive of the 
Ethiopian government to control the East Africa Power Pool (EAPP)108. If Ethiopia can export 
electricity to the 10-member block, it will be able to promote regional peace and stability 
especially tensions with Egypt over Blue Nile watershed management and the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. An official from EFRSSI claims that “if Ethiopia can sell electricity 
to Djibouti, Sudan and Kenya and for others, that will bring peace” (Interview 
20170630114108). However, the Ethiopian government may use ‘peace’ as legitimatory 
discourse to extend its geopolitical ambitions in the region.  
5.3.4 Regional electricity infrastructure distribution  
Ethiopia has an uneven power infrastructure distribution (see table 5.5). The government’s 
motivation for developing not only Adama but also Ashegoda wind farms was an attempt to 
balance the regional power plants. Development of power plants is in line with the EPRDF 
coalition that wind and solar were to be deployed in regions that do not or have few hydropower 
plants (Interview 20170802142852). Future wind farms are regionally distributed, taking into 
consideration wind resource potential and location of already existing power plants. As such, 
Assela (100 MW) will be in the Oromia, Aysha (300 MW) in Somali, Debre Berhan (100 MW) 
in Amhara, Adama 3 (150 MW) in Oromia, Mossobo (42 MW) in Tigray. According to an official 
from MOWIE:  
“Hydropower has specific areas of the country that have abundant hydropower 
resources. Most of the investment in infrastructure would be channelled towards those 
areas, but by developing solar, wind and geothermal, that also spread out this 
investment across the country, because those places that got good wind potential, may 
not necessarily have other resources to develop” (Interview 20171011140053).  
Regional electricity infrastructure distribution also contributes to spreading out infrastructure 
development and the resultant forward and backward linkages. It creates local employment109 
as claimed by a MOWIE official:  
“During the construction period, job opportunities are created, and some other social 
values are created, even after the construction period is over people get employment 
opportunity all the time and all those other ancillary benefits which need also to be 
spread out. If you have noticed, this Adama 1 and Adama 2 are in central Ethiopia, 
                                                          
108 In 2012 comprised Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Libya 
and Uganda.  
109 Aspects of local employment creation are discussed in detail in chapter 7.  
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Ashegoda is far in the north we are trying other wind projects on our planning, under 
consideration, some are far to the south, far east, so that’s also one way of spreading 
out investment” (Interview 20171011140053).  
However, this theory of EPRDF coalition driven distribution of electricity infrastructure is 
problematic if one takes a closer look at the current and planned distribution of power plants. 
Of the nine regions, Afar, Gambela and Harari do not have any plants planned for development 
which raises questions about the distribution of power plants.  
Table 5. 5 Active power infrastructure regional distribution  
No Name  Installed capacity (MW)   Region  
Hydro  
1 Gilgel Gibe III 1870 SNNP 
2 Beles 460 Amhara 
3 Gilgel Gibe II 420 SNNP 
4 Takeze 300 Tigray 
5 Gilgel Gibe I 184 Oromia 
6 Melka Wakena 153 Oromia 
7 Fincha 134 Oromia 
8 Amerti Neshi 95 Oromia 
9 Tis Abay II 73 Amhara 
10 Awash II 32 Oromia 
11 Awash III 32 Oromia 
12 Koka 43 Oromia 
13 Tis Abay I 11.4 Amhara 
14 Aba Samuel 6.6 Oromia 
Wind     
15 Adama II 153 Oromia 
16 Ashegoda 120 Tigray 
17 Adama I 51 Oromia 
Geothermal   
18 Aluto geothermal 7.3 Oromia 
Waste   
19 Reppie 25 Addis Ababa 
Diesel  
20 Diesel 143  
Total 4313.3  
Source: Fieldwork data obtained from EEP and MOWIE, 2018 
5.3.5 Learning and experimental motive 
Wind energy is a new technology in Ethiopia, and a majority of EEP and MOWIE staff do not 
have operations and maintenance capacity. It is not surprising that given the technical 
limitations of the government, it instead developed all the Adama wind farms under an EPC110 
plus financing scheme to hedge against risks and uncertainties associated with Greenfield 
projects. An official from MOWIE suggests that:    
                                                          
110 Discussed in detail in the chapter 6.  
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“We decided to go for these three111 plants as an experiment. The first feasibility studies 
of wind energy were completed in 2004 and 2006, but no developers were interested 
because of risk and uncertainty. The idea was then to pilot, experiment and draw 
lessons from these three wind farms. We then decided to use three different 
technologies, and two different sources of developers, that is one from Europe 
(France) and two from the Chinese. But going forward we intend to leave this space 
for private developers, which will be choosing their own technology. We are even going 
to put threshold, they will have to use progressively more and more Ethiopian inputs” 
(Interview 20171011140053). 
In the beginning development of wind energy was not financially feasible. As alluded to by two 
officials, one from MOWIE and another from EEP, there was resistance and it was difficult to 
convince those in authority at that time. One official noted that “at some point in time we almost 
gave up the pursuit, but now everyone wants to develop the wind energy in Ethiopia” (Interview 
20170731110952). Finally, “we were given a chance to prove the viability and success of wind 
since everyone was used to hydropower” (Interview 20170606140042). Although many 
bureaucrats and those in positions of power were not initially keen to develop the wind farms, 
the development of Adama wind farms was motivated by the need to learn and experiment. 
5.4 Motivations for the Chinese state and enterprises to develop Adama wind farms   
5.4.1 Request by the Ethiopian government  
The primary motivation for Chinese enterprises involved in the financing and developing of 
Adama wind farms was because of the request by the Ethiopian government. According to an 
employee of HydroChina, MOFEC approached MOFCOM for assistance to develop Adama 
and Mesebo Herena wind farms. The Ethiopian government indicated explicitly in their 
application that they were requesting funding for preferential export buyer’s credit from C-
EXIM Bank. This request was made after HydroChina and EEP had completed the Solar and 
Wind energy master plan where fifty-one sites were identified. MOFCOM agreed to finance 
the projects and considered the development of wind farms as demonstration projects. As a 
result, the wind farms received political buy-ins from CPC and EPRDF. An employee of 
CGCOC explains that the primary motivation of being involved in the Adama wind farms 
related to:  
“The need for the country. We basically rely from Ethiopia if they have demands or 
needs because you know every project should be outstanding for it to be financed by 
the EXIM Bank or any other Chinese financiers and it should meet some certain 
standards as per EXIM Bank principles. But if the demand by the host government is 
                                                          
111 Including Adama 1, 2 and Ashegoda wind farms. 
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not there, then we won’t have a market, and that is very important” (Interview 
20171020140152).  
Similarly, a HydroChina employee reiterated that they were involved in the development of the 
wind farms because of the:  
“Request from the Ethiopian government. They wanted to construct wind plant to cover 
for hydropower in the dry season they could only mobilise small amount, and the 
Chinese government has preferential loan” (Interview 20171229144752).  
The quotation above shows that the Chinese enterprises were involved in the development of 
Adama wind farms upon request of the Ethiopian government. As such, Chinese enterprises 
involvement in the development of infrastructure in Africa should be intepreted as  demand 
based.   
5.4.2 Favourable investment incentives  
The second underlying motivation for Chinese enterprises was the favourable investment 
incentives. Ethiopia promotes itself as having a favourable investment climate compared to 
the rest of East Africa. Specifically, in the electricity sector, EIC officials explains that Ethiopia 
offers:  
“Income tax exemption for electricity generation, transmission and distribution sector 
for 4 to 5 years. There is also customs duty payment exemption on capital goods and 
construction materials, and investors have the right to ask refund of customs duty paid 
on inputs when buying capital goods or construction materials from local 
manufacturing industries” (Interview 20170613100147).  
These sector-specific incentives motivated the Chinese and evidence assessed from the 
financial contract of the projects stated that:  
“the Ethiopian government is exempting from the customs duty; value-added tax, 
additional tax and withholding tax of the imported equipment, materials and 
construction equipment” (Volume 3 Section H Financial Scheme 2009, p2).  
As confirmed by a MOFEC official involved in the financial negotiations that the two wind farms 
were “government projects and the commitment as part of the loan negotiations was that we 
as the Ethiopian government will allow import of important inputs from China on duty-free 
arrangement” (Interview 20170630164633).  
Besides the sector-specific incentives, Ethiopia’s macroeconomic indicators were also 
identified as a motivation for Chinese enterprises’ involvement in Adama wind farms.  From 
2000 to 2013, Ethiopia experienced a 9.5% growth rate, second only to Angola at 11% and 
above the sub-Saharan Africa average of 5.2%. Regardless of the growth indicators, Ease of 
129 
 
Doing Business remained low, implying a challenging environment to do business. Publicly 
available data shows that Ethiopia was ranked 159 out 185 in 2016 and 161 out of 190 in 2017 
in terms of Ease of Doing Business (World Bank, 2018a; World Economic Forum, 2016, 2018). 
While the business environment has improved since 2010, Ethiopia fares not too bad as 
compared to other African countries (see table 5.6). Within the confines of the investment 
climate, access to low-cost land and labour also motivated the Chinese enterprises’ 
involvement in the two wind farms. As highlighted by a high-level official at EIC:  
“We have access to land with low cost. When you check the costs of land provided to 
investors, it is very low cost. We also have strong public institutions with track record 
of effective and timeous project execution capacities. We are less corrupt. There is no 
tolerance to corruption. The Global Competitiveness Report of 2016/17 ranked us 34th 
for impartial public decision making, well above most of our regional peers such as 
Kenya (92nd) and South Africa (115th)” (Interview 20170613100147).   
Nonetheless a closer look at the doing business statistics, the investment climate leaves much 
to be desired (see table 5.6) and may not provide adequate justification for the Chinese 
enterprises’ identification of the favourable environment as a motivation for their involvement 
in Adama wind farms.  
Table 5. 6 Competitiveness indicators for selected countries 2016/17 
Indicator Rank 
Ethiopia Kenya Nigeria South Africa 
Diversion of public funds 49/138 89/138 127/138 96/138 
Irregular payments and bribes 93/138 113/138 129/138 53/138 
Favouritism in decisions of govt. officials 34/138 92/138 127/138 115/138 
Business cost of crime and violence  91/138 128/138 121/138 133/138 
Reliability of police services  92/138 93/138 121/138 115/138 
Strength of investor protection  129/138 96/138 20/138 14/138 
Country credit rating  123/138 94/138 88/138 63/138 
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2016–2017 
5.4.3 Geopolitical and geo-economic considerations   
The financing and development of Adama wind farms relates to broader geopolitical and geo-
economic calculations by the Chinese government and enterprises. I conceptualise geopolitics 
as the “role and influence of territorial location, natural resource endowment and political 
organisation of space on a country’s practice of foreign policy” (Blanchard & Flint, 2017, p. 
233). In the context of Chinese geopolitics, Power and Mohan (2010, p. 462) argued for “a 
political economy approach that ties together material interests with a deconstruction of the 
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discursive […] ways by which Chinese capitalism internationalises”. It relates to the Chinese 
state and non-state actors’ broader geostrategy pursued to fulfil interests. Geo-economics 
relates to the application of economic means of power by actors to achieve geo-strategic 
objectives (Scholvin & Wigell, 2018). Specifically, it is “a set of transformative projects that are 
the product of actions that require representations and narratives to justify and explain those 
actions to limit dissent and gain consensus across a variety of audiences” (Blanchard & Flint, 
2017, p. 232). It is geographically bound, politically as well as economically motivated. 
MOFCOM, C-MFA, C-EXIM Bank and Chinese state council involvement in the Adama wind 
farms serves the Chinese government’s geopolitical calculations. Chinese government official 
in the African Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (C-MFA), sees Ethiopia 
as a strategic partner (Interview 20170621175736). He argues that China is helping Ethiopia 
develop.  
The idea of China helping Ethiopia as mentioned by the Chinese official depicts the longer 
term geopolitical and geo-economic strategy of promoting Chinese influence in the Horn of 
Africa. It also contributes to the discursive narratives that China want to help Africa develop. 
Such discourses contribute to China weakening the influence of the West in the region. As 
noted by C-EXIM Bank official: 
“China is serious about what it is going to do in Africa. It is not going to be a short-lived 
or provisional thing. It is a long term. We think China’s future is in Africa. Africa is the 
future; we should capitalise on this wonderful outlook. China will put special resources 
to work with Africa (Presentation 20192105).  
Ethiopia falls within the Chinese geopolitical strategy (Davies, Edinger, Tay, & Naidu, 2008). 
As noted by an official from EFRSSI:    
“Ethiopia is not just the second largest country by population in Africa; it is strategically 
positioned closer to the Middle East, Europe and Africa. The population size offers a 
huge market opportunity for the Chinese. So Ethiopia is the centre of the gravity, it is 
the exemplary case for industrial parks, the light railway, the Addis Djibouti railways. 
This may be the reason why Chinese are prioritising to invest in Ethiopia” (Interview 
20170712135318).  
The Chinese involvement in the two wind farms, and other mega infrastructure and industrial 
park projects in Ethiopia collectively contributes to a stronger projection of the Chinese 
geopolitical and geo-economic aspirations. An official from EFRSSI carefully pointed out that 
the Chinese financed, invested and built “the African Union building, Adama expressway, 
Eastern Industrial Zone, Ring road, Addis-Djibouti railway, Addis Light Rail Transit and many 
other projects to strategically show other African countries, African leaders” (Interview 
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20170630114108) the Chinese technological prowess and construction capabilities. Addis 
Ababa is the diplomatic city of the continent. It is the headquarters of AUC, United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), several international non-governmental 
organisations and diplomatic missions. Because of this, Ethiopia commands a measurable 
influence in the continent and bargaining power which may be of advantage for the Chinese 
government in the UN systems and voting processes (see Dreher, Fuchs, Parks, Strange, & 
Tierney, 2018, p. 18). According to a Western country embassy official in Addis Ababa:  
“China’s interest in Ethiopia is largely because they think is one of the most dependable 
countries in Africa in terms of its security, stability, population by population I mean the 
market and the most important, ideological similarity. China sees things in 20, 30 years, 
they see a bright future for Ethiopia, and they want to be part of it. Also, Ethiopia is 
among handful countries in Africa which does not just accept anything from Western 
values and partly from Eastern values but manages to have a very important and good 
relations with both of them” (Interview 20170724143353).  
A professor at AAU echoes the above argument:  
“Ethiopia strategic location is very important, particularly in the horn of Africa and the 
Ethiopia-Djibouti connections. China’s interest in Djibouti is very real, especially in its 
grand military strategy” (Interview 20170802142852).  
For HydroChina, their involvement in Adama wind farms served geopolitical and geo-
economic objectives for the Chinese government. The two wind farms are the first Chinese 
projects in Africa. The projects were used as demonstration projects:  
“In 2015 at the FOCAC summit as a model for new Africa-China cooperation. All the 
African leaders were told about this project. It was used as a benchmark as a form of 
cooperation between Africa and China” (Interview 20171229144752). 
The modelling of future engagement between Africa and China based on Adama wind farms 
as shown in the quotation above speaks volume about China’s long term geopolitical and geo-
economics in the continent. Such narratives offer possibilities for Africa to align with China for 
better development partnership than with the traditional Western powers.   
5.4.3 A learning motive  
Africa provides an important laboratory for Chinese policy formulation and business 
internationalisation. The involvement of the Chinese in the two wind farms was thus motivated 
by the need to learn and gain experience in wind energy project delivery in Africa. As noted 
by Wei Chen (cited in Wong, 2018, p. 1) who was involved in the development of two Longyuan 
Mulilo De Aar wind farms in Northern Cape, South Africa:  
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“The projects are basically testing water for us; we are gaining experience, training a 
team and figuring out whether it is a good market. Because of lowering of purchasing 
price, what we really need to have companies with rich experiences”.  
The quote above speaks to Chinese companies involved in South Africa’s wind energy sector. 
However, this is a general feeling by Chinese companies who were involved in Adama wind 
farms. As such, a professor at AAU notes that the Chinese “knowledge about Africa is very 
much limited, they want to experiment; they want to give their companies jobs in Africa” 
(Interview 20170802154843). For HydroChina, they “did not know some of the things, like the 
policy” (Interview 20171229144752) and preferred to learn from practice through 
experimentation (Kirkegaard, 2017; Korsnes, 2014). This learning aspiration come from the 
Chinese domestic experiences of developing wind energy industry. This suggests a ‘Chinese 
way’ of doing things (Kirkegaard, 2017, p. 28). That said, Chinese involvement in the Adama 
wind farms “help them transform from technology supplier to EPC contractors, gaining 
invaluable experience from carrying out these projects” (Chen, 2018). Because of 
HydroChina’s unfamiliarity with international standards, Adama wind farms were used as a 
laboratory.   
5.5 Determinants for Ethiopian government’s contracting of the Chinese enterprises to 
develop Adama wind farms  
What motivates African governments to award infrastructure development tenders to the 
Chinese remains an academically and empirically underexplored aspect in Africa-China 
relations. In the context of Adama wind farms, which economic and political factors influenced 
the Ethiopian government to contract the Chinese enterprises? In this section, I argue that 
there was a bricolage of economic and political factors that contributed to the Ethiopian 
government awarding the contract to the Chinese (see figure 5.1).   
5.5.1 Economic explanations    
In 2004 the first comprehensive solar and wind resource assessment report was completed, 
but it was difficult to find finance to develop the wind farms on the identified sites. According 
to MOWIE official, traditional donor countries were not ready to experiment with the new 
market because of risks and uncertainties (Interview 20171011140053). By then, no 
regulatory and policy framework existed focusing on the wind energy sector in Ethiopia 
(Gordon, 2018). The Ethiopia-China Development Cooperation Directorate in MOFEC then 
approached the Chinese institutions for the potential financing of a cluster of infrastructures. 
After a series of negotiations between the Ethiopian government, HydroChina and CGCOC, 
C-EXIM Bank agreed to finance the projects using an EPC plus financing scheme. Based on 
assessments conducted by the technical experts drawn from a multi-stakeholder commission 
composed of MOWIE, EEPCo (before split) MOFEC, MEFCC (then Environmental Protection 
Agency), Ministry of Labour, EIC, Ministry of Trade, and regional government representatives, 
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the Ethiopian government used the following economic reasons to award the contract to the 
Chinese: financial resource availability, quick capital disbursement, and acceptable total 
project costs (Interview 201817015552244). I discuss these reasons below.  
First, the financial resource availability was a significant determinant which led the Ethiopian 
government to award the contract to HydroChina-CGCOC-JV. According to interviews 
conducted with EEP officials involved in the two projects’ ‘direct negotiation’112 processes, the 
primary prerequisite for HydroChina and CGCOC as the contractor to be awarded the contract 
was the financial clause. The clause stipulated that the contractor was required by the 
Ethiopian government to provide a majority share of the project cost either from their own 
company or through their financing network and arrangements. As explained by an official 
from the EEP “as part of our shortlisting, we wanted the contractor who would come with the 
loans, for which we would negotiate the financial terms and financing model before awarding 
the contract” (Interview 20170623163225113). However, it is critical to mention that the 
financing pre-requisite set by the Ethiopian government was not exclusive to the Chinese 
contractors only, but also any potential contractors, whether from Europe, America, Asia or 
Africa. This was the case in the French developed Ashegoda wind farm. The decision to award 
the contract to the Chinese enterprises was contingent on the fulfilment of this financial pre-
requisite. C-EXIM Bank agreed to finance the projects but also set its pre-conditions.  As noted 
by a government official from MOWIE:  
“The finance was closed, tied from the Chinese EXIM Bank. That means it has its own 
qualifications. The qualification means it is only the Chinese companies that can 
participate in the development of the projects” (Interview 20171011140053).    
The fact that the Ethiopian government used the financing clause among the French and the 
Chinese shows a consistent decision-making pattern applied across different contexts and 
time. What one reads from this is the operationalisation of agency. Also, it shows that 
regardless of Ethiopia being in a less privileged position, it still made demands. Obviously, the 
Ethiopian government did not have enough money, the technology or the skills to develop the 
two projects. It also portrays that negotiations are not always conditioned by power 
asymmetries, but by the ability to carefully plan, strategize and negotiate.    
Quick capital disbursement was the second factor why the Ethiopian government contracted 
the Chinese. Mega infrastructure projects are often used as campaign projects to win votes 
by African politicians towards elections. Marx (2017, p. 2) research shows that “voters reward 
                                                          
112 Direct tendering process discussed in detail in chapter 6. 
113 Three respondents participated in this interview 
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incumbent politicians for completing projects in their districts and that governments respond 
to these incentives by expediting project completion before elections”. Examples of these 
projects are mega infrastructures and social services, which provide directly observable 
benefits to voters. This comes from the fact that majority of voters in Africa have “limited 
information to assess the performance of elected officials, beyond tangible” infrastructure and 
social service outputs they can observe in their constituency (Marx, 2017, p. 3). Accordingly, 
C-EXIM Bank has often been associated with quick capital disbursement capabilities 
compared to WB, IMF and traditional donor countries and agencies. As noted by an African 
Development Bank official interviewed for this study, depending on the size of the project and 
volume of the financing, traditional development banks take on average 4 to 7 years or more 
to disburse capital (Interview 20170712152354). This is because of very long and winding 
negotiations which allow the development banks to be cautious, avoiding unsound financial 
decision-making.  
However, this raises questions about whether quick capital disbursement correlates with 
incautious decision making. Because the Chinese are quick in disbursing capital, does that 
mean their lending patterns are not risk averse? In the context of Adama 1 “the project taken 
up to 2 years from Memorandum of Understanding for Co-Financing contract signing in July 
2009 to notification of the Effectiveness of Loan Agreement in May 2011” (Interview 
20171011140053; 20170714094901) and “about 9 months for Adama 2 from contract signing 
in October 2012 to project start in July 2013” (Interview 20170623163225). The length of time 
for Adama 1 is attributed to the time spent in financial negotiations and not capital 
disbursement. Officials from EEP claimed Adama 2 ranks first in terms of quick capital 
disbursement for infrastructure financing in Ethiopia.  
Evidence presented mainly in the context of Adama 1, suggests that the two years spent by 
the Chinese before financial closure was attributed to risk sensitisation since it was a new 
market. Such risks include “risks of default or insolvency of the buyers or cover against the 
risks of non-payment by buyers due to currency issues, political unrest and other factors” 
(Massa, 2011, p. 4). To mitigate against such risks, China Export and Credit Insurance 
Corporation extend credit insurance to Chinese contractors and subcontractors. This would 
also imply C-EXIM Bank structuring of the loans in such a way that “there is a revenue stream 
that will be able to support the debt repayment” (Corkin, 2013, p. 89). C-EXIM Bank’s risk 
sensitisation is similar to Western enterprises where profit maximisation is a priority. As 
highlighted by a respondent from MOWIE, the delay was “because it was a new sector for the 
majority of Chinese enterprises and us as well” (Interview 20171011140053). An official from 
EEP further explained that:   
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“Although we had gained experiences from Ashegoda, for the Chinese, in particular, 
EXIM Bank, it took them about 24 months before the finance was approved. They had 
to be diligent to ensure that all potential risks and uncertainties were hedged for. So 
unlike what people normally say that the Chinese do not weigh options, or do not 
assess the risks and uncertainties in their financing decision making, that was not the 
case for Adama 1. For Adama 2, I think they had learnt their lessons. The groundwork 
had been done” (Interview 20170714094901).  
Consistent with the Ethiopian government-set target in the GTP, quick capital disbursement 
was a contributing factor why the Chinese were awarded the contract.   
Third, the Chinese were identified as not cheap but offering an ‘acceptable’ total project cost. 
According to Kaplinsky and Morris (2009, p. 561) the costs of Chinese financed and developed 
large infrastructure projects are “20–30 per cent lower than those of Northern, South African 
and Brazilian competitors”. The total project cost for Adama 1 was $117.9945 million in which 
the unit power cost was $2314/Kw; investment was $117 million plus $0.9945 million interest 
incurred during construction (EEP, 2017b). For Adama 2, the total project cost was $345 
million in which the unit power cost was $2254.9/Kw (Interview 20170623163225). While the 
total project cost was seen to be cheaper compared to Western prices, Ethiopian officials from 
different government portfolios disagree. On one hand, the top level management of MOWIE 
claims that the Chinese were cheaper in comparison to Western offers (Interview 
20170608141010). On the other hand, low and middle-level management from EEP and even 
some from MOWIE claim the Chinese were a “bit expensive” (Interview 20170609111018; 
20170531143837; 20170714094901).  
To triangulate these different perspectives, a CGCOC employee claimed that Adama 1-unit 
power cost and construction cost was lower than Ashegoda (Interview 20170801090344). The 
Chinese were comparatively cheaper on the construction cost (Interview 20170731110952). 
That said, according to an EEP official the Chinese deal was attractive as “it provided high 
repayment period of about 13 years, 7 years grace period, and 2% interest rate” (Interview 
20180120178596). Similarly, a TPLF-EPRDF party official claims that the Chinese offered a 
“very good technical presentation at the same time their price was acceptable (Interview 
20170512172020). In contrast, although the financial offer from the Chinese was lucrative, the 
unit power cost was consistent with the industry price at that time. An EEP official argued that, 
“contrary to what many people think that Chinese technology is cheaper, it is not true. At the 
market rate of that time, they were expensive” (Interview 20180120178596). For Adama 2 
project consultancy team member from MU:  
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“Adama 1 and Adama 2 have the same pricing value as per the Europeans or 
Americans. So, in wind energy technology prices are similar. Unit cost is similar. What 
may constitute the difference is the site specifications and complications. Otherwise, 
everything is similar, or even be surprised that the Chinese are expensive, as again 
the bidding would be closed door” (Interview 20170811121252). 
The two extracts above point to the uniformity in terms of international unit power cost. It also 
suggests that because of the closed-door tendering system, there is room for inflation of costs. 
Meservey argues that closed door tendering system:  
“gives Chinese companies an unfair advantage over competitors, and—since a fair 
bidding process is usually the best way to secure the most cost-efficient delivery of a 
project—robs Africans of receiving maximum return on the investment of public money 
paying for Chinese-built projects114” (Meservey, 2018, p. 3). 
In the context of Adama wind farms, I did not find any evidence to corroborate such claims. 
However, the closed-door tendering system tends to create avenues for corruption and project 
execution inefficiencies since the processes are not transparent and not open to public 
scrutiny. 
5.5.2 Political explanations   
The Ethiopian government made several political calculations before awarding the contract to 
the Chinese. First, the Chinese have a non-interference policy in the political affairs of the host 
country. According to a professor at AAU, unlike the Western agencies and countries, the 
Chinese do not advocate and prescribe economic structural adjustments (trade and financial 
liberalisation, privatisation of state entities, devaluation of the national currency) when doing 
business with Ethiopia (Interview 20170524162135). The Chinese do not advocate for the 
observance of the rule of law, human rights and the democratic process as preconditions for 
loan provision; something associated with traditional financial institutions and Western 
countries’ agencies. Hackenesch (2015) argues that Ethiopia is very reluctant to give in to the 
governance reform agenda of the European Union. During the 2017 China-Africa Think Tank 
Forum I attended at AUC in Addis Ababa, Arkebe Oqubay, a special advisor to the Ethiopian 
Prime Minister notes that:  
“Ethiopia should not be treated to get loans or assistance by applying the policy 
recommended by international financial institutions or the Washington Consensus that 
has brought a disaster to this continent in the 1980s and 1990s. Chinese leaders have 
                                                          
114 See Andy Keiser, “ZTE: A Threat to America’s Small Businesses,” testimony before the Committee on Small Business, U.S. 
House of Representatives, June 27, 2018, https://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/6-27-18_keiser_testimony.pdf; and 
Ann-Sofie Isaksson and Andreas Kotsadam, “Chinese Aid and Local Corruption,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 159 (March 
2018), pp. 146–159.1 
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been good partners, coming up with financial resources without putting any pre-
conditionality” (Presentation 20170621111431).  
The extract above suggests that the Ethiopian government resents the use of conditionalities 
as determinants for development finance provision. The government’s experiences of 
negotiating with WB and IMF in the 1990s is often used as a reference point. A top-level TPLF-
EPRDF official underlines that “we had very difficult negotiations with IMF and the WB. They 
were pushing for financial liberalisation and telling us to privatise the telecom and power” 
(Interview 20170512172020). EPRDF sees privatisation of the telecom, banking and power 
sector as a no-go area. The Chinese, at least from the EPRDF position, do not precondition 
assistance. An official from the E-MFA underscores that the Chinese were given the contract 
to finance and develop the two projects because they “have no hidden agenda or mould 
political make-up other than business as compared to other donors or partners” (Interview 
20171027105200). This explains why officials from MOWIE “prefer working with the Chinese” 
(Interview 20170609111018). 
However, this non-conditionality discourse requires qualification in as far as Chinese interests 
are concerned. The Chinese use three parameters to condition their assistance: (i) 
observance of the One China policy, (ii) subcontracting of Chinese enterprises and (iii) use of 
Chinese technology or inputs (Interview 20170724143353). Is it misplaced, therefore to 
suggest that the Chinese condition development finance? One thing I have observed is the 
failure of people to understand the meaning of preferential export buyer’s credit (a form of a 
concessional loan) which the Chinese use as a lending facility. It is defined as “credit provided 
to foreign borrowers to finance their import of Chinese goods” (Massa, 2011, p. 6). This implies 
the usage of Chinese contractors and inputs on a project largely funded by the Chinese, which 
is a form of clandestine conditionality. This is not unique to the Chinese, as an EPDRF official 
observed “even European countries115, everybody does that” (Interview 20170512172020). As 
such, China follows international practises; it is up to the host government to ensure they 
structure the deals in ways that retain value and control.  
Second, HydroChina and CGCOC were given the contract to develop Adama wind farms 
because of the quick project completion rate combined with a good track record of previous 
infrastructure project delivery. This attribute links with the quick capital disbursement point 
raised in the previous section. HydroChina and CGCOC have been involved in many 
infrastructure projects in Ethiopia since the early 2000s and their experience of the Ethiopian 
                                                          
115 Part of the financial deal for the Ashegoda wind farm was that European countries were to supply the technology to be 
deployed and even the contractor Vergnet which is from France. That’s why Ecotecnia 74 (Alstom Power) and Vergnet GEV HP 
1000/62 turbines were used which were manufactured in Spain and France respectively.  
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market spans over ten years. For example, HydroChina was involved in Tekeze, Gibe 3, and 
Gibe 4 dams (Hwang, Brautigam, & Wang, 2015). Their performance has been remarkable. 
According to the Ethiopian Reporter journalist CGCOC116 has been involved in several projects 
including the Kombolcha-Gundewein road in Amhara, Cheko-Yergachefe road along the 
Addis-Nairobi corridor, and Eastern Industrial Zone construction (Interview 20170829094453). 
The journalist further claims that CGCOC has been able to quickly and with quality execute 
the projects to the satisfaction of the Ethiopian government (Interview 20170829094453). This 
was confirmed by a HydroChina employee:  
“Ethiopians don’t like the characters from other countries. There was another project 
Ashegoda which was constructed by the French, by that time Adama 1 was 
constructed very quickly and came out very nice. Also Adama 2 was finished on time. 
I think the speed element. The Chinese had been involved in other projects, the 
expressway, the Addis-Djibouti and the Addis Ababa Light Rail Transit. They had good 
reputation of delivering the projects in time” (Interview 20171229144752). 
Good working relations between Ethiopians and the Chinese create pathway lock-ins. 
Currently, the Ethiopians are now contracting Chinese enterprises to construct projects funded 
by other financiers such as AfDB as is the case on Ethiopia-Kenya high voltage transmission 
line (Interview 20170712152354). A comparison of time spent constructing French developed 
Ashegoda and Chinese developed Adama wind farms suggests something else (table 5.7). 
Ashegoda was set for completion by 2011 but because of logistical (transportation, 
renegotiation of the contract and turbine model change) issues, was delayed till 2013 
(Interview 20171011140053). Adama 2, which was bigger and supposedly had more logistical 
nightmares, was completed in 24 months, making the Chinese to be seen as practical, 
hardworking and efficient in time management by the Ethiopian government.  
Table 5. 7 Adama vs Ashegoda wind farms project execution time frames  
Descriptor  Adama 1 Adama 2 Ashegoda 
Contract signing 2009 2012 2008 
Capacity  51MW 153MW 120MW 
Project start  2011 2012 2009 
Commission  2012 2012 2013 
Project execution 
time  
12 months 24 months  42 months 
Source: Fieldwork data  
                                                          
116 The company is also listed as a Grade 1 contractor with effect from 2 March 2008 by the Ethiopian Ministry of Urban 
Development, Housing and Construction.  
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Third, the global financial and economic crisis and the shifting geographies of power is creating 
a global division of labour in terms of infrastructure financing in Africa. Traditional donors have 
adopted austerity measures, which include massive cuts in aid and infrastructure financing for 
developing countries, creating a financing gap. African countries have set ambitious, hard 
infrastructure development targets to address structural transformation challenges. 
Fortunately, China has emerged as a significant and reliable development finance provider to 
Africa. As alluded to by a lecturer at EFRSSI: 
“China funds hard infrastructure while the traditional donors target soft infrastructure. 
But this does not only end there, Western donors are pre-occupied on democracy, 
while the Chinese are on infrastructure, of course with an exception of the Obama 
initiative, the Power Africa” (Interview 20170712135318).  
Western agencies and development banks target soft infrastructure, private sector 
development, and capacity building, which are vital for Africa’s sustainable development 
(Interview 20170830072517).  
Fourth, Ethiopia and China share similar political and economic institutions in terms of an 
authoritarian developmental state. The ideology-driven developmental state sees political 
elites committed to economic development while curtailing civil and political liberties. This 
developmental orientation ensures that the state’s survival is substantially dependent on 
increasing and promoting high rates of accumulation and industrialisation (Gebremariam & 
Bayu, 2017). These tenets appear to be similar to China as explained by a lecturer at the 
Renmin University: 
“Ethiopia certainly under Meles and also under Hailemariam has looked to China using 
China as a model for development practice, also linking interests in the political 
makeup of China in the way in which the country can economically liberalise but not 
politically liberalise. So, Ethiopia relations with China is among the strongest in the 
continent because it is one of the few countries, which has outrightly said that China is 
a model” (Interview 20170526121908). 
This political affinity between Ethiopia and China means that deal brokerage starts at the party 
to party level before even reaching the government level. According to a Xinhua News Agency 
reporter, deals are reached at the party to party level. The stronger the party to party relations, 
the higher the chances of striking deals at the government level (Interview 20170830072517). 
As such, the closer relations between EPRDF and Communist Party of China creates 
collective identity, which generates a perception of like-mindedness and trust (Lejeune, 2015). 
Accordingly, a top-level Chinese official at the Africa Department of C-MFA notes that Ethiopia 
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and China “treat each other as equals, we have high level mutual political trust. Trust is very 
important in business. That is what we share in common” (Interview 20170621175736).  
 
A final reason why the Ethiopian government awarded the contract to the Chinese was the 
need to learn and compare project execution capabilities between the Chinese and the 
Western enterprises. Wind energy remains a new sector in Ethiopia, and the government 
wanted to gain experience and acquire new technology. As such, all the three wind farms were 
developed on an EPC scheme in which Ashegoda was developed by a French firm, Adama 1 
and Adama 2 by Chinese contractors (Interview 20171011140053). This further allowed the 
government to diversify contractors and areas of cooperation with the Chinese and Westerns 
enterprises (Interview 20170819151844). Therefore, wind was a new avenue to diversify the 
areas of cooperation.  
Figure 5. 1 A bricolage of economic and political factors 
 
5.6 Chapter summary    
This chapter has presented a description and analysis of the drivers and motivations of the 
Ethiopian and Chinese actors financing and developing of Adama wind farms. The drivers for 
the Ethiopian government were a combination of three factors, namely wind technology 
maturity, availability of ideal and harvestable wind resources, and the global push towards 
renewable energy. From the Chinese side, the primary drivers were a combination of the 
‘Going Abroad strategy’, seeking new markets, and climate change and reputation 
considerations. The chapter also presented and analysed the motivations for both Ethiopians 
and Chinese involvement in the two wind farms. While there is a plethora of motivations for 
the Ethiopian government, the need to diversify the electricity sector was identified as the most 
significant. For the Chinese, the request made by the Ethiopian government was the deciding 
motivation for their involvement in the two projects. However, geopolitical and geo-economic 
interests combined with Ethiopia’s investment climate and sector-specific incentives also 
motivated the Chinese involvement in the two projects.  
The chapter analysed the economic and political factors which influenced the Ethiopian 
government to award the contract the Chinese enterprises. A finely grained analysis of the 
reasons why the Ethiopian government awarded the contract to the Chinese suggests that 
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political determinants were not significant compared to economic factors. As argued by one of 
the Ethiopian government officials interviewed in this study: 
“The government invited the Chinese simply because of the financing aspect. Any 
developer that is prepared to finance the project can undertake such work. Look at 
Ashegoda; the French developed that one because they came with their own finance 
for the project” (Interview 20170811121252).    
This finding challenges the assertion that political factors greatly influence Chinese 
infrastructure financing and development decisions in Africa. In the context of the Adama wind 
farms, it is nonetheless vital to emphasise that political factors have an enabling effect but not 
necessarily a significant influence. In the next chapter, I unpack the engagement and 
negotiation processes between the Ethiopians and the Chinese in the two wind farms.    
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CHAPTER SIX: ENGAGEMENT MODALITIES AND NEGOTIATION PROCESSES 
BETWEEN AND AMONG ETHIOPIAN AND CHINESE ACTORS IN ADAMA WIND FARMS  
“There is this big change globally […] if we don’t take care, we will be taken for a ride 
and dropped when the time comes. If we don’t use this window of opportunity to 
transform our economies, then it will be lost” Meles Zenawi117. 
6.0 Introduction  
The quotation above shows how Ethiopia, under Meles Zenawi, engaged with foreign actors  
with the emphasis on Ethiopia being in the driver’s seat (Staden, Alden, & Wu, 2018) or in 
charge (Brautigam, 2011). Ethiopia remains an aid-dependent country (Feyissa, 2011) or 
foreign-funded revolutionary democracy (Gadzala, 2015b) where donor policies have made 
no significant impact “in terms of influencing Ethiopian policies” (Borchgrevink, 2008, p. 195). 
This could be explained by Ethiopia’s negotiating capital (Whitfield & Fraser, 2010), which 
relates to the capacity of “political leadership to make use of enabling socio-economic and 
political structures” (Feyissa, 2011, p. 789). This chapter analyses modalities of engagement 
and processes of negotiations between Ethiopian and Chinese actors in the financing and 
developing of Adama wind farms. To draw a nuanced understanding of the interactions, 
several interrelated questions are asked: in the two wind farms, who initiated or brokered the 
engagements and at what stage or organisational level? When did the negotiations begin and 
how long did they take? What was negotiated on, and what instruments were used to achieve 
objectives? The chapter presents findings from document analysis, unstructured and semi-
structured interviews conducted with Ethiopian federal and regional government officials, 
public utilities, politicians and farmers where the wind farms are located. From the Chinese 
side, informants were drawn from the Chinese government officials, state and semi-state-
owned enterprises involved in the Adama wind farms.  
I argue that an examination of modalities of engagement and negotiation processes through 
these multiple layers of stakeholders allows one to unravel the “field of African agency” 
(Brown, 2012, p. 1891). The Adama wind farm cases show that modalities of engagement and 
negotiation processes are not always conditioned by power asymmetries (Soulé-Kohndou, 
2019a) but by the social and material context in which these interactions occur (Phillips, 2018). 
The case studies show that the Ethiopian actors’ decision-making when interacting with the 
Chinese was carefully and strategically planned to ensure there was maximum retention of 
control in the engagements and at the same time, ensuring their Chinese counterparts were 
happy. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section traces the modalities of 
                                                          
117
 Meles Zenawi. 2012. Africa 2012—Accelerating Infrastructure Investments. World Economic Forum, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
9-11 May 2012.    
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engagement. The second section unpacks the question of who brokered the deals. Section 
three responds to the question of who negotiates followed by section four that examines the 
details the of the negotiations. The last section concludes and draws empirical insights to help 
understand Ethiopian agency when interacting with the Chinese.  
6.1 A framework for tracing the engagement at the negotiation tables 
Negotiation tables are the official or formalised platforms where actors meet to deliberate or 
negotiate on mutual interests. The negotiation tables vary from sector to sector and range 
from “diplomatic conferences involving heads of states, through donor consultations between 
international financial institutions and local NGOs, to meetings by customary chiefs under the 
village tree” (Hagmann & Peclard, 2010, p. 551). In the case of Adama wind farms, 
engagements occurred at several negotiation tables. Engagements between Ethiopian and 
Chinese stakeholders are traced from the FOCAC to the project execution level/platform. At 
these negotiation tables, various instruments of power were used by Ethiopian actors to 
influence the way they interacted with the Chinese actors. As depicted in table 6.1, the first 
level of engagement initiation is the multilateral platform where African and Chinese actors 
meet to deliberate on policy and the direction of their relations. African governments in this 
context use their domestic regulatory, organisational and political capital—what Mann (1984) 
terms despotic118 and infrastructural power119 as instruments to influence their relations with 
China. The commonality of interests and themes on the areas of engagement such as win-
win friendship, cooperation, shared histories and experience of underdevelopment are used 
as discursive forms of power to shape and condition the informal and formal engagement 
(Hagmann & Peclard, 2010).  
Table 6. 1 Adama wind farms engagement at the negotiation tables 
Actor  Negotiation 
table  
Engagement 
modality 
Resources Repertoires  Outcome  
President 
/ Prime 
Minister/ 
Minister 
Multilateral 
level (e.g. 
FOCAC) 
Informal & 
formal 
Sovereignty; 
regulatory, 
organisational
& political 
capital 
Commonality 
of interests & 
themes (win-
win 
friendship; 
solidarity) 
Agreement; 
disagreement; 
declarations & 
action plans 
President/  
Prime 
Minister/ 
Minister of 
Foreign 
Affairs/ 
Ambassador/ 
Consular  
MFA/ 
Embassy/ 
Consulate 
level 
Informal & 
formal  
Sovereignty; 
regulatory, 
organisational
, political & 
informational 
capital 
Commonality 
of interests & 
themes (win-
win 
friendship; 
mutual 
cooperation; 
anti-Western 
rhetoric).  
Agreement; 
disagreement; 
economic & 
business 
diplomacy 
                                                          
118 The range of actions that the elite is empowered to undertake without routine 
119 The ability to execute them 
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MOWIE  Energy 
Ministry level  
Formal 
engagement; 
negotiations; 
bargaining; 
Passivity  
Cooperation  
Regulatory 
capital; 
institutional 
capital; 
informational 
capital 
Commonality 
of interests & 
themes (win-
win 
friendship; 
climate 
change & 
clean energy 
narrative).  
Official or 
formal 
agreement of 
cooperation 
through 
Memorandum 
of 
Understandin
g 
Ethiopia-
China 
Development 
Cooperation 
Directorate     
Finance 
Ministry level  
Negotiation; 
bargaining; 
resistance; 
passivity; 
cooperation  
Sovereign 
guarantor 
capital; 
financial 
negotiations 
coordination 
capital; 
Political 
capital  
Commonality 
of interests & 
themes (win-
win 
friendship; 
anti-
development 
finance 
conditionality)
. 
Agreement; 
disagreement; 
low-cost 
financing 
scheme.  
Bureaucrats/ 
Technocrats 
from EEP, 
MOWIE, sub-
Contractors, 
Community 
leadership, 
farmers & 
other 
concerned 
stakeholders
.  
Project 
Implementatio
n & 
management 
level 
Negotiation; 
bargaining; 
resistance; 
passivity; 
cooperation 
contestation, 
conflict and 
resistance 
Control over 
enforcement 
of the 
regulatory & 
institutional 
power; control 
over physical 
access to 
land; control 
over 
mobilisation & 
utilisation of 
resistance & 
physical 
violence  
Transparency
; 
accountability
; good 
governance; 
human rights; 
democracy; 
service 
delivery; 
national 
development. 
Project 
execution; 
project 
management; 
land 
acquisition; 
compensation
; service 
delivery; 
national 
development; 
agreement; 
disagreement.   
  
While the initiation of engagements between Ethiopian and Chinese actors in the context of 
the Adama wind farms can be traced back to the 2003 Addis Ababa FOCAC Conference, 
2006 Beijing FOCAC Summit and the 2009 Sharm el-Sheikh FOCAC Conference, no 
significant evidence suggests that any negotiations occurred here (Interview 
20170630164633). As highlighted by an official from the MOFEC, FOCAC as a multilateral 
platform is there for declarations and action plans for the next three years after the meeting 
and not for specific negotiations. He argues that it is merely a talking shop and nothing 
concrete and material is discussed. Similarly, engagement initiation at the continental or 
regional level was not evident in the case of the Adama wind farms. As explained by an official 
working in the Partnership and Collaborations Division of the AUC who happens to be a former 
Ethiopian government official for the then Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 
under the Asia Desk: 
“The AU is highly limited when it comes to a continental position on engaging with 
China. Although we are responsible at preparing policy documents and identification 
145 
 
of areas of cooperation for member states, it is up to the member state to pursue 
cooperation on its own. Of course, we have a FOCAC Unit here, but it is not very 
powerful enough to decide the pathway for member states because of the sovereignty 
clause, which affects total jurisdiction on member states. Again, China always refuse 
to allocate the money to AU treasury; rather, they prefer direct engagement at a 
bilateral level with the partner country as implementation is done at a bilateral level.” 
(Interview 20170616002456). 
The absence or silence of the AUC in the context of Ethiopia-China cooperation in the 
development of the Adama wind farms is not surprising. The AUC does not have a binding 
and sovereign mandate to micro-manage Ethiopia’s foreign policy. Similarly, China prefers to 
engage African countries at a bilateral level since the implementation of the projects is done 
at a bilateral level. While the idea of leaving member states to set their own engagement 
priorities with the Chinese demonstrates what some may consider as a weakness of the AUC 
(Staden et al., 2018), it is an expression of strategic passivity of agency at the continental level 
(Procopio, 2019). This suggests that “inter-state brokerage is the pre-eminent mode of 
engagement” (Mohan, 2015, p. 6) between Ethiopia and China in the context of Adama wind 
farms.      
The MFA level is the second negotiation table where engagements begin. This platform 
includes the head of state (President) or government (Prime Minister), Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Ambassador and Consul who act on behalf of the Ethiopian state to attract 
investments. Ethiopian actors here conduct economic and business diplomacy which is 
essentially state-sponsored and sanctioned marketing by the President, Prime Minister, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Embassies and Consulates. As is the case with the multilateral 
platform; these actors use regulatory, organisational, political and informational capital and 
commonality of interests as instruments to influence the engagements. Engagements at this 
stage begin at an informal and then move to a formal mode.  
The third platform involves MOWIE, where formal engagements begin. After the conduct of 
economic and business diplomacy by the MFA and the presidential branch of the state, 
MOWIE will formalise the engagement by signing an agreement of cooperation in the form of 
a Memorandum of Agreement or Understanding (MOA/U) which would stipulate the guidelines 
of the cooperation. The process within which the MOU is reached in this context, should be 
seen as a negotiation zone, a space where political decisions and agendas are set (Hagmann 
& Peclard, 2010). The actors here bargain, aided by the sector-specific regulatory capital, 
institutional capital, and informational capital as resources to influence the outcomes. Win-win 
friendship, climate change and clean energy development repertoires are used to influence 
146 
 
engagement outcomes. Agreements here are reached out of strategic passivity and 
cooperation.  
Financially related engagements between MOFEC and Chinese financial institutions occur at 
the fourth platform, as shown in table 6.1. At this stage, Ethiopian implementing institutions 
are led by the director of Ethiopia-China Development Cooperation to negotiate, bargain, 
resist, cooperate and at times passively reach an agreement with the Chinese financial 
institutions. Passivity does not necessarily imply that decisions are reached without contesting 
pre-set conditions. It shows the strategic calculations of the actors where priority is on 
achieving the set goals. This is the most challenging stage of the process. It may, at times, 
take longer if the area of engagement is less familiar to both Ethiopian and Chinese actors. 
As shown in table 6.1, Ethiopian actors make use of their financial negotiations’ coordination 
capital, and political capital in tandem with the sovereign guarantor (in the case of a 
concessional loan facility) as resources to influence the outcomes. Likewise, repertoires such 
as commonality of interests and themes of engagement help condition the financing 
arrangement, price, interest rate, maturity, and grace period issues. This often leads to a low-
cost financing scheme arrangement.  
Project implementation and management aspects constitute the final level, where ideas are 
translated to practice. At this stage, both state and non-state actors battle out for influence 
and domination and employ several tactical resources and repertoires as instruments of power 
to promote their own interests, ideas, values and preferences. Bargaining, negotiations, 
resistance, cooperation, passivity and contestation becomes the modus operandi. Because of 
the practical challenges and complexity of implementing mega-infrastructure projects, the 
Ethiopian state strategically selected state and non-state actors who were to participate in the 
process (Jessop, 2010). In the case of Adama wind farms, the stakeholders involved at this 
stage were EEP as the employer, HydroChina—CGCOC-JV as the contractor, Oromia 
regional government as the political leadership of the region with ultimate control over access 
to land. Adama City, Woreda and Kebele administrations were also involved as the local 
government and political administrators as well as farmers and community members as 
custodians of the land—where the projects were to be sited. Having provided the framework 
for analysis, in the next sections, I operationalise the framework.  
6.2 Who brokered the engagements?  
The question of who brokered the Adama wind farm deals is important because it contributes 
to answering the African agency dimension, viewed as the ability to initiate the engagement. 
Initiation of deals, as explained in the previous section, happens both informally and formally. 
At an informal level, there are opposing narratives. Some of the Ethiopian government officials 
claim they approached the Chinese first. For example, a high-level politician from 
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TPLF/EPRDF and former Ethiopian ambassador to China between 1999 and 2004 claims that 
“in those projects, we first approach the Chinese government for loans” (Interview 
20170512172020). This idea of Ethiopia approaching the Chinese first is supported by an 
official from China-Africa Dialogue platform of the Oxfam International based in Addis Ababa:  
“China will pledge for African countries that they will give this so and so amount in the 
next three years. It is up to the respective government to go and negotiate with China, 
even if the thing is not pledged at FOCAC” (Interview 20170615113129).  
According to The Reporter journalist, the deals were brokered by Meles Zenawi. He argues 
that it was an initiative of the late Prime Minister after co-hosting and organising FOCAC 
Summit in Addis Ababa in 2003 and also after co-hosting FOCAC in Beijing in 2006. 
Engagements about the wind farms could have started there (Interview 20170829104223). 
Crediting Meles Zenawi with initiating the deals suggests a classic reading of a “great man” 
role in directing his country towards intended directions (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014, p. 74). Oral 
evidence obtained from many respondents working at EEP, MOFEC and MOWIE support the 
claim that Meles brokered the engagements soon after the 2006 FOCAC in Beijing.  
At the informal level, some of the Ethiopian government officials claim the Chinese 
approached the Ethiopian government but only in the case of Adama 2. A senior government 
official from MOWIE who was involved in the negotiations presents a less straightforward 
answer for Adama 2 context: “Ethiopia started the engagement aaaaah maybe it is difficult to 
answer because the Chinese know that we have the wind potential. So perhaps the Chinese” 
(Interview 20170609111018). This corresponds with the one CGCOC employee view that: “in 
case of Adama 1, the Ethiopian side started” (Interview 20170801090344). Another CGCOC 
employee notes that it was the Ethiopian government which brokered the deals. The employee 
argues that “Ethiopian government is the one that needed the projects, but I also feel that 
probably Chinese companies approached them in the case for Adama 2. It is like that in 
business, some of them will find the market, or sometimes the market will find you” (Interview 
20171020140152). A former EEP employ argues that at times, companies approach the 
government based on the government’s strategic plan. For him, “the government of Ethiopia 
has five-year plans, the businesses will know there is interest” (Interview 20170614122145). 
Such a view implies that the Chinese proposed to develop the project using their financing 
arrangements, which the Ethiopian government accepted.  
The excerpts above suggest two things: (i) that it was the Ethiopian government initiative to 
follow-up on Chinese commitments to finance clean energy development and (ii) it was part 
of the broader Going Abroad strategy by Chinese enterprises to approach EEP and MOWIE 
with lucrative proposals. This suggests a similar pattern of findings to that seen by Soule-
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Kohndou (2019a) on Benin-China engagements on infrastructure project development. That 
said, it is logical that HydroChina and CGCOC initiated the engagement for Adama 2 after 
timely and competent execution of Adama 1. The two Chinese enterprises had gained relevant 
business experience and were ‘practically’ aware of the wind resource potential around Adama 
location. This pattern confirms the learning-by-doing approach by the Chinese (Kirkegaard, 
2017), which is consistent with the market logic of testing the waters first before going full 
scale (Tsegaye, 2018).  
At the formal level, the Ethiopian government initiated the deals. As explained by an official 
from MOFEC:  
“In every five-year period, normally, three major infrastructure projects are jointly 
agreed on by the Council of Ministers before the National Planning Commission sets 
a national development plan (GTP).  It is then passed to MOFEC to check if there are 
financial resources that are available which can be used to achieve the set objectives. 
If it involves borrowing, then necessary steps are taken. Taking the wind farms as an 
example, MOWIE would then submit to MOFEC that they want funding. Sometimes 
the identified priority areas will even be sent directly to the Prime Minister’s office if 
indeed they are ‘high status’ projects. This is to prioritise which one will be very crucial 
and should be done first. MOFEC will then be tasked to mobilise financial resources to 
ensure that the set projects will be achieved. As part of MOFEC, this directorate 
specifically, and only deals with China. So, we send our national development plan to 
the MOFCOM and other stakeholders who may have business interests in our country. 
Interested Chinese stakeholders will then demonstrate their interest. MOFEC then 
composes a negotiating team which is composed of members of the implementing 
ministries and their agencies. It should be known that only on financing negotiations, 
MOFEC liaises with Chinese funders such as C-EXIM Bank, ICBC backed by a 
negotiating team from the implementing ministries. Once the MOFCOM gives a green 
light, we begin the negotiation processes. The Embassy and Consulate, in each case, 
are involved. The entire process is reported to the Prime Minister every time. EEP does 
the implementation, management and commissioning” (Interview 20170630164633). 
The Council of Ministers which is exclusive to EPRDF plans the national development vision 
in the form of the GTP. This central policy framework helps in coordinating the development 
pathway of the country. Besides the centrally administered GTP, there is also an institution-
based policy framework—a strategy to regulate the basis of achieving the set vision. In the 
context of the energy sector, this is the National Energy Policy (NEP). To achieve this strategy, 
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a target-oriented tactic is needed, and in the Ethiopian context, it is the National Electrification 
Program (NEP) (see figure 6.1).   
Figure 6. 1 Planning and implementation of electricity projects in Ethiopia 
 
Source: National Energy Program, 2017.  
The contestations on who brokered the deals first, at the informal level, bring to the fore two 
practices of political symbolism. First, the Ethiopian government want to present a narrative 
which showcases that it is in charge of its deals with China. Second, the Ethiopian government 
also want to create another narrative of making itself appear weak, thereby using that strategy 
as a basis for making more demands during the negotiations.  
6.3 Tracing the negotiation processes: who negotiates?  
The question of who negotiates is highly contextual and requires to be analysed in line with 
the platform at which the engagements occur, as shown in table 6.1. At the multilateral level 
such as FOCAC, engagement initiation and informal negotiations are usually handled by the 
executive branch of the state. These actors have the constitutional and sovereign mandate 
(Brown, 2013; Williams, 2013) and are internationally recognised and acceptable to act in such 
a manner (Corkin, 2013). Such include the President, Prime Minister, or Minister (for example 
Foreign Affairs, Energy, Finance, and Environment). Agreements reached here are not 
conclusive but set the tone of interactions. Actual negotiations are undertaken by technical 
experts who will be involved in the execution of the projects. This confirms Brown’s (2012) 
view of fields of African agency with the state (Ethiopia) and state-based actors (MOWIE, 
MOFEC, EEP and MFA) representing the operationalisation of agency in the form of 
engagement brokering with external actors. 
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The negotiating team is composed of a technical team assembled from bureaucrats and civil 
servants of the implementing institutions and interested stakeholders120. Empirically speaking, 
there is no difference between bureaucrats and civil servants as they are all government 
employees. However, as alluded to by a lecturer at AAU, in the Ethiopian context, there is a 
difference. He argues that bureaucrats, like civil servants, are technical people who are 
‘politically’ appointed to safeguard the political and economic interests of the ruling elites, while 
civil servants are both technical and administrative employees of the government121 (Interview 
20170802154843). As is the case elsewhere, a bureaucrat “works closely with political 
executives, assisting them in substantiating and enacting their policies” (Christensen & 
Opstrup, 2017, p. 495). Civil servants “apply considerable discretion [and] consistently call on 
professional standards” (Ibid, p. 494). Commenting on the Ethiopian bureaucrats, Belachew 
Mekuria, former head of the EIC, argues that Ethiopia’s “bureaucracy is a very old, it is also 
typical of a monarchical tradition. Every institution has its own systems, its own turf, its own 
compartmentalised mandate” (Fick, 2018, p. 1). Ethiopia’s bureaucratic machinery is 
considered one of the most rigid in Africa (Ibid).  
According to a former director of a portfolio in EEPCo, now Chief Executive Officer of EEU, 
the Ethiopian negotiation team was composed of  personnel from EEP, EEU (by then EEPCo), 
EEA, MOWIE, MFA, MOFEC, National Development Bank of Ethiopia, and Ministry of Labour 
(Interview 201817015552244). MOWIE and EEP led the technical team while MOFEC led the 
financial team. EEP and MOWIE negotiated with the Oromia regional government, Adama city 
administration, Adama and Mojo Woreda, and community leaders and farmers on access to 
land and compensation. Project consultancy negotiations were handled by EEP and AAUIT 
(for Adama 1) and MU-ASTU-JV (for Adama 2). For sea transportation, negotiations were 
between ESLSE (but only for Adama 2122) representing the Ethiopian government and 
HydroChina-CGCOC-JV and Sinotrans representing the contractors.  
6.4 Opening the engagement modalities and negotiation black boxes  
Negotiation processes between African and Chinese actors are treated as black boxes 
because of the paucity of information and limited access to how the actual negotiations are 
conducted (Corkin, 2013; Gadzala, 2015a). In this section, I will show how negotiations and 
decision-making processes were undertaken by Ethiopian actors in their interactions with 
other Ethiopians and with Chinese actors. The discussion follows the project life cycle 
beginning with (i) MOU signing, (ii) feasibility studies and environmental and social impact 
                                                          
120 See Assefa, Henok Seyoum. 2018. “Recruitment and Promotion Practices in the Ethiopian Civil Service”, Public Policy and 
Administration Research, 8(7):27-37 
121 Overtime, they can be captured too. 
122 Sea transportation for Adama 1 was all handled by HydroChina, no Ethiopian company was involved. 
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assessment, (iii) tendering and bidding procedures, (iv) project financing modalities, (v) EPC 
contractual aspects, implementation and project management processes, and finally (vi) land 
acquisition issues.   
6.4.1 Memorandum of Understanding   
A Memorandum of Understanding is the agreement of cooperation between two or more 
parties. The difference between the MOU and Contract is that the latter is legally binding and 
enforceable while the former is not legally binding but defines the areas of cooperation and 
the framework under which the cooperation operates. Three MOU frameworks were signed 
for Adama wind farms. As depicted in figure 6.2, the first MOU framework was signed in 2009 
by MOWIE representing the Ethiopian government and MOFCOM representing the Chinese 
government. The implementing institutions signed two MOUs: EEP and HydroChina-CGCOC-
JV. The MOU for Adama 1 was signed on 20th July 2009 while that for Adama 2 was signed 
on 7th May 2011. The purpose of the MOUs was to formally recognise the demonstration of 
interests by both parties in the need to advance cooperation around wind and solar energy 
development. Because of confidentiality clauses of the MOU, the interviewees could not reveal 
particularities but hinted on the “purpose, scope, areas of cooperation, exchange of 
information, implementation and cost sharing, supplementary agreements, duration, channels 
of communications and notices, settlement of disputes” (Interviews 20170609111018; 
20170623163225).  
Figure 6. 2 Adama wind farms MOU framework 
 
The figure above shows the interactions between Ethiopian and Chinese institutions within the MOU 
framework. It depicts two levels of MOU framework, one at the Ministerial level and the other at the 
implementing institutions level.  
The MOU emphasised the exchange of information between Ethiopian and Chinese 
institutions and further proposed a joint venture project delivery arrangement. The first MOU 
also led the Chinese government to provide $1.5 million to HydroChina to comprehensively 
assess solar and wind resource potential in Ethiopia. HydroChina sub-contracted Beijing 
Engineering Corporation, its subsidiary, which further sub-contracted the job to the Institute of 
Atmospheric Physics of the Chinese Academy of Science. The commitment by the Chinese 
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government to finance the study of solar and wind resource in Ethiopia demonstrates the 
government strategy of supporting its enterprises to go abroad.  
Meanwhile, at the MOU stage, officials note that there was space for cooperation with limited 
resistance and bargaining. There are three reasons for this. First, the MOUs were setting the 
tone for future formalised cooperation, and there was no need for contestations. Second, the 
Ethiopians wanted Chinese technology and finance to develop their wind energy sector. Third, 
the Chinese were also eagerly interested in tapping into the potentially huge Ethiopian wind 
energy market. The commonality of interests created a mutual issue (Habeeb, 1988), a context 
that motivated the two parties to reach an agreement.   
6.4.2 Feasibility and the environmental and social impact assessment studies 
Feasibility assessment addresses whether a project is operationally, technically and 
economically feasible. The feasibility studies for both Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind farms were 
all conducted by the contractor in cooperation with the employer (see figure 6.3). Although the 
preliminary agreements in both cases suggested that the feasibility studies were to be 
conducted by a third party, interviews with EEP officials suggest that HydroChina-CGCOC-JV 
did the feasibility studies instead of a third party. One EEP official argues that “feasibility of 
two projects were done by Chinese, and the results are skewed favouring Chinese wind 
turbines. As a result, there were quality issues” (Interview 20170731110952). 
HydroChina-CGCOC-JV officials interviewed for this study reject this claim and insisted a third 
party conducted the assessment. According to EEP officials, the Ethiopian government did 
not contest HydroChina and CGCOC’s failure to use an independent third party to conduct the 
feasibility studies for the two wind farms, but strategically laid low allowing the contractor to 
continue the work. While it may demonstrate passivity, EEP and MOWIE later flexed muscles 
on the outcome of the studies. The two institutions evaluated the feasibility studies and 
recommended adjustments to be made by the contractor. One official from EEP notes that 
“the EEP board and management further reviewed it to check if they had made some 
necessary adjustments as per our suggestion” (Interview 20170623163225). An official from 
HydroChina expressed surprise that the Ethiopians had the capacity and skills to substantively 
evaluate the feasibility studies at that length. He remarked that “Ethiopian people are very 
intelligent, they are very clever. They have done three projects; now, they know everything” 
(Interview 20171229144752).   
Like the feasibility studies, the environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) studies 
were also conducted by the contractor cooperating with EEP and other Ethiopian institutions. 
The ESIA report documents the impact, mitigation and management processes to show the 
real opportunities and avoid or minimise adverse impacts of the project. The process includes 
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public consultation whereby affected stakeholders are asked to contribute their opinions and 
suggestions, which lead to some rejection or acceptance of the proposed project. Although 
the contractor conducted the ESIA reports for the two wind farms, they needed to be approved 
by MOWIE. MOWIE would issue an environmental clearance permit. The permit is critical; it 
serves as a financial agreement prerequisite by C-EXIM Bank. A former EEP employee notes 
the following:  
“Although the contractor conducted the ESIA, the projects public consultation process 
was done by EEP and even made use of the Ethiopian Broadcasting Corporation and 
other local media houses in Adama to promote and make transparent the benefits and 
advantages of developing wind farms in the selected sites. For me, it was just done to 
ensure that the public knew about the projects, but in terms of whether they approved 
it or not, I don’t think it mattered because decision had already been made at the top 
level to go ahead with the projects with or without the public approval” (Interview 
20180120178596).  
The former EEP employee’s view was corroborated by farmers and community members from 
the Woreda and Kebele where the wind farms are located. For example, one farmer criticised 
the Ethiopian government’s conduct of the public consultation process arguing that “we were 
never consulted, we were simply told the results or outcome of the findings” (Interview 
20171102111348 translated from Afaan Oromia to English). Another farmer lamented that 
EEP and the Chinese “did not come to us directly; they visited the Kebele administration 
offices and then started working. I was never consulted” (Interview 20171101115937 
translated from Afaan Oromia to English). However, a group of farmers note “we were involved 
with other farmers, there were great discussions and consultation, but after that, the 
consultation is limited to those in the office, we are no longer part of it” (Interview 
201711021212240 translated from Afaan Oromia to English). 
There was a clash of values between EEP and MOWIE with regards to Adama 2 ESIA. 
Technical and confidential documents I reviewed during fieldwork show that EEP asked 
MOWIE to issue a letter of no objections with regards to the issuance of the environmental 
permit after the conduct of ESIA by the contractor. Although MOWIE later issued the letter of 
no objection, initially it did not because the ESIA was not conducted according to the standards 
and guidelines set by MEFCC. MOWIE highlighted that they could only issue the letter only 
after the necessary recommendations based on the guidelines set by MEFCC were adhered 
to. How MOWIE acted when dealing with EEP with regards to the issuance of a letter of no 
objection suggests a “procedural stratagem”—which entails how civil servants exercise 
agency by invoking and enforcing legality to influence choice and outcome of an engagement 
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(Soulé-Kohndou, 2019a, p. 199). This shows that the state is not a monolithic actor as there 
are competing interests and values which influence the outcomes.   
Figure 6. 3 Adama wind farms feasibility and ESIA interactions 
The figure above shows Ethiopian and Chinese actors who were involved in the feasibility and ESIA 
studies for the two wind farms. Feasibility studies were conducted by BEC being sub-contracted by 
HydroChina-CGCOC. BEC is listed as a subsidiary of HydroChina. Therefore, claims made by some of 
EEP engineers that an independent third party was not used could be true. MOWIE and EEP provided 
the institutional support. For ESIA, HydroChina-CGCOC interacted with EEP with limited participation 
of the Oromia regional government and the peasant farmers.    
The Ethiopian government did not force the contractor to use a third party as stipulated in the 
contract. As explained by an EEP employee, the government of Ethiopia did not initially 
recognise that BEC, which was sub-contracted to undertake the feasibility studies was a 
subsidiary of HydroChina. It was later that they came to know about it. Also, “EEP did not have 
the technical experience and skills, wind energy is a new sector” (Interview 20170731110952). 
Besides these explanations, insights from EEP suggests that the Ethiopian government 
together with the contractor did not want to experience delays as it was likely that an 
independent party was going to derail progress and lengthen the project timeframe. Insights 
from HydroChina and CGCOC highlight that the so-called independent ‘third party’ was likely 
to be from a Western institution and the outcome as viewed by Chinese contractors was likely 
to be unfavourable123 (Interviews 20170801090344; 20171229144752). Also, the 
environmental permit which was to be issued after the ESIA, was a pre-requisite for the loan 
application from C-EXIM bank. EEP, together with the contractor, therefore could not risk 
appointing an independent third party. This illustration shows how the Ethiopian government 
collaborated and colluded with the Chinese enterprises to influence interaction outcomes. The 
Ethiopian government could have pushed the Chinese contractor to appoint an independent 
third party, but it did not. This is because the Ethiopian government wanted the projects to be 
                                                          
123 Chinese hinted the possibility of Lahmeyer which could have created a conflict of interest since they were initially planning to 
have developed the Adama farms. Possibilities were that, Lahmeyer was going to recommend Western turbines, which was 
against the Chinese business interests. 
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quickly delivered. Appointing an independent third party could have delayed the process. This 
could be interpreted as strategic passivity.  
6.4.3 Employer-contractor direct bidding and tendering processes 
In infrastructure projects, the process of bidding and tendering is often scrutinised by the local 
and international community. The scrutiny is largely based on the need for transparency and 
accountability to combat corruption. Bidding and tendering is composed of two essential 
processes: estimation, which is the determination of the approximate project cost; and 
adjudication, which is the determination of bidding price (Aje, Oladinrin, & Nwaole, 2016, p. 
21). These two processes are significant for quality and cost efficiency. The processes depend 
on the market, availability of materials, labour and human resource with technical capacity and 
skills, the source of project financing, project location, contract modality, contractor profit 
margin, size of the project, and government policy towards that particular sector (Shash, 
1993).  
Figure 6. 4 Adama wind farms employer-contractor direct negotiation process 
According to interviews, generally, for the Ethiopian government and particularly EEP, there 
are three types of bidding negotiation undertaken by the EEP. The first one is direct negotiation 
with the contractor (see figure 6.4). Here, the government directly contacts the contractor to 
submit an expression of interest, which is later evaluated by the organisation’s internal 
processes to check if the potential contractor meets the employer expectations and objectives. 
The second one is the contractor shortlisting. Here, the government identifies companies 
which have good experience, reputation and track record of delivering and executing a project 
through the EPC scheme. The shortlisted companies will be requested to submit an 
expression of interest, which is evaluated in a similar way as in direct negotiation. Third and 
finally, the open tender system. Here, the government publicly publishes the call for 
expressions of interest. A few contractors will be shortlisted and further scrutinised until one 
contractor is selected, which meets the terms of reference.  
According to a TPLF-EPRDF executive committee member, the two wind farms underwent 
international and competitive bidding processes. For him, “the competition was open for 
everyone, the Chinese contractor won this tender because they present very good technical 
presentation” (Interview 20170512172020). However, officials from EEP disagree with the 
above statement. The Ethiopian government entered a ‘direct negotiation’ bidding and 
tendering process which was closed to other ‘outside’ potential bidders. The two wind farms, 
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therefore “did not undergo international bidding, there was no competition” (Interview 
20170731110952). In the case of Adama 1, an official from EEP explains the process below:    
“The Ethiopian government approached the Chinese government to assist them with 
funding for construction of wind projects. It was not an open tender system. It was 
closed as the government then invited expression of interests from Chinese companies 
(HydroChina-CGCOC124) which was part of the financing agreement that a Chinese 
company was supposed to develop the wind farms. HydroChina and CGCOC were 
thus invited to submit their feasibility studies, technical and financial proposal. It was 
not open to the public. Only HydroChina and CGCOC participated in the tendering 
process. Some rumours suggested that there was one Egyptian company (El Sewedy 
Electric) that participated, but no one knows how far true that is” (Interview 
20170714094901). 
For Adama 2, an EEP official explains:  
“It was a direct negotiation with the developer. We wanted the contractor who would 
come with the loans, for which we would negotiate the financial terms and financing 
model before awarding the contract. After that, we asked the contractor to submit the 
financial, technical and commercial proposal. The financial and commercial proposal 
was evaluated by the purchasing and procurement committees of EEP. After the 
procurement and purchasing committee approval, we take it to the board and 
management for evaluation. After these evaluations and approval of the financial, 
technical and commercial proposal, we entered into negotiations with contractor 
precisely on the financial and technical aspects. We then reached an agreement; then, 
the agreement was submitted to the EEP management for further evaluations before 
a contract was reached between HydroChina and CGCOC. The forward and backward 
process takes on average 4-5 months” (Interview 20170623163225). 
Elsewhere, direct negotiation between the employer and the contractor may be facilitated in 
instances where the contractor came with a financing arrangement. Empirical studies from an 
American firm shows that “competitive bidding is associated with higher planned engagement 
effort and decreased fees, relative to non-competitive bidding” (Johnstone, Bedard, & 
Ettredge, 2004, p. 46). However, competitive bidding is seen by contractors as an extra layer 
of administration, delays and complications, especially for Chinese companies in Africa that 
                                                          
124 A further probe on this suggest that initially, only HydroChina was invited, CGCOC was later included in the deal because 
HydroChina did not have the market experience of operating in Ethiopia. CGCOC had been in Ethiopia longer than HydroChina 
and had been registered in Ethiopia as a Grade 1 contractor by 2008.  
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may not have the necessary experience in the competitive bidding process. As confirmed by 
an employee of HydroChina: 
“I will prefer shortlisting or direct bidding. For example, on the open tendering system, 
60 companies submitted their pre-qualification papers. So, imagine, out of 60, only five 
were shortlisted. Oooh no this is funny. EEP should maybe consider the shortlist 
tendering system” (Interview 20171229144752125). 
Direct negotiation is not an uncommon way of engaging external contractors (Shash, 1993). 
According to a TPLF-EPRDF official, the government has awarded several contracts not only 
to Chinese enterprises but also the Europeans using direct negotiations. He argues that direct 
negotiation with the contractor is out of strategic choice which comes from the country’s 
financial limitations and the huge demand for infrastructure development (Interview 
20170512172020). Another respondent reiterates the politicians’ view and claims that 
Ashegoda wind farm, Gibe 1, 2, 3, Tana Beles hydroelectric power plant and now Great 
Renaissance dam (developed by Salini Costruttori, an Italian enterprise) are among notable 
foreign contracted mega-infrastructure projects in Ethiopia which were all developed using 
direct negotiations with the contractor (Interview 20170829094453).   
The decision by the Ethiopian government to go for direct negotiations and not competitive 
bidding with the contractor was by desire, and strategic choice. The Ethiopian government 
had to conform to the Chinese government unofficial conditionality of finance provision, where 
a Chinese enterprise was to be awarded the contract without competitive bidding. This 
suggests the significance and conditioning effects of the capitalist world system (Lonsdale, 
2000). The Ethiopian government was hemmed into the foreign contractor's financial 
preconditions. In those tight corners, the government was still able to carve out and shape the 
details of the engagements strategically.    
6.4.4 Project financing: conditions and procedures 
The two wind farms were all financed under two preferential loan facilities. Adama 1 was 
financed under the preferential export buyers’ credit and Adama 2 under the concessional 
loan126. The Ethiopian government applied for the loan to C-EXIM Bank supported by 
                                                          
125 This response was based on the question I asked the respondent on what he preferred between direct negotiation and 
competitive tendering. He used the Metehara solar farm as a case to express his view.  
126 According to Chinese EXIM bank, preferential export buyers’ credit is defined as credit given to foreign financial institutions, 
the Finance Ministry of the import country, institutions authorized by the government of the import country, and importers, foreign 
companies and ship owners that the Bank deems qualified, for their import of Chinese product, technology and service. The loan 
is provided both in Chinese yuan and in foreign currencies. Government concessional loan is defined as medium and long term 
subsidised (low) cost (interest rate) credit extended by the Chinese EXIM bank under the designation of the Chinese government 
with the nature of official assistance. The Chinese EXIM bank notes that “these two facilities are an arrangement made by the 
Chinese Government to support other developing countries with concessional funding. China EXIM bank is the only bank 
designated by the Chinese Government to implement such facilities” (for more see; China Export and Import Bank 
http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/tm/en-TCN/index_640.html; OECD, 2015. Massa, I. 2011).  
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recommendation letters obtained from the Chinese Economic and Business Consulate and 
the Chinese Embassy in Addis Ababa. The loan application was sent to E-MFA, which then 
took it to the Ethiopian embassy in Beijing using Ethiopian Airlines127 (Interview 
20171027105200). The Ethiopian embassy then submitted the loan application to MOFCOM. 
According to a CGCOC employee, the recommendation letters were significant because “if 
they do not give the support letter, it is normally difficult to get the funding” (Interview 
20170801090344).  
The loan application process requires the fulfilment of certain conditions. A senior MOFEC 
official involved in the application process relays that, “we follow procedures, a feasibility 
study, ESIA, environmental license and preliminary agreement to award the contract to a 
Chinese contractor” (Interview 20170630164633). After fulfilling these conditions:  
“On July 19, 2009, the Ministry of Finance of Ethiopia proposed the preferential Buyer’s 
credit loan utilisation projects’ list to Ministry of Commerce of China, the list involved 7 
projects, with total amount of more than 1 billion USD, in which the first project is the 
wind power project, including Adama and Mesobo-Harena” (EEP, 2017b, p. 4).  
MOFCOM then reviewed the applications resulting in the wind farms being accorded a high-
status profile. Immediately the applications were directed to C-EXIM Bank to structure the 
financial terms and conditions (see table 6.2). Although MOFCOM agreed to finance the 
projects, it was the Chinese State Council that approved the applications (see figure 6.5). Just 
as noted by a CGCOC employee: 
“The projects were high status, and they were directly influenced from the Prime 
Minister’s office who even approved the loans although formally it was handled by 
MOFCOM. For Adama 1, MOFCOM approved the financing because the amount was 
smaller, but for Adama 2, the amount was approved by the Chinese State Council 
because the amount was larger” (Interview 20170801090344). 
Meanwhile, the Chinese Ministry of Finance and C-MFA roles were minimal, as explained by 
EEP and MOFEC officials. The C-EXIM Bank responsibilities were to structure and negotiate 
the financial terms and condition with MOFEC, operate and monitor the loan disbursement 
and also administer the collection of principal and interest after the maturity period. The 
financial terms are presented in table 6.2 below. According to the financial agreement, the 
collection of principal and payment of interest would be twice per year on 21 January and 21 
July of each year.  
                                                          
127 According to an official from the E-MFA, the Ethiopian government stipulated that all contract administration and other related 
documents be transported using Ethiopian Airlines.  
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Table 6. 2 Financial details of Adama wind farms 
Descriptor Adama 1 Adama 2 
Capacity  51MW 153MW 
Unit power cost $2314/Kw $2254.9/Kw 
Interest incurred during 
construction 
$0.9945 million N/A*128 
Interest rate 2% 2% 
Project cost $117 million $345 million 
Source of financing 15% Ethiopia & 85% C-EXIM 15% Ethiopia & 85% C-
EXIM 
Finance modality Preferential Export Buyer’s Credit  Governmental 
Concessional Loan**129 
Loan payment   13 years 13 years  
Grace period 7 years 7 years 
Loan maturity 20 years 20 years  
Total investment cost $117.9945 million  $345 million  
Source: Field data obtained from EEP, HydroChina-CGCOC-JV, 2017 
Ostensibly, officials from EEP argue that the financing agreement was favourable and unique 
because:  
“Government to government loans are preferred by the government of Ethiopia 
because there is long-term possibility of debt forgiveness which is not the case if it is 
not between government to government. Otherwise, EEP would have provided the 
guarantee for this loan, but we decided to use the MOFEC because there is a 
possibility in the long run of the Chinese government to cancel the debt if we fail to 
repay it, unlike if the loans were signed off by the EEP” (Interview 20170623163225). 
However, an official from CGCOC rejects the uniqueness of the Chinese financing approach 
arguing that they follow “standards set by C-EXIM Bank. If you don’t meet the requirements, 
you will not get the loans” (Interview 20170801090344). It is important to emphasise that this 
policy conformity applies only to enterprises seeking financial assistance from Chinese 
                                                          
128 *By the time of conducting fieldwork, project capitalisation report was not yet completed so the interest incurred during 
construction is not factored in. Total investment cost may be more if interest incurred during construction is added. 
129 **Official data does not state whether it was Preferential Export Credits, Export Sellers Credits or Mixed Credits. Simply it is 
recorded as a government concessional loan. For more details about the financing models, see (Massa, 2011; OECD, 2015) and 
also Export and Import Bank of China Preferential Facilities on http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/tm/en-TCN/index_640.html  
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financial institutions (Daouda, Grimm, & Nolke, 2014). Some of the private and (both central 
and provincial) state-owned Chinese enterprises pursue businesses in ways at times 
contradictory to the Chinese central government’s policy dictates (Shen & Power, 2017). 
Competition often leads to contradictions between ‘political’ and ‘commercial’ interests. As 
such, the majority of Chinese enterprises end up not operating within the regulatory practices 
of the Chinese government to win contracts in Africa, and this may in some cases be conflictual 
to the central and provincial governments’ politically driven modus operandi (Gu et al., 2016).   
The total investment cost presented in the financial offer and the final agreed amount 
decreased from $123 million to $117 million for Adama 1 and from $528.85 million to $345 
million for Adama 2. According to a MOFEC official, reaching these price agreements was not 
easy (Interview 20170630164633). The difference in prices is attributed to the Ethiopian 
government’s ability to negotiate for a low-cost financing arrangement with the Chinese. As 
alluded to by a former ambassador of Ethiopia to China:  
“Every country has to know what is the meaning of relationship and what will be the 
outcome of the relationship, and we have our policies and strategies. We base those 
policies and strategies to deal with any country. Is not only China, we deal also with 
EU, with WB, with AfDB. When it comes to negotiations, we do proper project 
preparations so that it reach our satisfaction. You have to understand, the attitude of 
the counterpart, no no no, Chinese are not easy, they are very formidable negotiators, 
so you need to be as smart as them” (Interview 20170512172020). 
While there is no substantial evidence to suggest that the price difference was a result of the 
Ethiopian government negotiating capacity, it could at least be interpreted as such. 
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Figure 6. 5 Adama wind farms loan application, approval and disbursement framework  
 
 
 
Source: Developed from fieldwork data. The figure depicts a simplified loan agreement, disbursement, 
management and flow framework between Ethiopian and Chinese actors.     
6.4.5 Contractual aspects, implementation and project management processes  
Adama 1 and Adama 2 were all delivered on an EPC plus financing contract under a build 
operate (short-term) and transfer (BOT) mechanism. As per Fédération Internationale des 
Ingénieurs-Conseils (FIDIC) (1999), an EPC contract is the agreement reached between the 
employer and the contractor in which design, engineering, procurement, construction, 
commissioning and project handover responsibilities are shifted to the contractor to deliver the 
KEY  
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project within agreed cost, time and required performance level, in return for payment of a 
fixed price (Hosie, 2007).   
The Ethiopian government decided to go for the EPC contract as a risk aversion strategy. The 
government shifted the risk to the contractor (Interview 20171117145704). Risks associated 
with EPC project delivery mechanism include ‘completion risk’ within “the agreed lump sum 
price; or agreed timescale programme; or to the required performance quality” (Hosie, 2007, 
p. 3). This is because mega-infrastructure projects involve many sub-contractors undertaking 
different components of the project. Because of several sub-contractors (see table 6.3), a 
potential clash “arises where a plant contains one party’s proprietary technology but is 
otherwise delivered by another contractor (Hosie, 2007, p. 3). The EPC contractual terms and 
conditions for both Adama 1 and 2 show that HydroChina-CGCOC-JV as the contractor were 
obliged to undertake the design, manufacturing, supplying, construction, installation, testing 
and commissioning of all electrical and mechanical equipment of the two wind farms.  
Table 6. 3 Adama wind farms implementation entities  
Wind 
farm 
Employer/Owner Contractor  Consultant Main sub-contractors  
Adama 1 EEP HydroChina-
CGCOC-JV 
AAUIT Goldwind turbines 
SinoTrans 
SANY Crawler Cranes 
Adama 2 EEP HydroChina-
CGCOC-JV 
MU-ASTU-JV SANY Crawler Cranes 
SinoTrans 
SANY turbines  
ESLSE 
 
In addition to the EPC contract, there were also Particular Conditions of Agreement which 
further detailed the EPC contract. In the Particular Conditions of Agreement, the Ethiopian 
government put several conditions expected to be fulfilled by the contractor, demonstrating 
agency as shown below130:  
“The contractor cannot subcontract without the prior consent of the Employer for any 
part of the work, which was not specifically allowed to subcontract. […] Ethiopian 
engineers to monitor and supervise blade and turbine manufacturing processes in 
China. […] Provide training to Ethiopian experts (FDRE, 2012, p. xx).  
                                                          
130 I was only granted access to Adama 2 document. I believe nonetheless that there is no significant difference with Adama 1. 
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The Particular Conditions of Agreement further stipulated that 30 EEPCo engineers were to 
be trained in the case of Adama 2 as shown in figures 6.6  
Figure 6. 6 Training proposal by EEP to the contractor for Adama 2  
 
Source. Particular Conditions of Agreement (2012).  
Additionally, Ethiopian engineers and technicians were to inspect factory manufacturing of the 
wind turbine generators (WTGs) and associated equipment, towers of WTGs, two main 
transformers, circuit breaker, and disconnector and other electrical equipment (see figure 6.7).  
An analysis of the Particular Conditions of Agreement further highlights that the Ethiopian 
government is the owner of the projects. With that ownership came with the ability to shape 
the terms and conditions of the agreement as shown by an excerpt of Adama 2 below: 
“The contract shall be governed by and constructed in accordance with the Laws of 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Notwithstanding the transfer of 
ownership of Plant and Materials, the responsibility for care and custody thereof 
together with the risk of loss or damage thereto shall remain with the Contractor until 
the date on which the Works or Section is completed as certified in the relevant Taking-
Over Certificate. The language of the contract shall be English. All documents, 
approvals, designs, technical manuals, permits and licenses shall be in English. The 
Contractor shall provide the notarised English Translation version upon the request of 
the Employer (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2012, p. xx).  
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Figure 6. 7 Factory inspection proposal for Adama 2  
 
Source. Particular Conditions of Agreement, 2012.  
With regards to labour issues, Particular Conditions of Agreement stipulates that:   
“Unskilled labour, which is required by the Contractor for the Work, shall be recruited 
locally directly by the Contractor. The Contractor is encouraged to the extent 
practicable and reasonable to utilise staff and skilled labour with the required 
qualifications and experience from sources within Ethiopia. The Contractor and any 
Sub-Contractor employed on the works may import any personnel that are necessary 
for the execution of the works (if the expertise skill is not available locally)” (Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2012).  
Meanwhile, for Adama 1 and 2, there is separate Operations and Maintenance (O&M) contract 
that was signed by EEP and the contractor. For Adama 1, CGCOC did not participate in the 
O&M contract as highlighted by officials from EEP:  
“Adama 1 agreement was 20 months for operation and maintenance with Goldwind 
and the contractor. CGCOC did not participate in the Operations and Maintenance 
agreement. The project was given a five-year warranty period which started from 1 
September 2012 to 1 September 2017” (Interview 20170714094901). 
For Adama 2, an official from EEP claims “the agreement is that the Chinese were to stay only 
for two years during operations and maintenance. After two years, the EEP will take full control 
of the wind farms, and those two years are for skills transfer” (Interview 20170623163225).  
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On local procurement and subcontracting, the contract stated that the “contractor was to hire 
local sub-contractors as much as possible” (FDRE, 2012, p. xx). According to one official who 
was part of the project consultancy team for Adama 2:  
“There was a provision in the contract that a certain number of Ethiopian based 
companies were supposed to participate in Adama 2. But the majority of our Grade A 
contractors refused to participate because of the rate. The Chinese were complaining 
that they were too expensive” (Interview 20170811121252).  
Mugher cement131 was used for turbines foundation and other civil works. Some of the steel 
was sourced locally and some from China. The majority of machinery and equipment for 
construction purposes were sourced locally, with a small proportion imported from China. 
Goldwind manufactured and supplied the turbines and other equipment for Adama 1. SANY 
Group manufactured and supplied the turbines for Adama 2. SANY Group further supplied a 
SANY SCC4000 crawler crane and two 80-tonne truck cranes used for lifting the turbines. The 
SANY contract cost $108 million132 (SANY, n.d.). Sinotrans was involved in the ground 
transportation of the turbines from Djibouti port to project sites while ESLSE was responsible 
for sea transportation of Adama 2 wind turbines and other parts from China to Djibouti port. 
For Adama 1 both sea and inland transportation was handled by Sinotrans. The Ethiopian 
government had the technical capacity to transport the equipment through ESLSE; instead, 
the contract was given to the Chinese. For Adama 2, it became a heated issue, and after a 
series of negotiations between EEP and the contractor, the contract was later given to ESLSE. 
According to an official from ESLSE: 
“Ethiopia has nine ships which are designed for big cargo. We fought very hard. We 
could not allow the Chinese to do that, they did it on the Addis Ababa Light Railway 
equipment, industrial park equipment, but we said no on the wind farms. They wanted 
to take everything by themselves; we rejected that. We ended up getting the contract 
at $74 per freight tonne” (Interview 20171027565623).  
Similarly, an official from EEP further corroborates that it was not easy to reach this agreement 
with the Chinese:  
“The Chinese contractors wanted everything. Where we did not have the manpower 
and skills to undertake such work, we would allow them to use their fellow Chinese. 
Some of the things that the government refused was, for example, hiring a driver, and 
even lower grade staff. We refused that. That was the case also with the sea 
                                                          
131 Ethiopian government-owned. 
132 No information was provided for Goldwind contract.  
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transportation of the technology from China to Djibouti port. The Ethiopian government 
has an ESLSE which has the capacity to transport the technology. The contract was 
awarded to ESLSE after long debates and negotiations. In terms of land transportation, 
we did not have the capacity and the contract was then awarded Sinotrans logistics to 
transport the technology from port of Djibouti to the project site (Interview 
20170714094901). 
Another vital condition to highlight here is that all the project consultancy work was contracted 
to local universities: AAUIT for Adama 1 and MU-ASTU-JV for Adama 2. According to the 
Particular Conditions of the Contract for Adama 2: 
“The consultant will supervise the implementation of the project during the construction 
stage on behalf of the employer. The consultant and the employer will be responsible 
for review and no objection of detailed designs, testing procedures and certificates” 
(FDRE, 2012, p. xx).   
The local universities’ roles as project consultants were to supervise the construction of the 
projects, by administering the contract between EEP and HydroChina-CGCOC-JV and 
performing commissioning testing of the wind farms. In the case of Adama 1, there were 12 
members drawn from mechanical, electrical, and civil engineering departments (Interview 
20170626161007) (see figure 6.9). One team member from AAUIT reports that: 
“We always had some problems to discuss with the Chinese because they sometimes 
don’t do it properly. Part of the consultancy was to take corrective measures, to ask 
the Chinese to do it in the right way. If they do not do it the right way, we had to report 
to the owner” (Interview 20170620113822).  
The Ethiopian government saw the use of local universities as consultancies as a way of 
transferring skills and technical knowledge to Ethiopians, but the question of how those 
universities were selected is worth probing. According to AAUIT team member, “AAUIT was 
selected in the case of Adama 1 as a consultant because it was by then the only institution 
that had successfully researched design review of wind farms in the country” (Interview 
20170626161007). An official from MU explains that MU-ASTU-JV was selected for Adama 2 
because of MU previous experience with the Ashegoda wind farm. The government forged 
MU cooperation with ASTU “to improve local university linkage” (Interview 20170811121252). 
To efficiently coordinate the implementation of the two wind farms, the Ethiopian government 
set up project management institutions that directly engaged the Chinese counterparts. As 
such, EEP and the consultants (AAUIT; MU-ASTU-JV) set up Project Management Offices 
(PMO) (see figure 6.8 and 6.9). Similarly, HydroChina-CGCOC-JV created a Project 
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Management Committee which directly interacted with EEP and the consultancy’s PMOs (see 
figure 6.10).     
Figure 6. 8 Adama wind farms project management structure  
 
Adama wind farms project management office located within the EEP generation department 
 
Figure 6. 9 Adama wind farms project consultancy management structure  
 
Project consultants had their own offices which were further based on scope of work  
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Figure 6. 10 Contractor project management structure  
 
Source:  Chinese contractor Adama wind farms project management offices. Source. HydroChina, 2013 
6.4.6 Land acquisition issues  
Land for both Adama 1 and Adama 2 was acquired from Oromia regional government. The 
regional government issued a license which EEP and the contractor used to access the land. 
Several processes were undertaken before the land was released to the project office133. East 
Shoa Zone Agriculture office, Lume Woreda Agriculture office, Lume Woreda Land and 
Environmental Protection office, Adama Woreda Land and Environmental Protection office, 
Telde Kebele office, Jogo Kebele office, Kusaye Kebele office, Kechema Kebele office, Mukiye 
Kebele office and Adama City Land Administration Agency conducted the land use inventory. 
The valuation committee determined the compensation rate which was calculated based on 
the size and location of the farm, productivity (soil fertility status), and land use at the time of 
project implementation (FDRE, 2007). The Ethiopian government owns the land in Ethiopia 
as enshrined in article 40 section 3 and 4 of the constitution: 
“(3) The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all-natural resources, 
is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a common 
property of the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia. (4) Ethiopian peasants 
have right to […] protection against eviction from their possession” (FDRE, 1995).   
                                                          
133 Detailed explanation in chapter 7 
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However, regardless of the constitutional provision, the government retains the right to 
expropriate land with compensation for national development. The Expropriation of 
Landholdings for Public Purposes and Payment of Compensation Proclamation Number 
455/2005-part two section 3.1 states that:  
“A Woreda or an urban administration shall, upon payment in advance of 
compensation in accordance with this Proclamation, have the power to expropriate 
rural or urban landholdings for public purpose where it believes that it should be used 
for a better development project to be carried out by public entities, private investors, 
cooperative societies or other organs, or where such expropriation has been decided 
by the appropriate higher regional or federal government organ for the same purpose” 
(FDRE, 2005, p. 3126).  
To ensure a standardised land valuation and compensation, the Ethiopian Council of Ministers 
issued Payment of Compensation for Property Situated on Landholdings Expropriated for 
Public Purposes Regulation number 135/2007 (FDRE, 2007), shown in figure 6.12 below. Of 
interest is the contradiction between the constitutional provision and the regulation above, 
where on one hand landholders are supposed to be protected from eviction and on the other 
hand, national interest trumps individual rights.  
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Figure 6. 11 Compensation calculations  
 
 
Source: Compensation regulation135/2007 
At the background of these legalities, it is important to mention that the contractor was not 
directly involved in land acquisition negotiations. It was the responsibility of EEP in cooperation 
with the Oromia and local government stakeholders. Additionally, all compensation to farmers 
was handled by the EPP and money came from some of the 15% of the Ethiopian 
government’s contribution to the project's financing. Farmers whose land was taken were all 
compensated in cash.  
The Chinese were not directly involved in land acquisition and access negotiations because, 
as mentioned by a CGCOC official, land negotiations are a risk, and in Oromia, it is a sensitive 
issue. For the Chinese, it was best reserved for the Ethiopians to deal with each other. The 
official explains below:   
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“Dealing with local people will be more difficult. If I want to invest in the project, the 
farmer would say I want one million birr, but if EEP go, they will say according to the 
regulation we should pay you half a million” (Interview 20170801090344). 
The process of land acquisition for the two projects was not smooth as farmers initially did not 
want to lose their land134. The timing was bad because farmers were already looking forward 
to harvesting their crops. After a series of negotiations, the farmers later agreed to release the 
land on condition that all the compensation was paid first. The government delayed 
compensation and that created problems as alleged by CGCOC official, in case of Adama 2: 
“Land issue really a big headache. We needed their approval. The farmers, some of 
them not very friendly. We lose a lot of items during construction time, we lose steel, 
construction equipment during the construction period. They were stealing because 
we could not finish the compensation, you would put something aside, and tomorrow 
you could not find it. But towards the end of the project, a lot of items were found after 
the police started searching the houses of the farmers” (Interview 20170801090344). 
In the case of Adama 1, EEP official claims that:  
“The contractors were restricted to operate in certain designated area, temporary and 
permanent area. When they assemble their equipment and their heavy machinery for 
lifting the turbines and blades, they ended up affecting crops and land which was not 
compensated for and that created problems with the local farmers. They went to the 
extent of stopping the construction. The contractor could not provide money to 
compensate the affected area because that was not initially agreed on. The farmers 
took them to court. The Chinese did not know what to do. This happened for two times. 
We advised them to revise their plan for their requested need for land. They had to 
revise their drawing. Because we gave them the land according to the initial plan. It 
was revisited, and the local farmers were catered for. That was the main problem” 
(Interview 20170714094901). 
The Ethiopian government realised that allowing the Chinese to be involved in land acquisition 
and compensation was going to create a massive problem. Instead, the Ethiopian government 
took the responsibility. This demonstrates the ability of the government to take necessary 
control measures to ensure success of the projects timeous and efficiently. It portrays exercise 
of agency by the Ethiopian government.   
                                                          
134 Statistics for affected farmers and the compensation paid is discussed in chapter 7.   
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6.5 Chapter summary   
This chapter has discussed and analysed the engagement modalities and processes of 
negotiations between Ethiopian and Chinese actors in the financing and developing of Adama 
wind farms. Actions and choices made by the Ethiopian actors when interacting with the 
Chinese shows that context in which engagements occur matters. That said, the exercise of 
agency by the Ethiopians is highly relational. Below, I reflect on the areas where I feel the 
Ethiopian government exercised agency. While many studies treat Africans as not able to 
‘drive’, ‘own’ and ‘shape’ the engagements, be it in the form of negotiations, management and 
decision-making with China, the case studies of Adama wind farms shows a different story. 
Firstly, the Ethiopian government targeted to develop 200 MW of wind energy in the GTP 1. 
Consequently, Adama 1 (51 MW), Adama 2 (153 MW) and Ashegoda (120 MW) were all 
developed in this period. The total installed capacity of these three wind farms is 324 MW, 
which is more than the 200 MW initially planned. Following Fraser and Whitfield (2008), I argue 
that exercise of agency by the Ethiopian government should be understood within the context 
of ownership and degree of control over development priorities, project intervention and policy 
space. As explained by a MOWIE official: 
“The fact that these wind plants were chosen is actually an Ethiopia decision. We are 
collaborating with the Chinese government in many other areas, either roads, railways, 
or other infrastructure. But the selection and prioritisation of these projects is actually 
an Ethiopian initiative” (Interview 20171011140053). 
The fact that the Ethiopian government had control and influence in shaping the policy space 
(see figure 6.1) demonstrates control over the realm of decision making (Fraser & Whitfield, 
2008). Objectives and interests of the decision makers in Ethiopia, in particular, the Council of 
Ministers was to develop wind energy. This came out as planned, even more (324 MW vs the 
200 MW planned).  
Secondly, the Ethiopians exercised agency by brokering and initiating the engagements with 
the Chinese. Empirical evidence discussed in this chapter shows that for Adama 1, the 
Ethiopian government approached the Chinese for financial and technical assistance. For 
Adama 2, at an informal level, the Chinese approached EEP and MOWIE, but at the formal 
level, it was the Ethiopian government’s responsibility.    
Thirdly, the Ethiopian government was at least able to exercise agency when dealing with the 
Chinese using various and complex institutional structures as regulatory instruments. For 
example, all financially related negotiations between Ethiopia and China were handled by the 
Ethiopia-China Development Cooperation Directorate in MOFEC. MOWIE handled all energy 
policy and related regulatory aspects, and EEP handled all project implementation processes. 
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Project approval was given by the Council of Ministers which was exclusive to EPRDF 
members. The parliament ratified the agreements and Girma Wolde-Giorgis135 then issued 
Proclamations136. This created a network of institutions with which the Chinese were expected 
to negotiate. This suggests a concept of “institutional fixes” which create forms of 
‘enclaves’/parallel structures (Mohan & Lampert, 2013, p. 99) that are somehow accountable 
to the political elites (Corkin, 2015). It is not surprising that EEP—the Board of Directors was 
chaired by Dr Debretsion Gebremichael, the current President of Tigray region and executive 
committee member of TPLF/EPRDF137.   
Fourthly, the EPC contractual terms, project implementation, management, operations, and 
maintenance suggest how the Ethiopian government was able to influence the engagement’s 
direction. To begin with, the idea of going for an EPC plus financing arrangement shows 
strategic planning by the government. The two projects could have been delivered under any 
other model, but the Ethiopian government realised its weakness (finance, technical skills and 
capacity) and suggested an EPC model where risks were shifted to the contractor. By that 
same account, the total project cost presented in the financial offers and the final agreed figure 
shows a massive reduction, perhaps a discount which can be implicitly accredited to the 
negotiation capacity of the Ethiopian government. That said, the idea of using the same 
contractor, same financier (C-EXIM bank) on two different projects in capacity shows the 
Ethiopian government’s mitigation against donor commitment uncertainty, regulatory 
considerations and compliances.  
The EPC contractual terms, project implementation, management and operations were other 
fields where the Ethiopian government exercised agency. A case in point is the use of local 
universities as project consultants for the two wind farms. The government wanted to empower 
and create local university linkages in the wind energy sector. It is ordinarily unusual to use 
inexperienced local university professors as consultants. That said, the Ethiopian government 
wholly owns the two wind farms. To ensure maximum retention of control in the projects, the 
government instituted a limited O&M period for the contractor in both cases to allow local 
engineers and technicians to learn on the job. It is again unusual to have shorter O&M 
contracts in such massive infrastructure projects that require a high level of technical 
                                                          
135 Former President of Ethiopia from 8 October 2001 to 7 October 2013.  
136 For Adama 1, it was Proclamation No. 696/2010 Export Import Bank of China Credit Agreement to Provide Loan for Financing 
the Adama/Nazreth Wind Power Construction Project Ratification Proclamation; and for Adama 2 it was Proclamation No. 
795/2013 Export-Import Bank of China Loan Agreement for Financing the Adama Wind Power Construction Project (Phase II).  
137 The new chairman of the board of directors is Girma Birru who is a central committee member of the OPDO. Before the board 
of directors chairman was Debretsion Genremichael and the board members were Debebe Abera who by then served in the 
Prime Minister’s Office as a Minister; Ahmed Abetew (by then Minister of Industry), Dr Workeneh Gebeyehu by then Minister  of 
Transport), Brigadier General Kinfe Dagnew (by then General Director, METEC), Mekonnen Manayzewal (by then Commissioner 
of, National Planning), Adamu Ayana (by then State Ministery of Civil Service) Motuma Maqasa (from the Ministry of Water, 
Irrigation & Energy) and Amanuel Kiros (from National Intelligence and Security Service). 
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competence (Chen, 2018). There were also three project implementation and management 
offices which could be considered project ‘management fixes’ (one for EEP, one for 
Consultants and one for Contractor). In the case of Adama 2, the Ethiopian government 
rejected the Chinese proposition that sea transportation for Adama 2 was to be done by 
SinoTrans, a Chinese company. Instead, the job was given to ESLSE, which demonstrates 
the ability of the Ethiopian government to make demands even in tight corners (Lonsdale, 
2000). Local content and procurement were also enforced but only in circumstances where 
there was local capacity. A closer and critical analysis of the contractual terms and conditions 
as discussed above demonstrates exercise of agency by the Ethiopian government when 
dealing with the Chinese.  
Fifth and finally, at the very bottom layer of the interactions, farmers—non-state actors 
demonstrated agency when dealing with the Ethiopian government and the Chinese. Farmers 
initially resisted the release of land, stopped the construction, and later removed construction 
materials from Chinese construction sites when the Ethiopian government delayed payment 
of compensation. This demonstrates James Scott’s (1985) weapon of the weak ideas. Stealing 
was innovatively used as a way of making the Ethiopian government fulfil the compensation 
commitment. The equipment was later recovered. In a nutshell, Ethiopia-China engagements 
through the wind farms’ project lifecycles highlight pockets of agency by the Ethiopian 
government. It is therefore vital to understand the context in which the interactions occur.In 
the next chapter, I discuss the outcomes and local development impacts of the two wind farms. 
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Appendix 6. 1 Historical traces of Adama wind farms development in Ethiopia 
Year Event/Report/Activity Stakeholder/Actor Description of activity/Comment 
1965 Contributo Alla Climatologia Del Risultati E 
Tableu, Metyerorogiche E Pluviometriche’ 
Fantoli A Academic study to assess wind resource potential 
in Ethiopia (including Eritrea by then) 
1986 Ethiopian National Energy Commission 
Report  
Ethiopian National Energy 
Commission  
Academic study to assess wind resource potential 
in Ethiopia 
1988 Wind Energy Survey in Ethiopia W. Wolde-Ghiorgis Academic study to assess wind resource potential 
in Ethiopia. This considered the first generation 
research on commercial wind energy development 
in Ethiopia. 
1996 Assessment of solar and wind energy 
resources in Ethiopia II. Wind energy 
Mulugetta Y & Drake F  Academic study to assess wind resource potential 
in Ethiopia.    
2004 Solar and Wind Energy Resource 
Assessment (SWERA) 
FDRE (MOWIE, EEPCo), GIZ 
& UNEP 
Solar and Wind Energy Resource Assessment 
(SWERA) for Ethiopia completed in October 2004, 
funded by The German Aerospace Centre and 
UNEP. 
2006 Feasibility Study, Financial Proposal and 
Social and Environmental Impact 
Assessment for Wind Energy Potential in 
Ethiopia 
GIZ-TERNA, Lahmeyer 
International  
GIZ-TERNA conducted the Feasibility Study, 
Financial Proposal and Social and Environmental 
Impact Assessment for Wind Energy Potential in 
Ethiopia in 2006. 11 sites identified including 
Adama.  
 
ADAMA 1 
2007/8 Project initiation   Ethiopian government  Ethiopian government begins processes for the 
financing and construction for Adama wind farm. 
Chinese companies invited to send proposals and 
expression of interest. 
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2009 MOU for development of wind energy  MOWIE and MOFCOM Ethiopia signs an MOU with MOFCOM to develop 
Adama Wind farm 
2009 MOFCOM gives the contract to HydroChina MOFCOM & HydroChina  MOFCOM appoints HydroChina to undertake the 
project. It is unclear under which conditions was 
the contract given to HydroChina. Some accounts 
suggest HydroChina is the largest state-owned 
enterprise involved in the standardisation of wind 
technology in China. It has developed many wind 
projects in China and is believed to be more 
experienced. So, it could have been given the 
contract based on merit (Interview with 
HydroChina and CGCOC project management 
team for Adama 1 & 2 projects.)   
19/07/2009 Ethiopia proposes preferential buyer’s credit 
loan utilisation to MOFCOM 
MOFEC and MOFCOM  MOFEC proposed the preferential buyer’s credit 
loan utilisation projects’ list to MOFCOM, the list 
involved 7 projects more than $1 billion, including 
Adama and Mesobo-Harena.  
20/07/2009 MOU to establish financing and EPC contract EEP and HydroChina & 
CGCOC-JV 
MOU between Ethiopian and Chinese 
implementing institutions for Adama wind farm 
22/09/2009 Preliminary Agreement for Co-Financing and 
turnkey delivery of Adama & Mesobo-Herena 
EEP and HydroChina & 
CGCOC-JV 
Preliminary Agreement signed in which the actual 
contract was to be signed after fulfilment of 
requirements from both parties.  
2009 Goldwind Company contracted to supply 
wind turbines technology  
HydroChina—CGCOC-JV & 
Xinjiang Goldwind Company 
Goldwind Company sub-contracted by 
HydroChina-CGCOC-JV to supply and install the 
wind turbines 
2009 Feasibility Study HydroChina HydroChina conducted the study with the support 
of MOWIE and EEP using its subsidiary, Beijing 
Engineering Corporation.  
2009 ESIA  HydroChina with cooperation 
from MOWIE & EEP  
According to informants, the ESIA was conducted 
simultaneously with the feasibility study.  
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28/11/2009 Contract signing for implementing Ethiopian 
and Chinese institutions  
EEP and HydroChina & 
CGCOC-JV 
EPC plus financing contract signing between EEP 
and HydroChina-CGCOC-JV 
12/2010 Micro-siting and Final ESIA Report  HydroChina-CGCOC-JV  A technical study is detailing the actualisation and 
implementation of the project.  
21/01/2011 The Ethiopian Parliament & the Prime 
Minister approved the loan agreement; the E-
MFA sent its letter to C-EXIM Bank advising 
the approval of the Loan Agreement by the 
Government of Ethiopia 
Ethiopian Parliament, Ethiopian 
Prime Minister, E-MFA, C-EXIM 
Bank 
After the approval by the Ethiopian Council of 
Ministers, Parliament and Meles Zenawi, then 
Prime Minister, the Ethiopian government submits 
a loan of approval agreement to the C-EXIM Bank  
31/01/2011 MOFEC signed the on-lending Agreement 
with EEP 
MOFEC & EEP Necessary pre-requisite for the provision of a 
sovereign guarantee to the lender.  
25/05/2011 C-EXIM Bank approves the loan 
(Effectiveness of the Loan Agreement) 
C-EXIM Bank & MOFEC C-EXIM Bank informed the MOFEC for the 
Effectiveness of the Loan Agreement. 
2011 Contract of Agreement for Consultancy  EEP & AAUIT Signed between EEP and AAUIT to administer the 
contract between the Employer (EEP) and the 
Contractor (HydroChina-CGCOC-JV).  
06/2011 Construction begins (mobilisation of 
resources and the actual construction)   
Multiple stakeholders 
(Ethiopian and Chinese) 
Commencement of construction of the project  
01/09/2012 Project completion and commissioning  The Ethiopian government, 
HydroChina-CGCOC-JV and 
the Chinese government 
(Embassy & Consulate in Addis 
Ababa).  
Project completed and connected to the national 
grid 
 
ADAMA 2 
2009 MOU for development of wind energy  MOWIE & MOFCOM The Memorandum signed also covered future 
cooperation in wind energy development. So, the 
process is traced from the Adama 1 case.  
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2010/11 Project initiation processes begin Ethiopian government & 
HydroChina-CGCOC-JV 
While in Adama 1 it was the Ethiopian government 
that initiated the move, in this case, informants 
agree that it was HydroChina-CGCOC-JV that 
initiated the move. Of course, formalisation of the 
engagement was undertaken by the Ethiopian 
government.  
10/2011 Draft Master Plan of Wind and Solar Energy 
in Ethiopia 
Institute of Atmospheric Physics 
of the Chinese Academy of 
Science; MOFCOM; 
HydroChina & Beijing 
Engineering Corporation 
The first draft of the Master Plan for Wind and Solar 
Energy Development in Ethiopia. This was at the 
backdrop of HydroChina contracting of BEC which 
then sub-contracted the IAP of the Chinese 
Academy of Science to undertake the Solar and 
Wind Energy Master Plan for Ethiopia 
07/05/2011 MOU for Financing and Turnkey Delivery for 
Adama 2 
EEP & HydroChina—CGCOC-
JV 
MOU between EEP and HydroChina-CGCOC-JV 
for the financing and EPC contract 
07/2012 Master Plan of Wind and Solar Energy in 
Ethiopia (2 wind farm sites recommended 
(Adama 2 included) 
IAP of the Chinese Academy of 
Science; MOFCOM; 
HydroChina; BEC; MOWIE; 
MOFEC & EEP 
Final Report for Solar and Wind Energy Master 
Plan for Ethiopia in which 51 wind farm sites were 
identified for potential wind energy development 
11/10/2012 Contract signing  EEP & HydroChina-CGCOC-JV  EPC plus financing contract signing between EEP 
and HydroChina—CGCOC-JV  
10/2012 to 
06/2013 
Financial negotiations  MOFEC & Chinese EXIM Bank Financial negotiations between MOFEC and C-
EXIM Bank  
2013 Feasibility Study  HydroChina with the support of 
EEP, MOWIE, and CGCOC 
Unconfirmed reports suggest that Chinese state-
owned companies were given tenders to perform 
and design technical works of the turbines, 
geological surveying, e.g. Beijing Engineering 
Corporation. Other Chinese companies 
participated in the civil works and 
electromechanical works using HydroChina-
CGCOC cover without the notice of the EEPCo  
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The table above shows the historical traces of wind energy development in Ethiopia 
 
 
2013 ESIA   HydroChina-CGCOC-JV with 
the support of EEP & MOWIE 
and other Ethiopian 
stakeholders  
Study to conduct the environmental and social 
impact of the wind farm in the affected Woreda  
2013 SANY Group contracted to supply wind 
turbine technology for Adama 2 
HydroChina-CGCOC-JV  SANY to supply the wind turbine technology to be 
deployed in Adama 2 
2013 Agreement of Ocean Transportation of 
Adama 2 Equipment  
ESLSE; HydroChina-CGCOC-
JV and SINOTRANS LTD 
Agreement for ocean transportation of the 
equipment from China to Djibouti  
13/05/2013 Contract of Ocean Transportation of Adama 
2 Equipment  
ESLSE & HydroChina-CGCOC-
JV 
The contract for ocean transportation of the 
equipment from China to Djibouti 
2013 Contract of Agreement for Consultancy EEP; MU & ASTU  MU and ASTU employed by to administer the 
contract between EEP (the employer) and 
HydroChina-CGCOC-JV  
06/07/2013 Construction begins (mobilisation of 
resources and the actual construction)   
Multiple Ethiopian and Chinese 
stakeholders 
Commencement of the construction of the project 
18/05/2015 Project completion and commissioning  The Ethiopian government, 
HydroChina-CGCOC-JV and 
the Chinese government 
(Embassy & Consulate in Addis 
Ababa).  
Project completed and connected to the national 
grid 
180 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: INTERROGATING THE ENGAGEMENT OUTCOMES AND LOCAL 
DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS OF ADAMA WIND FARMS 
 
7.0 Introduction  
The outcomes and impacts of Chinese developed infrastructure projects in Africa is centre 
stage in academic, policy and media analysis. Researchers have paid attention to impacts of 
Chinese involvement in Africa’s trade sector (see Eisenman 2012; 2015), extractive sector 
(see Brautigam 2009; Taylor 2010), transport infrastructure (see Foster et al. 2008; Arewa 
2016) and mega hydropower projects (see Hwang, Brautigam, & Wang, 2015). However, 
engagement outcomes and development impacts of China’s role in financing and developing 
wind energy infrastructure in Africa let alone Ethiopia, are not well understood (Baker & Shen, 
2017; Chen, 2016; Shen & Power, 2017).   
This chapter examines the outcomes and local impacts of Ethiopia-China engagement in the 
financing and developing of Adama wind farms. Findings from this chapter are drawn from 
literature sources, technical document reviews and interviews conducted with Ethiopian and 
Chinese stakeholders involved in the projects. Due to limitations and unavailability of 
potentially quantifiable data regarding direct and indirect impacts and outcomes, the 
assessment is primarily based on qualitative accounts of those involved and affected by the 
projects. The chapter argues that given the multiplicity of social, economic and political actors 
involved in the wind farms, the outcomes and impacts are likewise multiple and variegated. 
The outcomes are experienced at the local and national level. At the local level, the impacts 
are on local job creation, skills and technology transfer, rural road infrastructure development 
and resultant forward and backward linkage to the rural economy in the respective 
communities during and after the construction of the wind farms. I further argue that ‘in the 
name of development’ peasant farmers experienced government facilitated land 
dispossession, which negatively impacted on the communities’ livelihood capabilities 
(Gebresenbet, 2016).  
At the national level, on the one hand, I argue that the engagement between Ethiopia and 
China in the wind farms contributes to the proliferation of new forms of cooperation and at the 
same time, generation of negative discourses that present Chinese domination in Ethiopia’s 
development trajectories (Crowen, 2018). The development of wind farms is also seen through 
the lenses of ‘debt trap’ diplomacy and the potential impacts on Ethiopia’s sovereignty. On the 
other hand, the wind farms have also ‘opened’ Ethiopia’s wind energy market and generated 
interest to international developers, which impacts on future wind energy project contracting 
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and delivery mechanisms138. To adequately capture these varied perspectives, the chapter is 
divided into three sections. The first section discusses outcomes and impacts at the local level, 
followed by a discussion at the national scale. The last and concluding section critically 
examines whether the engagement outcomes and impacts in the two wind farms directly 
reflect agential dimensions of the Ethiopian state and non-state actors or reflects the 
conditioning effect of Chinese capital.  
7.1 Development outcomes and impacts at the local scale 
From 2000 to about 2013, Ethiopia experienced annual economic growth of 9.5% second only 
to Angola in sub-Saharan Africa (World Economic Forum, 2016). Much of this growth has 
been happening at the margins of Addis Ababa, in the Zones and Woredas inhabited by 
communities whose livelihoods predominantly depends on subsistence agriculture. 
Development at the margins of Addis Ababa in this study relates to the interventions, whether 
private or public, that affects positively or negatively communities’ livelihood capabilities. The 
majority of these interventions at the margins have, however, been captured by transnational 
and domestic capital serving the interest of a few economic and political elites at the expense 
of the people for whom the interventions are allegedly targeted.  
7.1.1 The question of local employment and skills development 
The proliferation of Chinese enterprises and their operations in Africa has attracted a lot of 
international and local attention concerning their employment practices. In 2014, former 
American President, Barack Obama, advised African leaders that “make sure that if, China is 
putting in roads and bridges, […] that they are hiring African workers” (The Economist, 2014, 
p. x). Often, Chinese enterprises are accused of (i) bringing Chinese workers139, (see appendix 
4.6) (ii) paying low wages (iii) exploiting African workers and not providing good working and 
living conditions, and (iv) do not offer training and skills development for African employees 
(Xiaoyang, 2016). To the contrary, Sautman and Hairong (2015) researched over 400 Chinese 
companies in Africa and found that more than 85% of the workers are Africans. Similarly, a 
McKinsey and Company report further dispelled the view that Chinese companies only hire 
Chinese; of the more than 1000 Chinese companies surveyed, over 89% employed Africans 
(Sun et al., 2017). In the case of Ethiopia, do Chinese enterprises employ Ethiopians, and are 
they fairly remunerated? Schiller’s (2005) research on Ethiopia-China cooperation in the 
development of the Tekeze dam suggests that the Chinese enterprises imported Chinese 
labourers and engineers.  
                                                          
138 Independent Power Producer (IPP) model. 
139 Some accuse China of using prisoners in the infrastructure projects. See Chellaney, B. 2010. China's newest export: convicts. 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/jul/29/china-export-convict-labour 
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Research conducted by World Bank in 2011 shows that in the 69 Chinese companies 
surveyed in Ethiopia, there were 18,368 permanent, full-time workers of which 15, 910 were 
locals (World Bank, 2012). Monthly average salaries were 1,445 birr ($85) which is more than 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) international minimum wage140 of $57 per month 
(Ferreira & Sanchez-Paramo, 2017). 69% of the “surveyed Chinese companies provide[d] 
formal training programs for Ethiopian workers, whereas only 38% of domestic firms would 
invest in such programs” (World Bank, 2012, p. 12). Recent studies confirm that Chinese firms 
employ more Ethiopians than other foreign firms (Xiaoyang, 2016). For example, Schaefer 
and Oya (2019) shows that Chinese firms have a more than 90% workforce localisation rate 
in Ethiopia’s construction and light manufacturing sectors. In the construction sector, Schaefer 
and Oya (2019, pp. 30–32) notes that low skilled workers in Chinese firms are paid an average 
of ETB 1,503 ($65) per month while in other foreign firms, workers earn an average of ETB 
1,740 ($75) per month. In Ethiopian firms, workers earn an average of ETB 1,699 ($74) per 
month. For semi-skilled level in Chinese firms, workers earn an average of ETB 4,422 ($192) 
per month compared to ETB 6,175 ($268) in other foreign firms. In Ethiopian firms, semi-
skilled workers earn ETB 6,141 ($266)141. Evidence presented above suggest that Chinese 
slightly pay less than Ethiopian and other foreign firms in the construction sector in Ethiopia 
(Schaefer & Oya, 2019). Also, Chinese firms hire more local workers than Chinese expatriates 
in the construction sector. As such, claims made about Chinese enterprises employing more 
Chinese than Ethiopian workers does not hold water (Oya, 2018b). There are justifications for 
that. According to Xiaoyang (2016), it is more expensive to hire Chinese expatriates than 
locals in Ethiopia: 
“China-Africa Overseas Tannery reduced the number of Chinese technicians from 
thirty-three to twenty-three within one year, as local engineers were promoted to the 
positions of supervisor. Huajian shoe factory moved even faster. It started operation in 
January 2012 with over three hundred Chinese. By July 2012, local workers had 
already replaced approximately one hundred Chinese expatriates” (Xiaoyang, 2016, 
p. 111).  
On the Adama wind farms, several hundred Ethiopians were employed as unskilled, semi-
skilled, and skilled personnel142 (see appendices 7.1 to 7.11). For Adama 1 employment 
statistics reported in the project commissioning documents and the one obtained from the 
respective project management offices state that a total of 1100 personnel were employed out 
                                                          
140 Ethiopia does not have a minimum wage as compared to 90% of the ILO member states.  
141 $ 1 =ETB 23.08 in mid-2017.  
142 Cooking, excavations, concrete pouring, road construction, security guard and any other non-technical jobs as deemed 
necessary by the employer. 
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of which 800 were Ethiopians, and 300 were Chinese (see appendices 7.1 to 7.11 showing 
monthly employment statistics). The contractor in liaison with EEP hired all local employees, 
and all unskilled employees were from the Adama locality, and most were Oromos. The 
appendices depict the monthly distribution of employment statistics for Ethiopian and Chinese 
workers in Adama 1 per type of work. Ethiopians were hired more than the Chinese in Adama 
1. This dispels claims that Chinese enterprises tend to hire more Chinese than locals. 
However, as highlighted in appendices 7.1 to 7.11, management and related technical 
positions were dominated by Chinese. This is because foreign firms, including the Chinese, 
tend to place their expatriates in senior management positions citing absence of local skills 
and capacity as a justification. In the Adama wind farms, EEP and MOWIE officials who 
participated in this study agree that they have limited technical and management skills to 
occupy such positions. Figure 7.1 below shows Adama 1’s monthly distribution of Ethiopian 
and Chinese workers as a percentage. It shows that Ethiopian workers dominated the labour 
pool from the start of the project in August 2011 to the end in August 2012. Also, the number 
of Chinese workers decreased towards the end of the project, and by August 2012, only 17% 
of the total workforce were Chinese while the rest were Ethiopians. Towards the end of the 
construction period, few Chinese technical staff were required, and this explains the decrease 
from June-July to August 2012. The peak percentage proportion of Ethiopian workers was 
recorded in June-July at 84% and for Chinese in March, April-May at 31%.  
Figure 7. 1 Adama 1 monthly distribution of Ethiopian vs Chinese workers (%)  
 
Source: Adama 1 Employment Statistics Report   
For Adama 2 no comparable staffing data was available during the time of fieldwork. However, 
the project commission report obtained from MOWIE suggests that of the total labour force, 
1200 were Ethiopians, and 280 were expatriates. However, the figure for foreign workers does 
not tally with data obtained from other sources. According to one EEP official: 
76 74 77 77 72 73
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“1200 local people were employed, which were majority unskilled, accounted for more 
than 90% of the total labour. 300 people came from China, 5 from Germany. Women 
were involved in soft work, such as cleaning, surveying, and cooking. Women were 
about 305 of the total workforce during the peak time of the project construction. 
Chinese workers brought their cookers, especially women. There were also translators 
who were involved in the project. During the Operations and Maintenance period, there 
are about 45 Ethiopian engineers and 12 Chinese engineers” (Interview 
20170623163225).  
Local farmers benefited during the construction of the projects. Some were employed as 
manual labourers and some as security guards. For Adama 1, there are currently 34 security 
personnel guarding the turbines143 (Interview 20170714094901). Farmers explain their 
feelings about employment experience at Adama wind farms:  
“It was a great experience, I was never in any level of workforce before, but I was a 
cooker there. I used to cook food and feed workers around the project” (Interview 
201711021212240 translated from Afaan Oromo to English).  
“I am still working as a guard on the wind farms and the experience is something good 
for me to make money” (Interview 20171101130419 translated from Afaan Oromo to 
English). 
“Even that time I was making a few hundred Birr, but it was not that much, but it helped 
here and there” (Interview 20171101130419 translated from Afaan Oromo to English).  
While many farmers were happy due to employment creation, some were not with regards to 
the overall benefit, compensation for land and the public consultation processes (I revisit this 
in the next section). Some farmers complained that the salary was not enough. For unskilled 
workers, the salary range was from ETB 600 ($34.6) to ETB 1000 ($57.73) per month144. As 
noted by an EEP official: 
“In terms of employment rights and right to complain, not to say that the Chinese were 
very abusive and did not treat Ethiopian workers well, but many people were looking 
for employment at the time and even up to now. That limited their bargaining power 
because the Chinese could look for other people to work for them. Those who were 
employed could not stand a chance to strike or disagree with the remuneration. That 
gave them a disadvantage. Local job creation was relatively poor and was not as it had 
been expected by the government. This was because the government was not able to 
                                                          
143 No data is provided for Adama 2 
144 Using December 2011 exchange rate of ETB 17.3204/$1 
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meaningfully control the Chinese, especially at the early stages, the Chinese would 
bring a driver or other lower grade staff. It was only in the 6th or 7th month that the 
government woke up and started protesting other things” (Interview 20170714094901). 
As shown in the excerpts above, the Ethiopian government was not happy about how local 
jobs were created in the case of Adama 1. At the same time, workers were not happy with the 
salary they received from the Chinese, but they were not at liberty to ask for more. In Ethiopia, 
hundreds of youth are looking for the same job, which generates a lot of competition (Oya, 
2018a). This, therefore, confirms widely held perceptions that the Chinese tend to underpay 
African (Ethiopia) workers in relation to what they pay fellow Chinese (Fei, 2018). It was noted 
by an official from EEP that: 
“In terms of salary, you will find that the Chinese will earn double for the same work 
that was being done by local engineers. The accommodation was same, although the 
working and living conditions were better for locals than the Chinese. EEP employees 
could get overtime, not sure if that was the same arrangement with the Chinese. 
Ethiopian workers also had holiday allowances.” (Interview 20180120178596). 
Figure 7. 2 Employment statistics for Adama 1 & 2 
 
Source: Employment Statistics Report.   
Several explanations exist on how Ethiopia was able to control the amount of Chinese and 
foreign expats involved in the two wind farms. The Ethiopian government has always enforced 
localisation in the context of Chinese enterprises’ operations. The Labour Proclamation 
Number 377/2003, 174 (1), (2) and (3) clearly states that the foreigners work permit is for three 
years and is annually renewed at the subjective discretion of the Ministry of Labour (FDRE, 
2004). Some Chinese officials from CGCOC mentioned that it was difficult to obtain work 
permits and resident cards. However, officials from EIC argued to the contrary, suggesting 
that those that faced difficulties was because they breached labour regulations, particularly 
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having a higher proportion of foreign workers to locals. Accordingly, EIC would not renew work 
permit and resident cards of their Chinese workers (Interview 20170613100147). Just as noted 
by an EIC official: 
“We permit foreigners to stay only for 3 years to the maximum. There was a case you 
will find 10 Ethiopians and 10 Chinese proportional, it was simple, we will not renew 
permits for the Chinese. By the way, work permits are renewed on annual basis. So, 
we will see their data if they are complying to the rules and regulations. But the 
maximum is 3 years unless is a manager, supervisor. We are pushing always to 
employ the locals. If the numbers of foreigners are very high, we tell them to reduce 
and employ more locals. They are also very good to take action when you tell them, 
the managers are good, they are not opposing, immediately, they will take corrective 
action” (Interview 20170613100147). 
The Ethiopian government demonstrates agency by using the Labour Proclamation to regulate 
foreign workers. It should be noted that besides the use of regulation by the Ethiopians, it is 
also becoming expensive for Chinese enterprises to hire foreigners. At the same time, due to 
international pressure and media scrutiny levelled against the Chinese, more locals are being 
hired to water-down the allegations (Fei, 2018; Oya, 2018b).   
7.1.2 Rural economic development? Forward and backward linkages  
Both Ethiopian and Chinese officials celebrate the construction of Adama wind farms as 
having contributed to rural economic development in Mukiye, Bubisa, Qachema, Kobolito, 
Sere-robi, Jogo Gudedo, Tede-dildima, and Mele-mele Kebeles during and after the 
construction period. According to information obtained from EEP for Adama 1, the road 
construction was about 13-14km, and most of the roads are for accessing the turbines. A 
significant proportion of the roads already existed, but they were rehabilitated. CGCOC 
constructed all roads and undertook civil engineering for the wind farms. As such, no local 
companies were involved in Adama 1(Interview 20170714094901). In Adama 2, 65km of new 
roads were constructed and an additional 2.5 km old tarred road was rehabilitated to connect 
the plant control office with the main road to Adama city. Unlike Adama 1, Adama 2 road 
construction was sub-contracted to local companies. An official from EEP commented that 
road construction:  
“Was given on the basis of packages, 5km for one contractor, then the other 5km to 
another contractor to ensure speedy construction. One contract would start the 
construction from point A to point B and another contractor from Point C to B at the 
same time. Some of the materials for road construction were sourced from the local 
supplies such as Mugher cement, steel and sand. And even some of the machinery 
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and equipment which was used were also rented from local contractors” (Interview 
20170623163225). 
A Chinese employee confirms that local contractors were employed to undertake some of the 
civil works:  
“We also gave a small job to Teclabrahan Ambaye Construction, they can do the civil 
works. But for installation, they could not do, because you need a special crane to lift 
the items. By that time, they did not have experience to do such kind of work” (Interview 
20170801090344). 
Construction of roads has brought benefits to the communities. Farmers relay that the roads 
have connected villages making commuting more efficient and remote places accessible, as 
captured in the following accounts by community members:   
“Road construction is a benefit that we got from the construction of these projects. We 
used to walk to buy food, now they can use Bajaj and the pregnant women can be 
transported very easily to the clinic” (Interview 20171101100610 translated from Afaan 
Oromo to English). 
“The road construction was a big positive development for the community. Now we 
have buses that go from Mukiye Haro to Adama. Before, people used to walk or use 
some scotch cart which would take longer. Now it is quicker” (Interview 
20171101112931 translated from Afaan Oromo to English). 
“The road construction is making our life easier to go to the town, access health 
facilities and other amenities. It used to take us long to reach a hospital. But now it is 
way quicker. You see, there are Bajaj’s around. Before, there was none” (Interview 
20171101123146 translated from Afaan Oromo to English). 
The excerpts show that road infrastructure is facilitating the social and economic fabric of 
communities. It takes less time to travel from one village to the other. Furthermore, the road 
network has generated indirect employment to Bajaj drivers because there are new routes 
between the communities. However, some farmers are critical of the associated benefits that 
came with the construction of the roads. For example, one farmer argues that:   
“The tarred road from that side did not come because of the two projects; this was 
already here way long before the two projects. But this one, on the other side, was built 
by them, as an access road to their offices here, and not for community benefit. So, 
the roads are saving their interests” (Interview 20171102115957 translated from Afaan 
Oromo to English).    
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Some farmers criticise the shoddy workmanship of the Chinese road construction. Not being 
aware that the roads for Adama 2 were subcontracted to local engineers, one farmer vents 
his disgruntlement at the Chinese: 
“The road construction did not factor in the drainage system. The farmland is eroded 
during the rainy season. It makes me feel sad, but the problem is that no one will listen 
to you. I am not powerful. The Chinese, when designing and building the road, they 
should have at least put some drainage system on the sideways so that water would 
drain properly. But that was not the case. You see the terrain is slope, this side of the 
road will wash away this part of the field when it is raining. This affects crops. The 
escarpment is widening now. It did not start like this. But year and year, it is growing 
bigger and bigger” (Interview 20171101115937 translated from Afaan Oromo to 
English). 
Aside from road construction and employment creation, some community members reported 
that they benefited from their small business enterprises. For example, a community member 
supplied about 200 to 300 kgs of steel that was used in some of the civil works for Adama 2. 
He was awarded that contract because, according to him, he used to stay closer to the 
construction site and also served as a professional welder during the construction of wind 
turbine generation (WTGs) foundation (Interview 20171101140944 translated from Afaan 
Oromo to English). A retail shop owner also experienced a temporary boom in sales during 
the construction period of the wind farms.   
“The project also brought positive results for my small business. During the 
construction period, I had to open a bigger restaurant and Draft House to cater for 
physical labourers who were working in the projects. After work, the majority of 
Chinese and Ethiopian workers would come here and drink beer and dance to music. 
That generated much profit for my business. In those three years, the business was 
equivalent to 10 years’ worth of business operations. I had the supermarket before, but 
the difference is that the operations during the time of project construction significantly 
increased.” (Interview 20171101112931 translated from Afaan Oromo to English). 
The question of whether the communities benefited in the development of the two wind farms 
remains contested. For some farmers, it led to reduced travel time to access social facilities, 
but for other roads were created only to serve access to the turbines and not for community 
development. These roads raise questions of whether they should be interpreted as 
development or disruption (Blaser, 2004). A closer look in particular at the farmer whose plot 
of land was affected by poor road drainage could potentially imply that he is not in opposition 
to the road, but simply demanding a degree of influence on how that road was supposed to 
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be built in the first place, especially as it affected his farm. Other farmers near the wind farms 
lament that there is nothing beneficial from these wind farms, “people around here have 
nothing, we live close to the wind farms. Still, we are not connected to the electricity” (Interview 
20171102111348 translated from Afaan Oromo to English). Some farmers argue that they did 
not demand those wind farms, and that all they want from the government is water, roads, 
health and educational facilities (Interview 20171101112931 translated from Afaan Oromo to 
English). This shows two divergent worldviews on development where on the one hand, the 
government is obsessed with infrastructure growth trajectories (Altvater, 2002) and on the 
other hand, citizens call for inclusive, and people-oriented interventions that do not necessarily 
threaten their livelihood capabilities (Bond & Mayekiso, 1996).  
7.1.3 Accumulation by dispossession: land and compensation question  
Access to land for the development of the two wind farms was considered one of the most 
challenging processes by Ethiopian government officials and TPLF-EPRDF politicians. As 
noted by a TPLF-EPRDF executive committee member: 
“Nobody want to give you land. You have to make them understand that this is a very 
important project. It is necessary for the development and development is also good 
for them; it will alleviate them from poverty” (Interview 20170512172020).  
Although land belongs to the federal state, the regional states are the custodians and land for 
any infrastructure project must be approved and allocated by the regional state. In this 
equation, farmers retain the usufruct rights. This legislative framework has created an 
ambiguous land tenure system at least from the perspective of the farmers “regarding the 
authority of state and non-state actors and the implications […] [for] land rights of ‘indigenous’ 
inhabitants” (Lavers, 2018, p. 463) and equally for broader land administration aspects.   
Table 7. 1 Land tenure system in Ethiopia 
Descriptor  State Ownership Ethnic Federalism  Neo-customary 
tenure 
Authority over land  Federal 
government  
Regional 
government 
Neo-customary 
leaders 
Territorial 
jurisdiction  
National Regional Local  
Citizenship principle  National Ethnicity  Members of a clan  
Source: Adapted and slightly modified from (Lavers, 2018) 
190 
 
Meanwhile, decisions over land allocation for infrastructure development are left to the Council 
of Ministers which is exclusively composed of the EPRDF Council representatives. As per the 
federal government principle of revolutionary democracy and democratic centralism, decisions 
reached by the EPRDF council are binding to the Congress and members of the coalition. As 
argued by a lecturer at AAU, land allocation for the development of the two wind farms was 
decided upon at the Council level, passed on to the Oromia regional state to action the 
directive. OPDO (now ODP) the ruling party from Oromia regional government is therefore 
bound by the EPRDF Council agreement as part of the ruling coalition. In turn, the regional 
government will extend the same directive to the zonal administration, then to the Woreda and 
finally to the Kebele level (Interview 20170802142852). He further argues that:  
“EPRDF claims to be the vanguard party to the respective four parties. Everything is 
synchronised, so the opposition is nearly dissolved and there will not be any resistance 
to projects. Once it is decided at the level of Council, federal institutions, regions and 
the regional political parties should adhere to them” (Interview 20170802142852). 
The excerpt reveals a top-down approach when it comes to a decision making with regards to 
land acquisition for infrastructure projects in Ethiopia. Farmers have the user rights and are at 
the bottom of the decision-making hierarchy with regards to land acquisition for infrastructure 
projects. It is not surprising that some of the grievances that Oromo protesters had from late 
2016 stem from the land question. A closer look at this suggests a discrepancy between what 
government officials at the top of the hierarchy consider as citizen engagement in the 
development process. It appears that there is an ‘official/public narrative’ and unofficial, 
‘hidden transcripts’ (Scott, 1990) with regards to land acquisition for infrastructure 
development in Ethiopia. While there is a clear procedure on what needs to be done to acquire 
land, farmers appear to be missing in the decision-making equation. In this case, farmers are 
seen merely as recipients of development but do not have a say regarding shaping what, how, 
why, when, and which ideas of the intervention. This shows that Ethiopian non-state actors, 
in this regard, farmers, have limited space to exercise agency because of the government’s 
tight control on the planning and project execution process. This comes from the authoritarian 
approach to development adopted by the Ethiopian government.   
The procedures for land expropriation as set out in the Payment of Compensation for Property 
Situated on Landholdings Expropriated for Public Purposes are as follows (see figure 7.3). 
First, it involves liaising with the community leadership to pave the way for the rest of the 
community involvement. The second stage relates to officials from EEP together with local 
Woreda and Kebele administration undertaking a property inventory. This marks the 
commencement of consultations. The third step is the development of a compensation 
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proposal. The fourth stage is the actual negotiations. The negotiation process is the most 
challenging stage as there is a crisis of expectation where, in most cases, government officials 
would promise things they will not be able to fulfil merely to get agreement. For example, one 
farmer notes that “the government used to make promises that our communities are going to 
be electrified and we are going to have running water and hospitals, but still today, we have 
nothing” (Interview 20171101130419 translated from Afaan Oromo to English). It is also at this 
stage that government officials enter a marriage of convenience with the local Woreda, Kebele 
and community leaders who will influence fellow community members to accept the 
government proposals. Community leaders here are indirectly ‘forced’ to comply in order to 
safeguard their leadership positions. One community leader relays his role here, playing the 
government advocate role: 
“The greatest problem I encountered is changing people’s mentality, convincing people 
to leave their land. People sometimes were talking about petrol bombs, stupid 
mentality, and they think that wind farms belong to the Chinese property. So, they were 
trying to show the Chinese that this is Ethiopia” (Interview 20171101100610 translated 
from Afaan Oromo to English).  
The fifth step was reaching an agreement, followed by preparation of agreement documents. 
The sixth step was the acquisition and compensation followed by the last step, which is the 
registration of Buyers Rights (Interview 20170623163225).  
Figure 7. 3 Land acquisition process for Adama wind farms 
 
Source: Fieldwork  
 
Table 7. 2 Adama wind farms affected households and compensation issues 
ADAMA 1 
 Woreda Kebele* Households 
affected 
Land size** 
affected 
Compensation 
Adama - 12 2.32 Ha  
 
 
 
 
2 322 819.30 
Birr*** 
Lome/Lume - 10 0.6 Ha 
Adama 
Municipality 
 
- 
 
105 
14.19 Ha 
 
Total  2 Woredas & 
1 Municipality 
- 127 households 17.101 Ha 
ADAMA 2 
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 Adama Mukiye 92 households (71 
males & 21 
females) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53.7 Ha 
(temporary) 
 
& 
72.30 Ha 
(permanent) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 503 971.20 
Birr*** 
Bubisa Kusaye 377 households 
(289 males & 88 
females) 
Qachema 108 households (78 
males & 23 
females) 
Kobolito 68 households (52 
males & 16 
females) 
Sere-robi 40 households (35 
males & 5 females) 
Lome/Lume Jogo-Gudedo 178 households 
137 males & 41 
females) 
Tede-dildima 170 households 
(130 males & 40 
females) 
Mele-mele 174 households 
(133 males & 41 
females) 
Total 2 Woredas 8 Kebeles 1200 households 128 Ha**** 
Source: Fieldwork. *For Adama 1, no information is provided at the Kebele level with regards to land 
size affected aside from aggregate data at the Woreda level. **Land size in the case of Adama 1 shows 
only permanent affected land. ***There is huge difference regarding the total amount paid for 
compensation not only between the Ethiopian and Chinese sources but also among the Ethiopian 
sources. For example, according to the Chinese sources, 20 million Birr was paid for compensation for 
Adama 1 and 100 million Birr for Adama 2. In the context of other Ethiopian sources, data obtained from 
officials involved suggest 36 000 000 Birr was the total compensation for both temporary and permanent 
land, woodlands, and trees. This is different from the figure presented in the ESIA Report for Adama 2 
which claims that the total cost of implementing the ESIA mitigation, management and monitoring was 
US$899 250 (which is equivalent to 16 918 400 Birr as at October 2013). Although the margin is still 
significant, the amount presented in the ESIA report is closer to the data presented in the table. ****This 
figure only shows land use for construction.  
Table 7.2 above shows the distribution of land required for construction of the two wind farms, 
the number of households that were affected and the compensation that was paid out. 
Importantly, while EEP, MOWIE and local administration purport that the compensation was 
sufficient, farmers were not happy with the rate. Official data regarding the compensation rate 
was hard to come by. Nonetheless, unofficial claims are awash. For example, a local 
administrator claims a compensation rate between 41 and 43 birr per square metre was used 
(Interview 20171117055623). An Adama City, Land Management and Development Agency 
official suggests that the compensation of land was around 225 000 to 280 000 Birr per 1 
hectare in 2012-2013 (Interview 20171117055562). The Adama 2 feasibility studies report 
further suggest that the compensation rate was 8000 birr per hectare (HydroChina 
Corporation, 2013). With all these discrepancies, it becomes equally difficult to tell the exact 
compensation rate and respondents from EEP did not disclose the compensation rate. The 
fact that there are various claims between and among Ethiopian and Chinese stakeholders on 
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revealing the actual land and compensation statistics could be interpreted as a strategy to 
perhaps create confusion especially in the wake of discontentment by farmers on the 
compensation rate. The government further create a narrative which suggests that there were 
no problems related to compensation in the two wind farms, as conveyed by an EEP official:  
“All the farmers who were affected were compensated, there were no problems which 
were recorded during the compensation period when undertaking construction” 
(Interview 201711150212123). 
The same narrative is relayed by an E-MFA official:   
“Development of wind farms, in general, does not impact in terms of compensation, 
relocation or resettlement. The two wind farms have a lesser environmental damage 
and issues of resettlement; they are limited public and civil society resistance to these” 
(Interview 20171027105200).   
While Ethiopian government officials provide a narrative that glorifies the process, many 
farmers and even some of the officials from the government countered the ‘official’ narrative. 
As noted by one EEP official:   
“We had big challenges with regards to obtaining land from the farmers. They blocked 
construction process. It even delayed the project schedule. There were two groups of 
farmers. Some accepted to leave their farmlands and give it to us before the 
government released the compensation. But some refused and said we would release 
the farms once the government had paid us the money. We finally managed to get 
things done after the local administration structures intervened. Local authorities 
convinced and gave orientation to landowners to permit construction first and be paid 
compensation at a later time when the payment process is ready” (Interview 
20170714094901). 
The excerpt shows that the farmers did not trust the government on aspects of compensation. 
In addition to the compensation rate being low (Interview 20170731110952), a further delay 
was unacceptable by the farmers. This illustration shows that people at the margins of 
development are not anti-development or do not want infrastructure but are not comfortable 
in the way development interventions are delivered. For a local administrator, “the 
compensation was not good; the compensation was supposed to reflect the market dynamics” 
(Interview 20171102111348 translated from Afaan Oromo to English). 
Several farmers lamented the compensation process:   
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“My plot of land was taken away, but the compensation I received was not sufficient. 
Even though it was done for national interest and not individual benefit, but when they 
take such a large piece of land which my family has been surviving on, a source of 
livelihood for my children, then the government needs to give me something that 
ensures I am able to survive when I had the piece of land” (Interview 20171102124808 
translated from Afaan Oromo to English). 
“About 70 to 100 meters of my land was taken to develop the wind farms. The 
compensation was inadequate. It was painful. I agreed for the compensation. If I knew 
that it was that much, I would have refused the money. I attempted to resist, but I was 
not successful. I tried that with Kebele administration as well as people from Adama 
Land Management and Development Agency who were involved in measuring and 
assessing the land; I was not successful. The issue was not the Chinese, but the 
Ethiopians” (Interview 20171101115937 translated from Afaan Oromo to English). 
The majority of farmers who lost their land were compensated with cash, and many of them 
were overwhelmed by receiving those sums of money at once. As noted by an official from 
the Adama City Land Management and Development Agency, Adama based farmers have a 
different lifestyle; they do not have the necessary skills to run small business aside from 
farming. It became a significant source of dissatisfaction and eventually a mental challenge 
for some farmers who had become jobless and had misused all the money received for 
compensation (Interview 20171117055562). However, some farmers, “benefited a lot because 
they were compensated very good and most of them bought Bajaj, and other went to buy 
houses in town” (Interview 20171101140944 translated from Afaan Oromo to English).  
While the ‘public transcript’ claims that there was no resettlement, I came across one farmer 
whose house was demolished to make space for the pylon for the electricity transmission line. 
One local administrator rejected the official narrative and directed me to the resettled farmer. 
Initially, the resettled farmer did not want to talk to me because he thought I was sent by the 
authorities. After careful negotiations, he told me his story:  
“My house was demolished. They wanted to put a pylon for a transmission line. I sold 
my oxen to build a second house, and it took me five years. They gave me 100 000 
birr for compensation only. It took them a night to destroy this house. I was promised 
piece of land in town as a replacement on top of the compensation. Until now, nothing 
has so far been received together with the property that was inside. I am very angry, 
but there is nothing I can do about that. Also, they demolition the fence and the trees I 
used for charcoal to generate income” (Interview 201711150245153 translated from 
Afaan Oromo to English).  
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Although the farmers whose land was taken were compensated, the majority were not happy 
with the compensation rate, but they were not powerful enough to resist or reject the 
government offer. This signifies government-facilitated accumulation by dispossession. As 
noted by Harvey (2004, p. 64), the government facilitated accumulation by dispossession 
relates broadly to “temporal displacement through investment in long-term capital projects […], 
spatial displacements through opening up new markets, new production capacities and new 
resource”. This results in peasant farmers being expelled from their land and suppression of 
their rights in the name of development, creating new forms of domination, subordination and 
equally resistance by the dispossessed and displaced. Blockage of construction, stealing of 
the construction materials, and blockage of the roads and the farmlands during the 
construction of the two wind farms should, therefore, be interpreted as a demonstration of 
resistance by the weak against the government (Scott, 1985).   
Since the government had to facilitate this accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2004), it 
is not surprising that even the public consultation process was done only to tick the boxes and 
not fully engage with the affected communities before the commencement of the construction 
of the wind farms. This raises important questions on the citizen and civil society engagement 
in development matters. As alluded to by two civil society organisations interviewed for this 
study, Ethiopia’s developmental state model closes the gap for citizen and civil society 
engagement in matters of national development (Interview 20170615113129; 
20178025141733). The Proclamation for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and 
Societies 621/2009 introduced restrictions on civil society organisations in which only NGOs 
that received 90% of their budget from domestic sources were the ones allowed to undertake 
advocacy work related to human rights, democracy, equality, conflict resolution, peace and 
justice. Meanwhile, many domestic NGOs could not operate given their reliance on foreign 
donations. This eliminated the civil society voice in Ethiopia, creating a state hegemony on 
matters of advocacy, transparency and lobbying in development issues (Brechenmacher, 
2017).  
7.2 Development outcomes and impacts at the national scale  
7.2.1 Skills, knowledge and technology transfer 
Skills, knowledge and technology transfer is one of the domains in Africa-China infrastructure 
development cooperation that has been critically scrutinised (Auffray & Fu, 2015; Chen & 
Landry, 2018; Li, 2016). This domain is awash with claims and narratives that blame the 
Chinese enterprises for not properly transferring essential skills and knowledge significant for 
the realisation of sustainable structural transformation in Africa (Elu & Price, 2010; Patroba, 
2012). Importantly, skills and technology transfer are not inherently a technical issue which is 
left to technical fixes; it is undoubtedly political. It is a political process which “includes crucial 
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issues on decision-making regarding the type of technology that is transferred, who is granted 
access to the decision-making process, and who benefits from the new technology” 
(Hensengerth, 2018, p. 499). Skills and technology transfer enter the social, economic, 
political and cultural environment at different levels which are governed and mediated by rules 
and norms. As such, various stakeholders harbour different interests with regards to skills and 
technology transfer.  
Both Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind farms were delivered under the EPC plus financing scheme. 
As such, access to Chinese financing allowed the transfer of wind energy technology and 
construction of the wind farms, which was otherwise not going to be possible without the 
financing. This contractual arrangement implied that the Chinese contractor undertook project 
engineering, design, procurement and construction services. As a result, the technology was 
imported as finished capital goods from China, leaving no or limited room for an Ethiopian 
wind energy industry to emerge. The Ethiopian government allowed the importation of finished 
capital goods from China for two main reasons. First, it was the contractual arrangement of 
the concessional lending and, second, Ethiopia does not have a domestic wind energy sector 
with capabilities to engineer and design wind turbines. A high-level MOWIE official confirmed 
that “all the local input was pretty limited to civil works that is to access roads, foundation and 
probably the supply of some materials like, iron road and steel and cement” (Interview 
20171011140053). Therefore, the transfer of technology created limited local supply chain 
linkages and opportunities for local value chain development (Chen, 2018).  
Technical skills and knowledge were transferred from the Chinese contractors to the local 
engineers, technicians and other personnel who were involved in the construction of Adama 
wind farms. For Adama 1, twenty-five145 and for Adama 2, thirty (23 technicians and 7 
engineers) EEP employees received theoretical training in China for one month and onsite 
training during the construction period. The theoretical training was on wind turbine generation 
system (tower and transformer manufacturing; wind turbine generator manufacturing; wind 
turbine generator transportation and installation; and wind park maintenance practices). The 
onsite training was mainly given to EEP officials from the National Grid Control Centre, 
Operations and Maintenance and Construction Departments.   
Regarding the quality of the training and skills transfer, there were mixed narratives. For 
example, an EEP employee involved in Adama 1 argued that:   
“Training was done using the translation, which had its challenges. The language 
became a barrier. Goldwind was sub-contracted to supply the technology, did not want 
                                                          
145 Some further accounts suggest that besides the 25 EEP employees who were trained in China and on-site, additional 30 
engineers were further trained in China (see Chen, 2018).  
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to bring the Ethiopians closer to them, and they were very reserved in transferring 
knowledge and skills to the Ethiopian engineers. I think there was a limited transfer of 
skills and knowledge. Maybe they were protecting their design and company 
intellectual property rights, and they were not willing to disclose some of the information 
to Ethiopian engineers. But when I ask why they were not keeping the Ethiopian 
engineers close during the installation period, they would often say that it is for health 
and safety reasons. The reasoning was not convincing. So, technology transfer; yes, 
but skills and knowledge was very poor. But if you talk to the top management, they 
will not tell you this. They will say everything went well” (Interview 20170714094901).  
A MOWIE official disagrees with the views presented above:  
“In terms of skill transfer, they [Chinese] might be in a better position. One thing which 
is recurrent is the linguistic barrier. Some good technicians running some part of those 
wind technologies may not be English speakers. You always have to translate, that is 
a significant barrier in negotiation or later on during operation and maintenance. I do 
not see any unusual desire by Chinese to maintain it as secrets. We are doing business 
with West technologies that is quite common. So, I haven’t seen any other companies 
doing better than what the Chinese have done, honestly speaking” (Interview 
20171011140053).  
The majority of the participants for this study agreed that the skills and knowledge transfer 
were weak in the Adama wind farms. An EEP employee involved in the day to day operations 
of the Adama 2 argued that while the Chinese contributed to skills and knowledge transfer to 
Ethiopians, it was not ‘enough’ and was not ‘perfect’ (Interview 201711150212123). Also, an 
Adama 1 consultant team member suggests that “the Chinese did not transfer sufficient 
technology for maintenance and operations, it is better to train technicians who will be 
internationally certified” (Interview 20170626161007).  
However, an Adama 2 project consultant team member argued that the question should be 
on how much capacity and capability has the EEP and MOWIE acquired to the extent that 
they can develop their wind farms without outside technical help? He argued that “in terms of 
skills and knowledge, it takes a lot of time of learning and I do not think in these three projects 
we are ready enough” (Interview 20170811121252). This argument is consistent across some 
of the EEP and MOWIE employees that Ethiopia has now improved its technical knowledge 
and skills because of developing the Adama and Ashegoda wind farms, but that does not 
imply they are capable of engineering, designing and constructing a wind farm on their own. 
For example, a former EEP official noted that: 
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“Ethiopia cannot develop their own wind farms on their own because construction of 
such projects requires several capacities: logistics; technical; construction and 
operations and maintenance which Ethiopia currently do not have. EEP can: balance 
the plant; do grid connection; transmission lines; and civil works. They cannot install 
the turbine on their own without foreign supervision” (Interview 20180120178596).  
Besides the structured skills and knowledge transfer experienced by EEP engineers, the three 
local universities which were consultants benefited in the two projects. ASTU and AAUIT 
students regularly visit wind farms to undertake practical lessons for wind farm planning and 
development. The two wind farms are now used as ‘open’ laboratories for students. At the 
same time, the university professors who were consultants in the two projects had no previous 
experience of undertaking project supervision but learnt on the job. As noted by a Chinese 
contractor:  
“The consultants supervised everything but could not really understand. A lot of 
questions, a lot of negative, maybe for the project. But EXIM Bank they don’t want to 
accept local consultant, especially the one without experience. They used students to 
be consultants. How can students supervise experienced and passionate engineers? 
You will need to have at least a Master’s degree to be able to supervise. The students 
were learning from the project and did not know how to supervise. We faced big 
problems from the consultants from MU and ASTU-JV. Government intention is good 
to save money and teach them experience. Maybe if you hire a German consultant, 
they want about 5% of the total project cost, which is very high. But if you go for a local 
consultant, it will be less than maybe 1%, which makes it very cheap” (Interview 
20170801090344).   
Another Chinese contractor also notes that:  
“The University professors had no experience of project supervision they were also 
learning. We had to explain to them we had to teach also. They gained skills and 
knowledge on how to supervise wind farms, so that is another knowledge transfer” 
(Interview 20171229144752).  
With all the necessary technical skills, knowledge and technology transfer, EEP and MOWIE 
are now able to undertake wind farm planning (including conducting of ESIAs), civil works, 
assembly of the turbines, connecting to national grid and monitoring performance, and 
undertaking operations and maintenance (as is the case in Adama 1). From the consultancy 
side, local universities involved in the two projects are now able to undertake design review 
and supervise the construction of wind farms. Finally, ESLSE, which transported the wind 
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technology equipment from China to Djibouti is now able to handle bulk and fragile cargo 
(Interview 20171027565623).  
7.2.2 Dancing with the dragon: ‘debt trap’ diplomacy? 
John Adams’ famous quote of 1826 states that “there are two ways to conquer and enslave a 
nation. One is by the sword. The other is by debt”. Is China conquering and enslaving Ethiopia 
by debt? Former US Secretary of State, Rex W. Tillerson, argues that China undertakes 
“predatory loan practices and corrupt deals that mire nations in debt and undercut their 
sovereignty, denying them their long-term, self-sustaining growth” in Africa (2018, p. 1). For 
Bolton (2018, p. 1) “China uses bribes, opaque agreements and the strategic use of debt to 
hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and demands”. The majority of African and 
Chinese deny these accusations and claim that Africans are capable of making meaningful 
choices in their borrowing practices (Xinhua, 2018)146.  
Similarly, the C-MFA officials disagree with Tillerson’s assumption claiming that the Chinese 
finance projects based on efficient market principles, including project bankability (Shiwei, 
2018; Xinhua, 2018). However, a recent statement released by China Export and Credit 
Insurance Corporation laments that some of the infrastructure projects in Africa are not 
planned well (referring to the Addis-Djibouti railway project) resulting in the corporation 
experiencing huge financial loses (Ng, 2018). As a result of the combination of debt distress 
and inefficient project planning capabilities, the Chinese are scaling back investment and 
financing of infrastructure projects in Ethiopia (Aglionby, 2018).  
In the meantime, while the C-EXIM Bank largely financed the development of the Adama wind 
farms, it is practically challenging to conclude that China is deliberately indebting Ethiopia. 
However, the cumulative effect of Chinese loans is contributing to Ethiopia’s High Debt 
Distress status. The 2017 IMF Debt Sustainability Assessment report classified Ethiopia as a 
‘High Debt Distressed’ country and the “Public and Publicly Guaranteed (PPG) debt as at end-
June 2017 amounted to 57% of GDP” (IMF, 2017, p. 13). The federal government’s domestic 
debt accounted for 23%, and the remainder is owed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at 
22.6% (IMF, 2017). Among the highly indebted state owned enterprises is EEP (MOFED, 
2014). According to the Ethiopian Prime Minister, Abiy Ahmad, EEP is in debt and is struggling 
to finish projects under construction and to pay back matured loans147. The two wind farms, 
therefore, contribute to the cumulative Chinese debt stock in Ethiopia. It is, however, important 
to mention that the Ethiopian government’s debt distress situation is largely accrued from 
                                                          
146 Some Africans believe China is indebting Africa, and at the same time, some Chinese lament that China is spending loads of 
money in Africa while there are over 100 million Chinese living below the poverty line. See Daniel, L. 2018. Debt colonialism: Is 
China trying to buyout Africa’s resources? https://www.thesouthafrican.com/news/debt-colonialism-china-africa-resources/  
147 On 18 June 2018, during the live parliamentary debates, Abiy Ahmad, the Ethiopian Prime Minister acknowledges that EEP 
is in debt.  
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concessional loans which have a higher grace period and lower interest rates as compared to 
commercial loans. 
Research estimates that Ethiopia owed $8.6 billion to the Chinese, Indian and Middle Eastern 
governments (see figure 7.4) (Jubilee Debt Campaign, 2018). Further research estimates that 
China committed $13.7 billion to Ethiopia between 2000 and 2017 (Eom, Brautigam, & 
Benabdallah, 2018). Although it is difficult to establish the exact figure given the discrepancies 
between the Jubilee Debt Campaign and CARI estimates, it is evident that China is Ethiopia’s 
largest bilateral creditor. However, there is no evidence to suggest that China is practising 
debt trap diplomacy in Ethiopia. Of all the infrastructure projects that have been financed by 
the Chinese in Ethiopia, I did not find any evidence to suggest that the Chinese are 
strategically using debt to hold Ethiopia captive of Beijing wishes and demands. Similarly, 
Brautigam (2019) argues that of the more than 1000 projects financed by the Chinese in Africa 
totalling about $143 billion, there is no evidence to conclude that China is deliberately 
indebting Africa.   
Figure 7. 4 Ethiopian government external debt as at end of June 2017 
 
Source: Jubilee Debt Campaign (2018).   
In the next section, I explore how the development of the two wind farms contributed to 
improvement of Ethiopia’s electricity production capacity.  
7.2.3 Electricity production, distribution, access and question of affordability  
According to EEP, Adama 1 was initially predicted to generate an annual electricity output of 
162.7 GWh with an equivalent full load148 of 3198 hours. However, the current annual electricity 
output was reduced to 157.4 GWh with a full load of 3087 hours (EEP, 2017b). The reductions 
are normal for such big projects because of theoretical estimates during the feasibility studies 
                                                          
148 Defined as the total number of hours a wind turbine is expected to operate at full load equal to the amount of electricity 
generated by the system.  
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and actual performance after the installation. For Adama 2, annual electricity output is 476.665 
GWh with an equivalent average full load of 3115 hours (EEP, 2017a). Adama wind farms 
contribute 4.73% of Ethiopia’s electricity generation capacity. The two wind farms account for 
62.97% of Ethiopia’s wind energy generation capacity, and according to HydroChina, the two 
wind farms provide Ethiopia with 15% of electricity during the dry season (PowerChina, 2016b) 
when hydropower operates below 50% (Chen, 2018).  
Electricity infrastructure development is vital for a country’s economic development. Electricity 
powers industrial productivity, which in turn creates employment and leads to poverty 
reduction. Recent data showing disaggregated statistics of electricity distribution, access and 
utilisation at a regional or local level are difficult to come by (see table 7.3 and figure 7.5). 
However, there has been steady growth in terms of geographic electricity access from grid 
and off-grid sources, increasing from 16% in 2006 to 55% in 2016. Regardless of the 
geographic electricity access for both grid and off-grid sources improvement, available data 
suggests less than 30% of the entire population have actual access to electricity (World Bank, 
2018d) and as of March 2017, only 6000 towns had access to electricity, and EEU had about 
2.3 million customers (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2017). In the same year, the 
country had 149 power stations, 12 800 km of high voltage transmission lines, and 160 000 
km medium and low voltage distribution lines. Regardless of the access challenges, electricity 
remains one of the cheapest commodities. The electricity tariff does not reflect the cost of 
production, but TPLF-EPRDF has a justification for this:   
“In Ethiopia, power is very cheap is $0.03 per kilowatt, is not paying because we cannot 
raise it while the population cannot afford. Secondly, we use it also as one of the 
incentives to bring foreign investors in Ethiopia” (Interview 20170512172020).  
Of interest is how the supply of cheap electricity is used as an incentive to attract foreign 
investors in Ethiopia. This suggests that the accounts I have heard from villages in Adama 
that they do not have access to electricity because it is supplied elsewhere may be correct. 
While the community members were promised that they would be the first beneficiaries 
regarding access to electricity, the transmission lines bypass the local communities and feed 
the Koka substation, which is connected to the national grid. Villages, where these wind farms 
are located, becomes zones of expropriation and dispossession. The Adama communities are 
essentially zones for electricity generation but, for use somewhere else, what McDonald 
(2009) terms electric capitalism. It is evident that access and availability of affordable electricity 
as exemplified in the Adama wind farms is not merely fixed to the technological/technical 
domain of planners, technicians and engineers, but the micro-politics of electricity control 
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(Luque-Ayala & Silver, 2016). Villagers, where these wind farms are located, have the right to 
electricity, yet are not connected. A farmer noted:  
“The expectation was that there was going to be electricity in our houses. And that is 
why many people in this village agreed to give their plot of land away regardless of the 
poor compensation. But still today, we have not yet received the electricity. We do not 
have it” (Interview 20171101123146 translated from Afaan Oromo to English).  
Electricity in Ethiopia is fed into the national grid which is redistributed across the regions, 
zones, Woreda, companies and industrial parks (Interview 20170819151844). Surprisingly, 
the majority of the community members where the wind farms are located did not even know 
where the electricity generated by Adama wind farms is sent and speculations are awash. For 
example, one farmer who is also a local government employee in one of the villages noted 
that: 
“The electricity produced from these wind farms is fed directly to the Eastern Industrial 
Zone, which is about 40 km from here. We were promised electricity and water as a 
result of developing these wind farms, but still, up to today, nothing has been fulfilled 
yet. Just promises, empty promises. The community did not demand the wind farms; 
they were simply told that the government was going to develop wind farms here. 
Although the community wanted electricity, they did not care whether it would come 
from wind energy, hydro or any other, they wanted electricity. The problem of EEP is 
administrated by the federal government. We are in the Oromia region now, and any 
resource from the Oromia region should work here. They take electricity from here and 
redistribute somewhere. That is not fair, because even here, we don’t have enough 
electricity and yet they are given it away to other places, or even exporting it. How can 
you export something that you have shortages in? (Interview 20171102111348 
translated from Afaan Oromo to English).  
These speculations do not end here. For some farmers, the electricity generated from Adama 
wind farms is being used to power the recently completed Addis-Djibouti railway which passes 
through Adama (Interview 201711150245153 translated from Afaan Oromo to English). For 
others, the electricity is used by Adama town residents (Interview 20171101123146 translated 
from Afaan Oromo to English). The official document obtained from EEP suggests that “the 
main territory of electric power consumption will be Adama city” (EEP, 2017b, p. 9). No further 
information is given to explain the distribution and utilisation of electricity generated by Adama 
wind farms.  
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Table 7. 3 Ethiopian electricity access at the household level by regional state, 2014 
Regional State Access to Electricity 
 
Percent Household 
number 
Yes No 
Oromia 5,045,932  1,383,155  22  6,429,087  
Amhara 3,635,136  953,983  21  4,589,120  
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' 
Region 
2,764,578  584,030  17  3,348,608 
Tigray  774,199 282,702 27 1,056,900 
Ethiopian Somali 389,066 46,980 11 436,046 
Afar 114,981 42,422 27 157,404 
Benishangul-Gumuz 184,814  22,993   11  207,807 
Gambela 58,519  23,438  29  81,957 
Addis Ababa (City State) 36,776  766,584  95  803,361  
Dire Dawa (City State) 30,117  80,883   73  111,001 
Harari 7,040  44,992  86  52,032 
Total 13,041,158  4,232,162  25  17,273,320 
Source: Ethiopia Living Standard Survey (2014).   
Figure 7. 5 Existing and future electricity consumption 2014  
 
Source: Data obtained from EEP (2014). Data from 2015 onwards is based on forecasts. 
 7.2.4 Adama wind farms: imagination and visualisation of development progress  
Ethiopia is the first East African country to develop wind energy which comes with modernity 
visualisations discourses. There are multiple and sometimes contradictory visualisations, 
which inevitably shape how elites and ordinary citizens imagine the future of development and 
modernity—collective fantasy of societal progress (Larkin, 2013). During data collection, 
officials from the MOWIE continuously remarked on how beautiful the wind farms are and how 
in future are going to be used as local tourism sites. This entails that, on the one hand, the 
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wind energy infrastructure is seen by economic and political elites as sentimental objects that 
circulate imaginaries of development. Such invite thoughts and invoke hope of a better future. 
As affirmed by Luque-Ayala and Silver (2016, p. 2) “even today, access to modernity is 
measured by the extent to which populations have access to electricity, a fundamental way in 
which the politics of energy is constituted”. On the other hand, those at the bottom of the 
pyramid population where dispossession occurred see these wind farms as objects of 
livelihood disruption. The development of wind farms, therefore “release different meanings 
and structure politics in various ways: through the aesthetic and the sensorial, desire and 
promise” (Larkin, 2013, p. 327). With this visualisation and imagination comes the politicisation 
aspect as infrastructure transmits and mediates representations about institutions (be they 
local or foreign) that built them and the spatiotemporal enclaves they create. The politicisation 
of infrastructure becomes a mobilisation tool to console and legitimise regimes’ stay in power 
(Corkin, 2015).  Therefore, infrastructure development is politics by other means. 
7.2.5. Learning curve: from EPC to Independent Power Producers (IPP)? 
The development of Adama wind farms contributes to Ethiopian government policy learning 
in terms of best practices for delivering renewable energy projects in the country. The majority 
of officials from the MOWIE and EEP consider that the financing and development of Adama 
wind farms using an EPC modality was a learning curve which allowed the government to 
create an avenue to evaluate the best possible mechanism through which future wind and 
solar power plants are going to be delivered. Two officials from MOWIE noted that:  
“After the experiences in Adamas, I think the government is going to push in future 
new renewables like solar and wind power on to the plates of private developers, so 
that is also a policy decision to facilitate that. We had operation management 
contractors with the EPC contractors going for some years but going forward; we are 
introducing the private sector both as operators and owners of these installations. So 
I think that experience helped the government in making decisions, eventually the 
government more or less to concentrate on hydropower. It has the internal capacity 
whereas they do not for the renewables, so they let the private sectors do that, they 
will take care of both operation maintenance and as well as investments (Interview 
20171011140053).  
“Things have changed, our policy has relatively changed 10 years back; there is no 
competition. Now there are a lot of companies, American, European companies; they 
want to have wind farms with Independent Power Producers. When you float bids, a 
lot of competition, last time 65 of them applied. Chinese now, in the olden days, they 
are not interested to do an IPP modality, now they want to have IPP, whatever the 
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government ask, whatever condition, IPP, even sometimes with birr (Interview 
20170609111018).  
The learning aspect of the two projects was limited to not only the Ethiopian side but also the 
Chinese. For example, a HydroChina employee claimed that:  
“Yes, it was our first project of this nature and we did not know some of the things, like 
the policy. We had issues on transportation from Djibouti to the project site. This is the 
first wind farm in East Africa, and also all the equipment and finance and technology 
come from China. It makes the project very unique” (Interview 20171229144752).  
Aside from the Chinese contractor getting a firm grip on the policy and project implementation 
and operation experience in Ethiopia, some of the Chinese engineers who participated in the 
projects also gained practical experience, as noted by an engineer from HydroChina that “now 
I am an engineer before I was an assistant engineer” (Interview 20171031151356).  
Although it is challenging to correlate whether the experiences from Adama and perhaps 
Ashegoda contributes to the Ethiopian government policy change in renewable energy project 
delivery, emerging evidence from elsewhere suggest that is the case. On 19 December 2017, 
“the legal provisions regarding Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and IPPs come into 
practical applicability when the first PPA was signed between Corbetti Geothermal PLC and 
EEP for the Corbetti geothermal power project” (Kifle, 2018, p. 1). Further to this, the 
amendment of EEP establishment by Council of Ministers Regulation No. 381/2016 legally 
allowed EEP “to purchase electric power on transmission lines above 66kilo volt level” (Kifle, 
2018, p. 1). This indeed created a platform for the entering into force of IPP and PPA law. To 
a reasonable extent, the Adama wind farms together with the Ashegoda experiences in 
delivering such kind of projects contributed immensely towards renewable energy policy 
transformation in Ethiopia as already shown by several regulatory provisions in the sector.  
7.3 Chapter summary  
This chapter examined the development outcomes and impacts of Ethiopian and Chinese 
financed and developed Adama wind farms. The Adama wind farms are the first Chinese 
overseas wind energy projects in Africa developed using a combination of Chinese technology 
and international standards. The primary objective of the Adama wind farms was to stabilise 
the grid by adding wind as an alternative source of electricity generation. At least, the source 
diversification objective in electricity generation by the Ethiopian government was achieved. It 
remains, however, difficult to quantitatively establish from an socio-economic perspective, the 
disaggregated effects of electricity generated from Adama since the electricity generated is 
fed directly into the national grid. Nonetheless, the local outcomes and development impacts 
of Adama wind farms are complex and are intertwined across and within various social 
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lifeworlds. They range from economic, social, technical and political impacts. Importantly, to a 
greater extent, the local outcomes and impacts of Adama wind farms are tied to the Ethiopian 
developmental state’s regulatory and governance structure, and a lesser extent to the 
conditioning effect of Chinese stakeholders. 
This chapter, therefore, answered the third research question on the development outcomes 
and impacts of the Chinese majority financed and developed Adama wind farms. Several 
aspects emerge with regards to the Ethiopian government exercise of agency when dealing 
with not only the Chinese but also with local stakeholders. First, the development of Adama 
wind energy infrastructure contributed to local economic development149 (Guta, Damte, & 
Ferede, 2015) through the creation of roads and temporary employment opportunities for the 
locals. Because of strict labour laws, all unskilled jobs were undertaken by locals while 
Chinese contractors were only allowed to bring expatriates in areas where the Ethiopian 
government did not have the local skills and capacity.  
Second, the supply of some materials and equipment for civil works in the projects allowed 
local industries to benefit. While the local content aspect could have been improved, it was 
not possible because of the absence of local companies involved in wind energy in Ethiopia. 
Furthermore, the EPC arrangement meant that most of the capital goods and other supporting 
equipment were sourced from China. This limited the development of local industrial capability 
in the sector. Third, the Ethiopian government did not allow the Chinese to be involved in land 
expropriation for project development. For that, the Ethiopian government bears the 
responsibility for all compensation and the resultant disruption of livelihoods of the affected 
communities.  
Fourth, the Ethiopian government played a pivotal role in attracting skills, knowledge and 
technology from China mainly through the use of regulatory government policies and 
stipulation and enforcement of various conditionalities during the contract negotiations. 
However, the transfer of knowledge and skills in the Adama wind farms “was not systematic 
and mostly occurred on an individual level, i.e. university professors and EEP engineers” 
(Chen, 2018, p. 7). Also, the ability of the Ethiopian government to convince C-EXIM Bank to 
accept the use of local, inexperienced university professors as project consultants shows two 
things: the negotiating capability and agential dimensions of the Ethiopian government and; 
the flexibility of the Chinese stakeholders to give in to the demands of the Ethiopian 
government.     
                                                          
149 Seen within the lenses of consumption and production (forward) linkages. Consumption linkages relates to the personal 
income generated by both Ethiopians and foreigners in the two projects and how it was productively spent domestically. The 
forward linkages relate broadly the productive uses of electricity generated by the wind farms.   
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Fifth, the Ethiopian government chose to go for a concessional instead of a commercial loan 
agreement. Concessional loans have below-market interest and grace period. This cushions 
the country’s debts status. That said, Ethiopian debts are “mainly in the form of project loans, 
largely concessional […] at below-market rates with a roughly 30% grant element from EXIM 
Bank of China” (IMF, 2017, pp. 4–5). This could be interpreted as a predetermined move by 
the Ethiopian government “to avoid further deterioration in debt sustainability” (IMF, 2017, p. 
5). This shows how smart the Ethiopian government is in dealing with the Chinese to avoid 
the so-called debt trap diplomacy.  
Appendix 7. 1 Employment statistics for Adama 1 for 01 to 31 August 2011 
Unit Management  On-site 
construction  
Installation Transportation  Supplementary  Sub-
total  
Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi 
JV PMO* -* 31 - - - - - - 21** - 52 
Equipment 
suppliers  
17 27 - - - - 15 30 - 4 93 
Civil works  37 38 435 - - - - - 84 - 594 
Electrical 
installation  
- 25 - - - 38 - - 2 - 65 
Total  54 121 435 - - 38 15 30 107 4 804 
Source: Adama 1 employment statistics Report. NB: Eth—Ethiopia and Chi—Chinese. * Joint Venture 
Project Management Office (from onwards hereby JV PMO) only for Chinese contractors. For 
Ethiopia, these are already EEP employees, so that is why they have been coded zero. **These are 
security guards.   
 
Appendix 7. 2 Employment statistics for Adama 1 for 01 to 30 September 2011 
Unit Management  Design & 
Construction 
Installation Haulage   Assistant 
work   
Sub-
total  
Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi  
JV PMO - 31 - - - - - - 21 - 52 
Civil works  37 54 506 - - - - - 84 - 681 
E&M I&T 
work*  
- 25 - - - 38 - - 3 - 66 
Suppliers 
& Designer  
17 30 - 22 - - 15 35 - - 119 
Total  54 140 506 22 - 38 15 35 108 - 918 
Source: Adama 1 employment statistics Report. *Electrical and Mechanical and Installation and 
Transmission work  
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Appendix 7. 3 Employment statistics for Adama 1 for 01 to 30 October 2011 
Unit Management  On-site 
construction 
Installation Haulage   Supplementary  Sub-
total  
Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi 
JV PMO - 31 - - - - - - 22 - 53 
Suppliers & 
Designer 
11 48 - 22 - - 105 36 3 - 225 
Civil works  43 54 552 - - - - - 84 - 733 
E&M I&T 
work  
- 37 -  - 52 - - 100 - 189 
Total  54 170 552 22 - 52 105 36 209 - 1200 
Source: Adama 1 employment statistics Report. 
 
Appendix 7. 4 Employment statistics for Adama 1 for 01 to 30 November 2011 
Unit Management  On-site 
construction 
Installation Haulage   Supplementary  Sub-
total  
Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi 
JV PMO - 31 - - - - - - 22 - 53 
Suppliers & 
Designer 
11 52 - 22 - - 105 36 3 - 229 
Civil works  40 58 447 - - - - - 84 - 629 
E&M I&T 
work  
- 50 - - 175 35 10 1 102 15 388 
Total  51 191 447 22 175 35 115 37 211 15 1299 
Source: Adama 1 employment statistics Report. 
 
Appendix 7. 5 Employment statistics for Adama 1 for 01 to 31 December 2011 
Unit Management  On-site 
construction 
Installation Haulage   Supplementary  Sub-
total  
Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi 
JV PMO - 33 - - - - - - 22 - 55 
Suppliers & 
Designer 
11 47 - 26 - - 105 36 1 - 226 
Civil works  21 37 243 - - - - - 51 - 352 
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E&M I&T 
work  
- 50 - - 225 38 10 2 35 9 369 
Total  32 167 243 26 225 38 115 38 109 9 1002 
Source: Adama 1 employment statistics Report. 
 
Appendix 7. 6 Employment statistics for Adama 1 for 01 to 31 January 2012 
Unit Management  On-site 
construction 
Installation Haulage   Supplementary  Sub-
total  
Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi 
JV PMO - 33 (7) - 23(4) - - - - 22 (8) - 55(15) 
Suppliers 
& 
Designer 
7 37(5) - - - - 105 36 4(1) - 212(10) 
Civil 
works  
23 26 200(10) - - - - - 55(4) - 304(14) 
E&M I&T 
work  
- 35(2) - - 140 33 8 1 40(7) 4 261(9) 
Total  30 131 200(10) 23(4) 140 33 113 37 121(20) 4 832(48) 
Source: Adama 1 employment statistics Report. NB: The figure in the bracket is for female workers.   
 
Appendix 7. 7 Employment statistics for Adama 1 for 01 to 29 February 2012 
Unit Management  On-site 
construction 
Installation Haulage   Supplementary  Sub-
total  
Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi 
JV PMO - 33 (7) - - - - - - 22 (8) - 55(15) 
Suppliers 
& 
Designer 
7 37(5) - 24(4) - - 105 34 8(2) - 215(11) 
Civil 
works  
23 31 200(15) - - - - - 55(4) - 309(19) 
E&M I&T 
work  
- 41(2) - - 157 32 8 1 29(7) 2 270(9) 
Total  30 142(14) 200(15) 24(4) 157 32 113 35 114(21) 2 849(54) 
Source: Adama 1 employment statistics Report. NB: The figure in the bracket is for female workers.   
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Appendix 7. 8 Employment statistics for Adama 1 for 01 to 31 March 2012 
Unit Management  On-site 
construction 
Installation Haulage   Supplementary  Sub-
total  
Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi 
JV PMO - 33 (7) - - - - - - 22 (8) - 55(15) 
Suppliers 
& 
Designer 
- 39(5) - 25(4) - - - 26 9(2) - 99(11) 
Civil 
works  
23 33 200(15) - - - - - 55(4) - 311(19) 
E&M I&T 
work  
- 50(2) - - 199 32 10 1 15(7) 1 308(9) 
Total  23 155(14) 200(15) 25(4) 199 32 10 27 101(21) 1 773(54) 
Source: Adama 1 employment statistics Report. NB: The figure in the bracket is for female workers.   
 
Appendix 7. 9 Employment statistics for Adama 1 for 1 April to 5 May 2012 
Unit Management  On-site 
construction 
Installation Haulage   Supplementary  Sub-
total  
Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi 
JV PMO - 31(6) - - - - - - 22(8) - 53(14) 
Suppliers 
& 
Designer 
- 38(5) - 25(4) - - - 26 6(2) - 95(11) 
Civil 
works  
23 30 177(15) - - - - - 51 - 281(15) 
E&M I&T 
work  
- 34 - - 173 30 12 1 18(7) 1 269(7) 
Total  23 133(11) 177(15) 25(4) 173 30 12 27 97(17) 1 698(47) 
Source: Adama 1 employment statistics Report. NB: The figure in the bracket is for female workers. 
   
Appendix 7. 10 Employment statistics for Adama 1 for 10 June to 7July 2012 
Unit Management  On-site 
construction 
Installation Haulage   Supplementary  Sub-
total  
Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi 
JV PMO - 20(2) - - - - - - 12(8) - 32(10) 
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Suppliers 
& 
Designer 
- 9 - 2 - - - - 4(2) - 15(2) 
Civil 
works  
19 10 87(15) - - - - - 37 - 153(15) 
E&M I&T 
work  
- 14 - - 114 - 3 - 11 - 142 
Total  19 53(2) 87(15) 2 114 - 3 - 64(10) - 342(27) 
Source: Adama 1 employment statistics Report. NB: The figure in the bracket is for female workers.   
 
Appendix 7. 11 Employment statistics for Adama 1 for 8 July to 5 August 2012 
Unit Management  On-site 
construction 
Installation Haulage   Supplementary  Sub-
total  
Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi Eth Chi 
JV PMO - 21(3) - - - - 6 - 45(11) - 72(14) 
Suppliers 
& 
Designer 
- 8 - 2 - - 1 - 4(2) - 15(2) 
Civil 
works  
18 5 97(15) - - - - - 44 - 164(15) 
E&M I&T 
work  
- 13 - - 8 - 2 - 9 - 32 
Total  18 47(3) 97(15) 2 8 - 9 - 102(13) - 283(31) 
Source: Adama 1 employment statistics Report. NB: The figure in the bracket is for female workers.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.0 Introduction 
This thesis has examined the role of African agency in shaping the engagement modalities 
and negotiation processes between Ethiopian and Chinese stakeholders in the financing and 
developing of Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind energy infrastructure. I have presented a holistic 
analysis of African agency, thereby challenging the dominant paradigm that presuppose the 
dominance of China in its engagement with Africans. I further critiqued the narrow 
interpretation of African agency studied purely from the perspective of brokering of relations 
with China. I have demonstrated that the exercise of African agency extends to negotiations 
and engagement modalities during the project implementation, management and operation 
stages.  
In seeking to understand African agency, the thesis has drawn on international relations and 
social theories that conceptualise agency as the ability of social-political actors to define and 
influence their choices and actions when engaging with other actors. The hybrid theoretical 
approaches mentioned in chapter one and discussed in detail in chapter two underscore the 
multiplicity of actors and related interests, values, and preferences. This is achieved using 
resources and repertoires as both material and discursive forms of power. However, as shown 
in chapter two, these actors are embedded in the environments in which they operate, and as 
such, a state-society relations approach was also used to understand how Ethiopian actors 
interact amongst themselves and with external stakeholders. An authoritarian developmental 
state approach discussed in chapter four was then used to understand how the Ethiopian state 
functioned domestically and how external actors were expected to comply with the informal 
and formal rules of the game.  
Informed by the literature gaps identified in chapter one and guided by the theoretical 
approaches discussed in chapter two, the following main research question was proposed: 
• How did the Ethiopian actors exercise agency when interacting with the Chinese in the 
case of Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind energy infrastructure financing and development?  
To systematically answer this main research question, three inter-related sub-questions were 
formulated:    
1. What were the drivers and motivations which contributed to Ethiopian and Chinese 
actors financing and developing Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind energy infrastructure in 
Ethiopia? 
2. What were the processes and modalities of engagement, and how did the Ethiopian 
government broker and negotiate with China? 
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3. What are the engagement outcomes and local development implications of the two 
wind farms, and to what extent did the host country’s socio-political and economic 
variables determined these outcomes? 
Applying a qualitative case study approach embedded in critical realism and interpretive 
epistemological paradigms, discussed in detail in chapter three, the main and sub-questions 
were all explored in the case studies of Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind energy infrastructure. 
One hundred and sixteen respondents were interviewed in this study. The participants were 
drawn from the AUC, AfDB, British Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopian federal state 
institutions (MOWIE, MOFEC, MEFCC, ESLSE, MFA, EEU, EEP, and EIC), Ethiopian regional 
state institutions (Oromia and Tigray state), Woreda level administrations (Adama and Lome), 
farmers and community members at the Kebele level (Jogo Gudedo, Bubisa Kusaye, Mele-
mele, Tede-dildima, Adama, Qachema, Mukiye, Kobolito, and Sire-robi), non-governmental 
organisations (Oxfam International—Africa-China Dialogue Platform and Forum for 
Environment), media institutions (Addis Fortune English edition, The Reporter English edition, 
and Xinhua News Agency English edition), and officials from academic institutions (AAU, 
ASTU, MU, and EFRSSI). Chinese participants were drawn from Chinese government 
institutions (MFA, Chinese Embassy in Addis Ababa, Chinese Economic and Commercial 
counsellor’s office in Addis Ababa), Chinese state, semi-state and private enterprises 
(HydroChina, CGCOC-Ethiopia and Goldwind), officials from academic institutions (University 
of St Andrews & Renmin University of China, and Zhejiang Normal University).   
Using document review and qualitative interview data, chapter four discussed and analysed 
Ethiopian socio-political and economic conditions traced from 1991, and how they laid the 
foundations for cooperation with China. The chapter provided the background context 
necessary to understanding the engagement patterns and dynamics in the context of the wind 
energy sector. Chapter five responded to the first sub-question on the drivers and motivations 
for the Ethiopian government and Chinese state and semi-state enterprises to finance and 
develop the Adama wind farms. Using data collected predominantly through interviews with 
state and non-state officials from Ethiopia and China, mentioned in chapter three, the chapter 
examined the factors which led to the Ethiopian government developing wind energy, in 
particular, the political and economic choices made by the Ethiopian government in deciding 
to award the contract to Chinese enterprises. Chapter six responded to the second sub-
research question and carefully applied a process-tracing approach (discussed in detail in 
chapter three) to establish and reconstruct the engagement modalities and negotiation 
processes along the projects’ lifecycles. In this chapter, I relied on data collected from 
qualitative interviews with officials involved in the projects and included a review of technical 
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documents. Chapter seven critically examined the engagement outcomes and local 
development implications of the two wind farms. Again, discussions here are drawn from 
qualitative interviews with officials who were involved in the projects and with local 
communities where these wind farms are located.  
This chapter concludes the thesis and is structured as follows. Section 8.1 discusses the key 
findings of this study, juxtaposed with existing literature. Section 8.2 discusses the important 
observations, while section 8.3 discusses the original contribution and broader implications of 
this research in the study of Africa-China relations. Section 8.4 reflects on the methodological 
limitations of the study. Policy recommendations are offered in section 8.5, followed by section 
8.6, which discusses the directions for future research. Section 8.7 concludes the chapter.  
8.1 Key research findings  
8.1.1 Finding 1: Drivers and motivations  
Despite volumes of research that have explored the drivers and motivations of Chinese 
engagement with African countries, the majority of studies have focused on the Chinese side 
of the argument (see Kaplinsky & Messner, 2008; Kaplinsky & Morris, 2009). While I do not 
dismiss the role of the Chinese, I argue that it is misplaced to suggest that China alone drives 
engagement with African countries. Engagement between Africa and China is a two-way 
process, where in this case, which may not be untypical, African actors play an essential role 
in forging relations with the Chinese. In this context, this study sought to understand the drivers 
and motivations of Ethiopian and Chinese actors in the financing and development of Adama 
wind farms. I contextualise the drivers and motivations of Chinese actors as a response to 
Ethiopian initiations—and not the other way around. The central reason why I formulated the 
first sub-question that way was a response to the absence of studies that empirically examine 
the drivers and motivations of Ethiopians to develop wind energy. I was also particularly 
interested in understanding why the Chinese were keenly involved in developing wind energy 
in Ethiopia; a practice not generally associated with the Chinese enterprises in Africa.  
The thesis demonstrates that there were multiple drivers and motivations for Ethiopian and 
Chinese stakeholders to finance and develop the two wind farms. For the Ethiopians, the main 
drivers were a bricolage of technological (technology maturity, costs and efficiency), global 
renewable energy policy orientation, and natural factors (availability of wind resource). These 
findings are consistent with other studies (see Asress, Simonovic, Komarov, & Stupar, 2013; 
Demirtas, 2013; Gaddada & Kodicherla, 2016; van Kooten & Timilsina, 2009). At the same 
time, wind energy was chosen instead of solar or geothermal for two main reasons: (i) the time 
taken to develop a wind farm, and (ii) the social acceptability factor, notably the land-use-
change aspect. As such, wind farms were seen to be fast-track projects realisable within a 
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short time, and with a minimum requirement for permanent land. As argued “approximately 
90% of the land is not occupied by wind power equipment” (UNCCD & IRENA, 2017, p. 15) 
and that reduces potential land use change conflicts. From the Chinese side, the study 
established that the primary driver for Chinese involvement in the financing and developing 
Adama wind farms was the need to establish and access the new wind energy market in 
Ethiopia and potentially the wider East African region. This was, however, made possible by 
the presence of a supportive (financial, informational, and political) Chinese government 
focused on the internationalisation of its enterprises. 
In seeking to understand the motivations for Ethiopians in financing and developing wind 
farms, the study discovered that the EPRDF’s obsession with the development of 
infrastructure including electricity generation facilities created the motive to develop Adama 
wind farms. As such, the study establishes that the desire to diversify electricity generation, 
moving away from over-reliance with hydropower, was the primary motivation. This resulted 
from previous painful experiences of droughts, which had catastrophic impacts on energy 
security. At the same time, the study found that the Ethiopian government was also motivated 
by the need to not only create new electricity generation plants but also to regionally distribute 
them as part of the ruling EPRDF’s political settlement. However, this regional distribution of 
electricity generation plants was also dependent on the availability of energy resources (wind). 
Also, the study found that the Ethiopian government was looking to export electricity to 
neighbouring countries to generate foreign currency. 
The electricity export motive was accompanied by geopolitical calculations by the Ethiopian 
government to influence and perhaps clandestinely control the East Africa Power Pool. Also, 
the Ethiopian government was motivated to develop the wind farms for learning and 
experimentation purposes. This is in line with Meles’ ideological orientation of understanding 
development as acquisition and accumulation of technology vital for social change and 
structural transformation (Zenawi, 2012). Exploring these motivations shed light on how the 
Ethiopian government would, in turn, broker and structure the deals when engaging with the 
Chinese. The study also interrogated the motivations for Chinese involvement in Ethiopia’s 
wind energy. Request by the Ethiopian government was the principal motivation. However, 
this ‘request’ was acceptable to the Chinese because of other complementary factors such as 
the favourable investment climate in Ethiopia, geopolitical and economic calculations by the 
Chinese enterprises and the central government. This study has therefore provided new 
empirically grounded evidence on understanding the drivers and motivations of both Ethiopian 
and Chinese actors in the financing and developing Adama wind farms.  
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The study also found that there is a scarcity of empirically grounded observations addressing 
why African governments award infrastructure development contracts to the Chinese. The few 
existing studies that interrogate decision making patterns of African governments in awarding 
infrastructure contracts to the Chinese are inconclusive (see Centre for Chinese Studies, 
2006; Gutman & Zhang, 2015). To bridge this gap, this study establishes that there were 
multiple political and commercial calculations made by the Ethiopian government in deciding 
to award the contract to the Chinese enterprises. Commercially oriented reasons as discussed 
and analysed in chapter five were, (i) financial resource availability, (ii) quick capital 
disbursement, and (iii) acceptable total project costs. These were, however, paralleled with 
political calculations namely: (i) the Chinese non-conditional approach to the host country’s 
political makeup and governance; (ii) quick project completion rates with a good track record 
of previous infrastructure projects; (iii) development finance division of labour between the 
traditional and emerging donors; and (iv) the somewhat similar political makeup and economic 
ideology (authoritarian developmental state). A finely grained analysis suggests that political 
calculations had a lesser effect on the Ethiopian government’s decision to contract the 
Chinese. This nonetheless challenges the assertion that political factors greatly influence 
Chinese infrastructure development in Africa. At the same time, the commercial motives 
narrative on its own is inadequate and ill-equipped to account for the non-technical based 
decision-making patterns.  
8.1.2 Finding 2: Engagement modalities and negotiation processes  
Engagement modalities and negotiation processes between African and Chinese actors in the 
financing and development of infrastructure have been conceived as a black box, perhaps 
because of the secrecy involved in these deals. Where research has been undertaken, the 
majority has focused on examining the ‘brokering’ of the engagement part without delving 
deeper into tracing and providing empirically grounded observations on how the negotiations 
play out (see Carmody & Kragelund, 2016; Phillips, 2018; Soulé-Kohndou, 2019). This study 
builds on this foundation by employing a process tracing methodological approach which 
tracked and analysed the engagement modalities and negotiation processes of the two wind 
farms through the projects’ life cycles. The study establishes that Ethiopians were able to 
influence their interactions with the Chinese (see table 8.1) by: (i) having embedded autonomy 
on shaping the policy space and planning of the wind farms as traced from the GTP I and II; 
(ii) brokering the engagements traced from 2006 onwards; (iii) initiating the formal 
negotiations; (iv) influencing the terms and conditions (financing and project delivery scheme) 
of the deals; (v) directing and determining allocation of land and compensation processes for 
the affected farmers; (vi) setting up joint project management offices, and use of local, 
inexperienced universities as consultants, something highly unusual in mega infrastructure 
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projects of this magnitude; (vii) influencing the labour aspects of the projects through the 
regulations; and (viii) influencing the skills, technology transfer and local linkage patterns and 
dynamics. By examining these indicators (see table 8.1), I opened two black boxes: (i) the 
terms and conditions of the deals, and (ii) the actors involved in the project’s life cycles.  
Table 8. 1 Reading Ethiopian agency  
INDICATOR  Autonomy  Influence  Ownership Responsibility  
Policy space  Proactive  Proactive  Proactive  Proactive  
Brokering the engagement  Proactive   Proactive   Proactive  Proactive  
Initiating the formal 
negotiations 
Proactive Precautionary Pro-active Proactive 
Financial agreement  Re-active  Precautionary  Re-active  Reactive  
Feasibility studies  Reactive  Precautionary  Reactive  Reactive  
ESIA studies  Reactive  Precautionary  Reactive  Reactive  
Land and compensation 
issues 
Proactive  Proactive  Proactive Proactive 
Project implementation 
and management  
Reactive  Precautionary  Precautionary  Proactive  
Skills and technology 
transfer 
Proactive  Proactive  Proactive  Proactive  
Linkages  Proactive  Proactive  Proactive  Proactive  
Labour aspects  Proactive  Proactive  Proactive  Proactive  
Outcome Proactive Proactive Proactive Reactive 
The table above shows the areas in which the Ethiopian government was able to exercise agency when 
dealing with the Chinese in the wind farms. This conclusion is carefully arrived at upon evaluation of 
engagement modalities presentation in chapters 5, 6 and 7 of the study.  
Several observations were made. First, the Ethiopian government was able to influence policy 
formulation and translation in the development of wind energy. In the GTP 1, 200 MW was 
targeted for development from wind energy and by the end of 2015, 324 MW had been 
developed, 124 MW more than initially planned. The Ethiopian government set the priorities 
for these projects, which demonstrates “ownership and degree of control” (Fraser & Whitfield, 
2008, p. 3). I consider this as a proactive element of the government in having embedded 
autonomy over policy formulation and translation. Second, it was the Ethiopian government’s 
initiative to develop the two wind farms. This explains why the Ethiopian government then 
brokered the deals with the Chinese and did not end there. Ethiopians used several institutions 
to deal with the Chinese including but not limited to EEP, MOWIE, EEA and MOFEC. These 
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institutional fixes created “enclaves” (Mohan & Lampert, 2013, p. 99) that are somehow 
accountable to the political elites (Corkin, 2015). Furthermore, three project management 
offices, one for EEP, one for consultants and one for the contractors were created to 
synchronise and create synergies for skills and technical knowledge acquisition.  
Third, the Ethiopian government was able to influence the terms and conditions of the deals, 
including the choice for using EPC plus financing arrangement. The government knew that it 
could not deliver the project under say IPP, PPP or full government funding because of 
finance, technical skills and capacity limitations. At the same time, to avoid donor commitment 
uncertainties and regulatory compliance challenges, the Ethiopian government used the same 
contractors (HydroChina and CGCOC) and the same financier (C-EXIM bank) on two projects. 
Furthermore, the consultancy contracts for the two projects were awarded to local universities 
which had no experience at all in managing such mega projects, a practice unheard-of in the 
sector. A significant observation is that the Ethiopian government owns all the projects, and in 
terms of operations and maintenance, Adama 1 is now entirely operated by EEP while Adama 
2 is still under joint operation with the contractor. Importantly, the government created a short 
operations and maintenance contract, which was separate from the EPC contract. The 
operations and maintenance period for the contractor in both cases was limited to allow local 
engineers and technicians to learn on the job, and then take over once the contractor had left. 
Fourth, local content and procurement were enforced only in circumstances where there was 
sufficient local capacity. The Ethiopian government rejected the use of Sinotrans, a Chinese 
state-owned enterprise as a sea transporter for Adama 2 wind technology equipment giving 
the job to ESLSE. This was not the case for Adama 1. By the same account, all land and 
compensation issues were handled by the Ethiopian government, saving the Chinese from 
dealing with the local communities. Fifth and finally, Ethiopian non-state actors, farmers and 
community members also demonstrated agency when dealing with their government. Due to 
delays by the government in paying the compensation for land loss, farmers demonstrated 
and even stole some of the construction equipment. Stealing was therefore used as a weapon 
of the weak (Scott, 1985). 
8.1.3 Finding 3: Engagement outcomes and local development implications 
Research on Africa-China engagement is polarised between those who see China as good 
and those who view it as bad. Good in the sense that China offers Africa favourable 
infrastructure development deals. Bad in the sense that China is perceived as not being so 
different from the Western exploitative practices which over time creates a new form of 
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dependence thereby continuously locking Africans in poverty and underdevelopment trap150. I 
have gone beyond this dichotomous view in this thesis by exploring how the host country’s 
socio-political and economic factors influence the engagement outcomes and local 
development impacts when engaging the Chinese. As such, a host country’s regulatory and 
governance structure angle was brought in as a point of departure, an approach less familiar 
in research in this area.  
The thesis has shown that the Ethiopian developmental state practices influenced the 
engagement outcomes and local development impacts of the two wind farms using regulatory, 
governance and contractual terms and conditions which ensured the government retained 
control. The government created a development-oriented national vision, the GTP, where 
targets, tactics and strategies are set, deliberated and defined by the EPRDF-led Council of 
Ministers. As such, new electricity generation plants, employment creation, technology, skills 
and technical know-how acquisition, and consumption and production linkages were the main 
outcomes of Adama wind farms. However, these outcomes had implications, including 
aspects of debt accumulation and rural community livelihood disruption as underprivileged 
poor smallholder farmers lost pieces of land. As observed elsewhere, African governments 
“particularly the executive, in many cases […] is comprised of a political elite whose reality is 
very much removed from the rest of the population. This results in […] approaches that are 
not beneficial to the more impoverished sectors of the population” (Centre for Chinese Studies, 
2007, p. 179). 
The study also found that the development of Adama wind farms contributed to local economic 
development. Local farmers and unskilled youth participated as physical labourers during the 
construction period and some as security guards even to date. Regardless of the temporality 
of these jobs, people received personal income, which undoubtedly had positive feedback in 
the rural communities. At the same time, the construction of new roads and repair of old roads 
improved transportation services. Several farmers bought Bajaj’s which are now plying the 
routes from these rural communities to Adama city and Mojo growth point.   
The study also found that some local contractors such as Teclabrahan Ambaye Construction 
were used for civil works. Also, some of the raw materials used for the construction of the two 
wind farms such as cement and steel, among others were sourced locally. Regardless of the 
rigidity of the EPC contract, where all wind energy technology and supporting equipment were 
sourced from China, the Ethiopian government managed to influence some of the contractual 
terms and conditions. These included robust negotiations which resulted in overall project cost 
                                                          
150 See Michael Klare and Daniel Volman, ‘America, China and the scramble for Africa’s oil’, Review of African Political Economy 
33, 108 (2006), pp. 297–309; Alison Ayers, ‘Beyond myths, lies and stereotypes: The political economy of a “New Scramble for 
Africa”, New Political Economy 18, 2 (2013), pp. 227–57. 
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reductions, the appointment of local universities as consultants, use of ESLSE (in the case of 
Adama 2) as a shipping company, and favourable operations and management contracts with 
the contractors. Building on this, the Ethiopian government also specifically requested 
concessional loans for the two projects. Use of concessional loans was specifically “to avoid 
further deterioration in debt sustainability” (IMF, 2017, p. 5). It also suggests two things: (i) the 
strategic exercise of agency by the Ethiopian government; and also (ii) the flexibility of the 
Chinese in giving in to some of the demands made by the Ethiopian government.  
Since the development of the two wind farms hinged on the need to acquire skills and 
accumulate new technology by the Ethiopian government, informal and formal regulatory 
channels were used to ensure that such objectives were fulfilled. This included the application 
of strict labour laws, handling of all land and compensation aspects by the government, and 
above all contractual stipulations of skills transfer to EEP staff. Although skills and knowledge 
transfer in the two projects have been celebrated at the top management level of both the 
Ethiopian government and the contractor, low to middle-level EEP engineers were not satisfied 
with how the transfer was conducted. Some argue that the transfer of skills and knowledge 
was not systematic, and was fraught with language-related challenges, as most of the training 
on the job was delivered through translation (Interview 20170714094901). Some, however, 
argue that Ethiopia is now in a better position in terms of designing and delivering wind farms 
as compared to pre-2015 (Interview 20171011140053). Nonetheless, the accounts converge 
on the inadequacy of the skills and knowledge transfer.  
8.2 Important observations about the exercising of Ethiopian agency 
There are four important observations. The first observation is that for Ethiopians, history 
matters substantially when engaging with foreign powers. The defeat of the Italians at Adowa 
in 1896 is an important cultural-historical reference point for foreign resistance to deals that 
impinge on national sovereignty. In this history also lies the long period of modern political 
organisation and state formation. As suggested by one of the interviewees, Ethiopia avoided 
the post-colonial state formation crisis experienced by most newly independent African states. 
Of course, it had its internal conflicts and contradictions, but that did not erode the political 
organisation, institutional memory and bureaucratic machinery of state institutions. Therefore, 
the exercise of agency by Ethiopians when engaging external powers can best be understood 
in its rich history and continuity in political organisation and state formation.  
The second observation is that the system of governance, socio-economic and political make-
up matters for the exercise of African agency. Ethiopia’s authoritarian developmental state 
system allows government institutions and political elites to exercise political and bureaucratic 
agency. This top-down developmental state created a national vision which had political buy-
in from the TPLF-EPRDF. All energies were thus channelled towards the achievement of the 
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set objectives. Although this approach often faced criticisms both internationally and 
domestically, the government maintained its position. Economic development was therefore 
seen as a precursor to democracy. That said, the continued stay in power and “absence of 
powerful elite factions outside the ruling coalition has provided EPRDF with the stability 
required to adopt a long time horizon and space for a developmental vision to emerge” 
(Lavers, 2016, p. 23). This has the following implications: (i) development policy and vision 
lock-in, and (ii) bureaucratic machinery and institutional practice continuity. This also helps to 
explain how the Ethiopian government successfully maintained a wind energy development 
target, traced from 2004 onwards. Therefore, the governance and political make-up of the 
Ethiopian government had implications on mediating the structure, terms, conditions and 
project implementation patterns and dynamics.    
The third observation pertains to the location of Ethiopia, which matters for geopolitical and 
geo-economic calculations by foreign powers. The Chinese have invested a lot of money in 
Ethiopia, a natural resource-poor country, which contradicts the assertion that China invests 
only in natural resource-rich countries. Explanations for this could be found in Ethiopia’s 
political and diplomatic role in Africa. It is close to Djibouti, and not very far from the Indian 
Ocean, a significant trade route for the Chinese merchants. It is a regional powerhouse and 
has remained politically stable in a volatile region. As a result, foreign powers such as USA, 
China, Russia and EU have been keen to establish relations with Ethiopia for geopolitical and 
geo-economic reasons. Therefore, carrots and sticks are used to win the support of the 
Ethiopians. For that, Ethiopia has often been used as a launch-pad, or experimental ground 
for Chinese engagements in Africa. Notable examples of projects include: (i) Adama wind 
farms; (ii) Addis Ababa Light Rail; (iii) Addis Ababa ring-road; (iv) Tekeze hydroelectric project; 
(v) AUC conference centre; (vi) Addis-Djibouti railway; and (vii) Gibe IV hydroelectric project.     
Fourth and finally, considering the three observations mentioned above, Ethiopian actors 
define and influence their interactions with the Chinese explicitly based on their knowledge of 
what the Chinese are able to deliver. As noted by the Deputy Director General for the 
Department of African Affairs in the C-MFA that Ethiopia “fully understands what we (Chinese) 
intend to do” (Interview 20170621175736). By the same account, Ethiopia’s development and 
political governance trajectories are quite similar to the Chinese, where political and civil 
liberties are restrained while promoting state-led economic development. Ethiopia has 
devoted much of its budget to infrastructure development as is the case with the Chinese. As 
confirmed by Arkebe Oqubay:  
“Ethiopia gives long term preferences to infrastructure investment. We spent close to 
60% of our federal budget only to infrastructure. There is no country like China that 
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can tell us that infrastructure is so important in terms of long-term development” 
(Presentation 20170621111431).  
While Ethiopia maintains and receives economic, social and political assistance from Western 
countries and development agencies, Chinese assistance, especially in ‘hard’ infrastructure 
financing and development, remains dominant. Although this complementarity exists, 
Ethiopians and other Africans prefer Chinese financing terms and conditions to the West’s 
conditioned assistance. This should not imply that the Chinese do not condition their 
assistance, which they do, but without prescribing governance and political conditions. As 
remarked by one official from MOWIE, the Chinese offer “political unconditional investments” 
(Interview 20170531143837). Therefore, “Chinese financing approach is preferred by Ethiopia 
because of non-conditionality which provides a unique opportunity for the majority of African 
countries” (Interview 20170829104223). 
8.3 Contributions of the study  
This study makes three interrelated contributions in the study of Africa-China relations and 
also on the role of African politics in shaping international development patterns and dynamics. 
Firstly, research on Africa-China engagement focusing on the engagement modalities, 
negotiations and decision-making processes on infrastructure financing and development is 
scarce. Those studies that exist do not offer detailed explanations of what drives and motivates 
the development of such mega-infrastructure projects, how the deals are structured, who is 
involved and with what implications. This thesis contributes new data on Ethiopian and 
Chinese engagement in wind energy development, a new sector of cooperation. I have 
explicitly presented in chapters five, six and seven, the drivers and motivations for developing 
the two wind farms, the facts and figures in terms of costs and financing information, 
contracting agreements, implementation, management, operations and outcomes of the two 
wind farms. By making these data available for further studies, I have ‘opened’ the black boxes 
that characterise, in most cases, the infrastructure deals involving African and Chinese 
stakeholders. This promotes transparency and accountability as data will be available, 
including to African political actors, to make informed policy choices.  
Secondly, this study contributes new evidence on the theory of African agency in Africa-China 
studies as presented in chapters four, five, six and seven. Despite a burgeoning literature that 
applies the theoretical framework of African agency in Africa-China relations (see Procopio, 
2019; Soule-Kohndou, 2019; Phillips, 2018; Lampert & Mohan, 2015; Corkin, 2015), very few 
studies so far exist in the context of Ethiopia-China engagements (Gadzala, 2013; Alemu & 
Scoones, 2013). Besides, such a theoretical framework has not been applied in the case of 
Ethiopia-China engagement in the case of wind energy infrastructure. Existing studies do not 
offer a holistic account of how domestic socio-political and economic variables influence how 
223 
 
Ethiopians broker, negotiate, implement, manage, operate and mediate the outcomes and 
impacts of the mega-infrastructure projects. Throughout the thesis, I have shown that the 
TPLF-EPRDF authoritarian developmental state model’s obsession with infrastructure 
development and economic progress has consistently been used as a yardstick to measure 
‘development’ explicitly aimed at maintaining political relevance and existential legitimacy. 
Therefore, contrary to some accounts that present China as more dominant, this study has 
provided new evidence to the contrary.   
Thirdly and finally, this study contributes to the methodological and conceptual model to 
empirically study the exercise of African agency in Africa-China engagements. Using a 
process tracing approach discussed in chapter three and applied in chapter five, six and 
seven, I have empirically reconstructed the engagement modalities and negotiation processes 
between Ethiopian and the Chinese along the projects’ life cycles. As presented in table 8.1, 
I empirically identified and defined the following parameters: autonomy, influence, ownership 
and responsibility. By autonomy, I examined the independence of Ethiopian actors when 
engaging with the Chinese. In terms of influence, I assessed the role and level of Ethiopian 
actors in directing the mode and nature of engagement and shaping intervention pathways. In 
the context of ownership, I questioned custodianship, right of possession of intervention and 
proprietorship of the wind farms. In terms of responsibility I examined the degree of control of 
proposed intervention pathways. To understand these parameters, three degrees of 
assessment were thus formulated: reactive, precautionary and proactive (see table 8.2). I 
define reactive agency in its broadest sense in which I underscore how Ethiopian actors were 
seen to undertake actions and choices in decision making based on scenarios already created 
by the Chinese. This could be understood as a response strategy. The second degree of 
measurement of Ethiopian agency is precautionary, conceived as how Ethiopian actors 
engaged the Chinese in ways seen not to ‘offend’ their ‘friends’, the Chinese. This implied the 
Ethiopians engaged with the Chinese strategically to prevent deadlocks. The last degree of 
measurement of the Ethiopian agency is proactive, which I conceptualise as the Ethiopian 
actors ‘taking charge’ or ‘control’ of the engagements with the Chinese. This is a direct 
opposite of reactive agency mentioned above.  
I have thus offered new insights and contributed to the empirical and theoretical debates on 
African agency in Africa-China engagements. I also further contribute to decolonising 
international relations and international development studies through a novel approach of 
researching a bottom-up angle beyond the dominant top-down or Global North-South 
approaches. 
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Table 8. 2 Relationality of agency in Ethiopia-China engagements in Adama wind 
farms 
Proactive Precautionary Reactive 
 
Towards more exertion of 
agency.  
Middle ground. More or less 
moderate expression of 
agency.   
Towards less expression of 
agency.  
 
8.4 Reflections on the methodological limitations of the research 
This thesis was premised on the need to understand Ethiopian actors’ exercise of agency 
when engaging with the Chinese in the financing and development of Adama wind farms. It 
was found that the Ethiopian actors were able to exercise agency when interacting with the 
Chinese. The exercise of different parameters of agency (see table 8.1 and 8.2) by Ethiopian 
actors are relational and highly dependent on the context in which the interactions occurred. 
Bearing this in mind, I now reflect on the limitations of the study and offer some suggestions 
for future directions of research on African agency in the context of Africa-China relations. The 
first limitation is on the use of one country case study and two similar sector-specific case 
studies—Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind farms. This may have implications on the breadth and 
representativeness of the findings. However, by narrowing my scope of focus to one country 
and two wind farms, I was able to provide a rich and detailed explanation of drivers and 
motivations, engagement modalities, negotiation processes and engagement outcomes and 
their development implications. The one country and sector-specific case studies used here 
were not intended for drawing comparisons, but to provide robust empirical evidence to 
support my argument presented throughout the thesis. Therefore, the findings of this study 
may not necessarily be generalizable, but the empirical-theoretical model (see table 8.1 and 
8.2) developed in this study can be applied in different countries and other case studies.  
Second, only Africa based151 (Ethiopia and South Africa) Chinese government institutions, 
state, semi-state and private owned enterprises were interviewed in this study. This was 
because contacting officials from C-EXIM Bank and SANY Group based in China proved to 
be impossible within the timescale of the project, in spite of repeated attempts. Nevertheless, 
there was a possibility as already warned by Brautigam that Chinese actors based in China 
have no information or little experience of the projects in Africa (The China Africa Project, 
2013). As such, I relied on local (Africa-based Chinese) accounts. The absence of the two 
identified stakeholders’ perspectives in this study does not, however, undermine the findings 
                                                          
151 Except for few Chinese delegates I interviewed on the side-lines of Africa-China Think Tank Forum in Addis Ababa, 2017.   
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of this study as much of the data was gathered from Chinese actors in Ethiopia, namely 
HydroChina and CGCOC, EEP project management teams, MOWIE, the consultant’s offices 
and Goldwind. The information gathered from these different sources were furthermore 
corroborated by triangulation between them, adding confidence in the validity and reliability of 
the findings.    
8.5 Policy recommendations for the Ethiopian government  
This study recommends five policy interventions to the Ethiopian government. First, there is a 
need for improving inter-institutional horizontal and vertical coordination within and across 
federal state (MOWIE, MOFEC, MFA, MEFCC, EEP, EEU, EEA, EIC), regional state and local 
Woreda administrative institutions so as to improve and increase efficiency to fully maximise 
the agency of the Ethiopian government. Second, there is a need to create space for civil 
society organisations and general members of the public to hold the government accountable 
on the public consultation, compensation, and implementation aspects of the deals.   
 
Third, although universities were involved as consultants, there was no official government 
policy that legally stipulated the role of local universities in terms of skills and technical 
knowledge transfer when dealing with Chinese enterprises. This also applied to EEP 
engineers. While the contracts stated the expected skills and level of training, this was not 
systematic, and there were no follow-up mechanisms to monitor the effectiveness of the skills 
transferred. Furthermore, there is a need to improve human resource capacity to have full, 
meaningful skills and knowledge transfer. EEP officials are not adequately remunerated such 
that the skills they gain from these projects are not actually of benefit to the government as 
the majority will shift to the private sector. Fourth, the Ethiopian government should design 
new or improve the existing monitoring and evaluation models to assess the performance 
indicators of Chinese enterprises after the completion of the projects. Finally, the Ethiopian 
government must design a local content policy to regulate systematically the expected 
percentage of project input from local resources.  
8.6 Directions for future research    
First, this research has established how the Ethiopian government exercised agency when 
engaging the Chinese in Adama wind farms. Future directions of research can benefit from 
the empirical-theoretical model developed in this study to examine comparatively Ethiopian 
agential dimensions on renewable energy infrastructure projects financed and developed on 
the one hand, by the Chinese and on the other hand, by the Western development agencies. 
Second, the study has established that the exercise of agency by Ethiopian actors is relational 
and contextual. It will be worthwhile to explore the Ethiopian agential dimension when 
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engaging with the Chinese in different sectors: health, education, transport and energy, aimed 
specifically at measuring how contextual differences impact on these parameters of agency.      
Third and finally, another potential direction for future research on African agency in the 
context of Africa-China relations may be a comparative exploration of countries with different 
systems of governance, location, natural resources endowment and economic development 
indicators.  
8.7 Concluding remarks 
In this thesis, I have examined the exercise of agency by Ethiopian actors when engaging the 
Chinese using Adama 1 and Adama 2 wind energy infrastructure as case studies. I have 
analysed: (i) the drivers and motivations for Ethiopians and Chinese to finance and develop 
the two wind farms; the engagement modalities and negotiation processes experienced in the 
two wind farms; and the engagement outcomes and local development impacts of the two 
wind farms. By exploring the exercise of agency by Ethiopian actors in these three interrelated 
sub-questions, this thesis contributes to new and emerging literature focused on African 
agency in Africa-China studies. Overall, the Ethiopian government was able to influence the 
engagement patterns and outcomes in the two wind farms. This finding is important and 
challenges the dominant paradigm that the Africans have little or no influence on major 
infrastructure engagements with the Chinese.  
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Interview 20170620113822 with an engineer from Addis Ababa University Institute of 
Technology who was a consultant for Adama 1 wind farm 
Interview 20171101130419 with 5 farmers near Adama 1 and Adama 2 plant sites translated 
from Afaan Oromo to English 
Interview 20171101100610 with Qachema Kebele Chairman translated from Afaan Oromo to 
English 
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Interview 20171101112931 with a farmer and a small business owner in Qachema translated 
from Afaan Oromo to English 
Interview 20171101123146 with a farmer in Qachema Kebele translated from Afaan Oromo 
to English 
Interview 20171102115957 with a youth in Adama Kebele translated from Afaan Oromo to 
English 
Interview 20171117055623 with Adama Woreda Administration—former Chairman for Adama 
Woreda during the implementation of Adama wind farms 
Interview 20171117055562 with Oromia regional government official, Adama City Land 
Management and Development Agency 
Interview 201711150212123 with Adama 2 plant manager from Ethiopia Electric Power  
Interview 20171102124808 with a farmer in Adama Woreda translated from Afaan Oromo to 
English 
Interview 201711150245153 with a was resettled farmer in Adama 2 translated from Afaan 
Oromo to English 
Interviews 20178025141733 with the Executive Director of the Forum for Environment Non-
Governmental Organisation in Ethiopia  
Interview 20171031151356 with construction and foundation engineer for Adama 1 and 
Adama 2 working for HydroChina 
Presentation 20192105 given Chinese Export and Import Bank official at the Oxford University 
China Africa Conference at Oxford University on 21 May 2019  
Presentation 20170621111431 given by Dr Arkebe Oqubay at the China-Africa High Level 
Forum in Ethiopia 21 June 2017 
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